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PREFACE
This final report summarizes two years of research on
analyzing procedures for the establishment of standards. The
research was sponsored by the Volkswagenwerk Foundation and
jointly carried out at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis at Laxenburg and the Kernforschungszentrum
Karlsruhe. The final report is meant to be both a problem-
oriented review of related work in the area of environmental
standard setting and an executive summary of the main research
done during the contract period. The following eleven technical
papers (Volume II of the Final Report) are reference reports
written to accompany Volume I. They describe the studies and
findings performed under the contract in more detail, and they
have been either published as IIASA Research Memoranda or as
outside publications, or were especially written for this
report. These technical reports are structured in four parts:
policy analyses of standard setting procedures;
decision and game theoretic models for standard
setting;
applications of decision game theoretic models to
specific standard setting problems;
biological basis for standard setting.
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I.
POLICY ANALYSES AND STANDARD SETTING PROBLEMS
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETTING: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS·
Giandomenico Majone
Technical Report No. 1 written for the Volkswagenwerk Foundation
Project, "Procedures for the Establishment of Standards"
•Presented at the Workshop on Environ~ental Standard Setting at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria, May 1978.
Environmental Standard-Setting: Efficiency, Equity,
and Procedural Problems
Giandomenico Hajone
Russell Sage Foundation
Even more than executive agencies, regulatory bodies today find themselves
in the eye of a storm of criticism and distrust. Two main approaches have
emerged as possible solutions of what many people see as a general failure of
governmental regulation. The first alternative, strongly advocated by
economists, is deregulation. The second alternative, favored especially by
the courts, relies on institutional and procedural innovations designed to
permit all affected interests access to the process of regulatory agency
1
decisions, and to improve the quality of agency deliberations ..
The capture of the regulatory commissions by the very interests they are
supposed to control, and the ultimate futility of economic regulation, have
been repeatedly discussed, and to some extent documented. These facts have
been interpreted as providing additional confirmation of the virtues of the
market, and of the need to reduce governmental intervention. This critical
literature has its counterpart in many analyses of the environmental problems,
where the administrative approach to pollution control (prohibitions, standards,
incentives, and so on) has been severely criticized for its lack of
effectiveness, and for its tendency to become "a political process entailing2 -
bargaining between parties of unequal power." Effluent charges and related
market-oriented techniques have been proposed as alternative approaches that, by
their automat~sm and in conjunction with the integrated management of river
basins and airsheds, "would reduce the scope for administrative discretion and·
3
bargaining." But these normative conclusions overlook one important point:
the same forces that influence and distort the regulatory framework, will also
2.
affect other approaches, by the same or by different methods. The comparison
between, say, an uncorrupted system of effluent charges, and a regulatory
machinery captured by special interests, is a specious one. Where effluent
charges have been used, for instance, i~ France, they have proved to be as
subject to bargaining and as conditioned by considerations of political and
administrative expediency, as standards, licenses, and other regulatory measures.
Thus, the search for a system that "would resolve most of the political
conflict over the environment in a highly visible way," is bound to lead to
disappointments and, in the final analysis, to doubts lias to the ability of a
4
pluralist political system to make wise choices in issues of this sort. 1I
What are wise environmental choices? Traditionally, efficiency and equity
have been used as the main evaluative criteria, but the intense controversies
surrounding many regulatory decisions suggests that legitimacy -- the generalized
disposition to accept, within limits, decisions independently of their
substantive contents -- i.s equally important. It follows that it is not
sufficient to examine the substance of a proposed policy in terms of economic
and distributional impacts; the procedures by which decisions are reached must
also be carefully considered, for in the absence of generally accepted criteria
of "truth" or "rightnes~, II legitimacy depends on procedures. Present concern with
questions Of legitimacy in the environmental field is revealed by the fact that
regulatory agencies in the United States, Germany, and other countries, have
come under increasing pressures from the courts to formalize their decisionmaking
process by such procedural requirements as hearings with sworn testimony and rights
of cross-examination~ Such developments are 50und to have far-reaching
consequences for policymaking as well as for policy analysis.
This paper reviews the current state of the debate on the relative merits
of the market and administrative approaches to pollution control, and analyzes some
recently proposed institutional mechanisms to improve the quality of
3.
Market Approaches
Under this heading { shall con~ider effluent charges, pollution rights,
and a number of proposals to internalize environmental externalities through
utilization of the existing lesal system, or a better definition and enforcement
of property rights.
Consider the case Qf a chemical factory producing product P and
discharging its wastes into a nearby river, or polluting the air with its fumes.
These discharges reduce the quality of the environment and its suitability for
a number' of alternative uses. Since water and air are common property, their
services (in this case the service of carrying off wastes) are not sold. The
cost~ in terms of reducing environmental quality is thus overlooked by the
price system, and failure to account for such costs leads to an oversupply of P
and an undersupply of the benefits which are reduced by pollution. This is the
efficiency problem. If the damage cost of pollution were internalized, resource
u~e would become more efficient: the price of P would be higher, less P would be
produced, pollution would be abated,
TO consider the simplest case, suppose that both the level of discharge
and the cost of damage are monotonically increasing functions of the level of
output P; and that, in the short run at least, nothing can be done to reduce the
damage done per unit of output of P. The situation depicted in Figure 1 results.
4.
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Here AS is the firm's supply schedule (under competition), DE the marginal
damage cost (e.g., the loss of water quality valued in dollars per additional
unit of P), and ASt , the sum of the costs of production and the environmental
costs. If DO is the demand schedule, a quantity OQ of P would be produced
in the absence of government intervention. On the other hand, efficient output
(taking into consideration also the environmental costs) should equal OQ'.
To achieve such an efficient output without direct regulation, it is in
principle sufficient to impose a tax or charge equal to AB. Assuming
compliance, output is reduced from OQ to OQ', and pollution damage is reduced
by the amount of Q'FEQ.
This simple case is sufficient to bring out the basic logic of the
pollution (or effluent) charges approach. The more realistic case, in which
technologies are no longer assumed to be fixed, and the pollution level can
be reduced by changing the methods of production, presents no major analytic
difficulties; at least as long as marginal damage costs and marginal abatement
costs are ~upposed to be known. The public authorities simply set a charge or
price equal to the marginal damage for each unit of waste. Polluters would
then decrease their waste flmo,Js as long as the marginal cost of doing so was. less
5.
than the price for discharging, settling at the optimum where marginal
treatment costs equal the charge.
But even at this level of abstraction, one practical complication
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arises. Namely, as pointed out by Baumol and Oates, the optimal charge
level is not equal to the marginal net damage caused initially by the
pollution-generating activity, but rather to the damage it would cause if the
level of the activity had been adjusted to its optimal level. Thus, if a
factory currently causes 50 cents of damage for each additional unit of output,
but suitable changes in the technology could cut the damage to 20 cents,
the optimal charge should be set at 20 cents per unit of output. A unit charge
of 50 cents would lead to an inefficient situation, where pollution is
reduced beyond the range over which the marginal benefit of decreasing the
externality exceeds its marginal cost. Thus, while it is difficult enough to
estimate the environmental damage currently produced, a rigorous application
of the charges approach actually requires that we estimate the damage that
would result in an hypothetical world where technology, production methods and
instituti~ns have been optimally adapted to prevalent environmental conditions.
Under an alternative market approach, the public authority does not attempt
to tax polluters at a predetermined rate. Instead, after setting a limit on
the allowable discharge in the region, the authority auctions off pollution
6
rights" to polluters willing to bid the highest price for them. Under static
conditions, the outcome prevailing under a system of pollution rights can be
made identical to the one prevailing under the charge system. Consider, by way
of illustration, a situation with only two polluters, X and Y, each discharging
the equivalent of 100,000 pounds of FSUQD a day (First Stage Ultimate Oxygen
Demand is a way of describing biochemical oxygen demand in" terms of carbonaceous
oxygen demand). Suppose that the environmental agency wishes to reduce the
discharge from 200,000 pounds to 80,000 pounds per day, and that the daily total
6.
cost of treating q hundred pounds of waste is, say, $.125 q2 for X and $.025 q2
7
for Y. A charge of 50 cents a pound would produce the desired elimination
of 120,000 pounds of waste per day, since Xwould find it convenient to
treat 20,000 pounds, and Y, 100,000 pounds (the total cost function for X
is $.125 q2, his marginal cost is therefore $.250 q. Thus, the marginal
cost equals the charge when q : 50/ = 200; an analogous calculation gives
.25
the corresponding result for Y). In fact, as will be shown later, this
pattern of waste reduction achieves the agency's quality goal of 80,OQO pounds
of FSUOD per day at minimum cost.
But the same result can be obtained also by means of the pollution rights
scheme. If the agency issues 80,000 pollution rights, Xwill outbid Y for
all of them, just as he finds it more profitable to pay the 50-cent tax on 80,000
pounds of his waste than to engage in costlier treatment.
More generally, if the number of pollution rights issued is less than
the number of pounds of waste discharge (expressed in some equivalent measure),
the rights will command a positive price and a continuous market will develop
in response to the competition among buyers and sellers. This market will
generate an equilibrium price at the point where the capitalized value of the
marginal cost of treating an extra pound of waste just equals the price of
the right. This means that the marginal costs of waste treatment will be the
same for all dischargers in the same region, thus assuring that the agency's
environmental quality objective will be satisfied at minimal total cost.
Although the two market approaches bring about the same result, in the
simplified situation considered here the use of pollution rights presents
several advantages over the charges system, especially when the pollution
8
problem is viewed dynamically.
7.
It is now generally recognized that the main difficulty in internalizing
the costs of environmental pollution is the ambiguous specification of
exchangeable property rights in media like water and air; the creation of a market
in pollution rights can be seen as an attempt to remove some of the
ambiguity. Other schemes aimed at internalizing environmental externalities
through utilization of the existing legal system, or a better definition
and enforcement of property rights, have also been proposed. In fact, whenever
the cost of reducing the damage inflicted by a pollution-creating activity
(by decreasing the §ta1e or changing the technology of the operation) is less
than the benefits created by the abatement, there arises the possibility of a
contractual solution. The pollutees can afford to pay the polluter enough to
cover the abatement costs, and in such a way that the transaction is
advantageous for all parties concerned.
It should be noticed that such a system of contractual payments (or
i'bribes,1I as they are often called) could·in principle achieve the same result
as a scheme of optimal effluent charges. The lIin principle" character of this
statement must be stressed, however. Unless the number of parties is quite small,
.,
the familiar free-rider phenomenon will appear. Since it is technically
difficult to exclude anyone from the benefits of the pollution-abatement
measures, the i,ncenti.ves to contr'i bute to the necessary payments are
correspondingly reduced. This will make the contractual solution infeasible
without some assistance from the state to overcome the free-rider problem. Nor
is this the only difficulty. How can one rule out the possibility that the
centractual solution may degenerate into a form of blackmail, with one party
creating pollution for the purpose of extorting payments from others? The
answer is that polluters and pollutees are assumed to act within a legal
9
frame\'lOrk that determines their respective bargail'lfng position. For instance,
8.
the existence of a right of a private individual to seek an injunction
or to sue for the damage created by a pollution-generating activity will
strengthen his bargaining position. But in a situation where one polluter
-.
inflicts relatively light damages on a large number of people, the bargaining
advantage created by the right is more apparent than real, if nuisance actions
are possible only on a case-by-case basis; for the costs of court action
would probably exceed the expected bene~its. Hence we can expect that a good
deal of effort will be devoted to make class actions possible, or perhaps to
introduce regulations forbidding certain types of activity (e.g., smoke ordinances).
Optimality of Pollution Charges·
The existence of pollution poses an efficiency problem for the economy
at large: failure to account for external costs leads to an oversupply of the
pollution-producing good, and a corresponding undersupply of the benefits
(e.g., good water and clear air) which are reduced by pollution. If the
damage cost of pollution were internalized, resource use wquld become more
efficient. As we have seen, efficiency can be restored, in theory, by
imposition of a suitable charge.
In Figure 2, MD is the marginal damage cost curve and MA the marginal
abatement cost curve. The efficient level of discharge is OE, corresponding
to the point of intersection of the two curves. In order to induce a polluter
to carry the abatement level to the point where discharge is reduced to DE,
it is sufficient to impose a charge equal to OK per unit of discharge since now
the marginal abatement cost over the range EA is less than the charge (OA
represents the level of pollution in the absence of control measures).
9.
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In the partial equilibrium context usually considered in problems of
this kind, the determination of an optimal charge presents few theoretical
difficulties. The practical problems, however, are staggering. A
complication has already been mentioned in the preceding section: the
optimal charge level is not equal to the initial marginal net damage, but
rather to the damage that would result if the pollution-generating activity
had been adjusted to its optimal level. Even more serious difficulties
arise from the fact that neither abatement costs nor damage costs are known
with sufficient precision. Abatement costs vary greatly among firms,
municipalities, and households, and the sheer number of polluters makes
reliable estimates all but impossible to obtain. The situation is, if
~nything, even more hopeless in the case of damage functions, where we must
reckon with the practical impossibility of quantifying some of the basic values
affected by pollution. However, ecological damage varies not only with the
type and level of activity, but also with the location of the polluting unit.
Since the direct route to an optimal system of pollution charges is beset by
too many obstacles, an alternative second-best approach seems more promising.
It consists in assuming a given set of ambient standards (i.e., the standards
are taken to be determined exogenously through the political process), while
the price system is put to use in the realization of the envi'ronmental constraints
10.
which "society" imposes on its activity. Specifically, the charges (prices)
are to be selected so as to achieve given acceptability standards at minimum
cost rather than attempting to base them on the unknown value of marginal
net damages.
In the case of water pollution, for example, this amounts to taxing all
installations discharging waste into a river at a rate t(f) cents per gallon,
where the tax rate t would depend on the FSUOD value of the effluent, accordfng
to some fixed schedule. Mistakes in setting the charges would now be easily
detected from the deterioration of the quality standards (if the charges are
set too low), and corrective action taken (even this is not as easy as it
sounds, since e~pectations have been based on the previous set of charges;
but there is no doubt that the difficulties here are orders of magnitude smaller
than those facing a pure system of pollution charges). This charges-and-
standards approach enjoys a significant optimality property: it minimizes the social
cost of achieving the desired reduction in the total emission of pollutants.
An intuitive proof of this proposition is easily given. Suppose it is decided
that the S02 content of the atmosphere in a certain region should be reduced
by 50~. The environmental agency places a unit charge on smoke emissions,
raising the level of the tax until S02 emissions are in fact reduced by 50%.
In response to these charges, polluting firms (which are here assumed to be cost-
minimizers, though not necessarily profit maximizers) will cut back their
smoke emissions until, the marginal cost of further reductions is equal to the
charge. Since the charge is the same for all installations in the area, marginal
costs of reducing smoke output will be equalized across all activities. But
this implies that it is impossible to reduce the aggregate (social) cost of
achieving the specified quality standard by rearranging smoke-reduction· quota'S:
~
any alteration in this pattern of smoke emissions would involve an increase in
11.
smoke output by one firm, the value of which to the firm would be less than
the cost of the corresponding reduction in smoke emissions by some other
10
firm. For a formal proof, see Baumol and Oates.
Efficiency vs. Equity
To make the ever-present conflict between efficiency and equity
considerations as clear as possible, it seems advisable to start with a simple
numerical example. Let us go back to the case already considered of two
polluters, Xand Y, each discharging into a river raw sewage equivalent to,
say, 100,000 pounds of FSUOD a day~ The environmental agency wishes to reduce
the di,s,charge from 200,000 to 80,000 pounds/day. To achieve this goal, a
number of methods can be used,ranging from pollution charges or the issuance
of pollution rights, to a variety of cut back patterns imposed by direct orders.
Thus, X could be required to eliminate all of its waste, while Y would
eliminate only 20,000 pounds, or conversely. In practice, elementary
considerations of equity seem to dictate that if a regulatory approach is used,
each polluter should treat waste to the same extent; in the example, X and Y
would be required to eliminate 60,000 pounds of waste each.
But polluters di:ffer with respect to their treatment costs. Let us say' that
, '
the daily total cost of treating q hundred pounds of waste is, as before, $. 125q2
for X, but only $.025 q2 for Y, so that marginal cost of treatment rises five
t~mes faster for X than for Y. Taking differential costs into consideration,
the simple notion of equity used in arriving at the equal allocation of
pollution abatement effort to the two polluters (50%) reveals its limitations.
For the costs of "equal" effort are (.125) (600)2 = $45,000 for X and (.025) (600)2
$9,000 forY.
Requiring equal financial effort would perhaps be a more equitable way of
proceeding. Before discussing this possibility, let us derive the least-cost
(efficient) solution to the agency's pollution control problem. The total cost
function is given by
C = 1/2 \(.2S(aq)2 + .05 L-(l - a) gJ2~
'-
where 0 < a < 1 is the proportion treated by X, and q is the tota'l load
.... "
treated in hundreds of pounds.
12.
Since ~~ = .25 a
minimizing value is a
2q2 _ .05 (l - I') q
-= .05 = 1
. 30 "6 •
The environmental standard prescribes the value q=1200. Therefore,
in a least cost solution X should eliminate 20,000 pounds of waste at a cost of
$ .125 (200)2 = $5000, while Y is required to eliminate all his waste at a
cost of $ .025 {1000)2 = $25,000. Any other allocation would increase total
costs, since it involves requiring X to treat a pound of waste when Y could do
so at less co~t.
But equity demands that two individuals who have jointly caused a harm in
equal measure should make an equal effort to eliminate the harm. Of course, as
all~eady mentioned, the meaning of "equal effort" is ambiguous: it may be
interpreted as meaning that each polluter should treat the same percentage of his
\1aste or, alternatively, that each should make the same financial sacrifice.
Neither interpretation leads to the least-cost solution; though equity and
11
efficiency could, in principle, be reconciled using a two-stage procedure.
Consider first the principle of equal financial sacrifice. Step one: the agency
determines the least-cost solution which imposes treatment costs of $25,000 to
Y and $5000 to X. Step hlO: X is induced to pay Y ~lO,OOO.
A similar pl-ocedurc could be lJsl'd to recollcile l'fficiency ~vith tile
principle of equal percentage of tre~tnlent. First, the agency calculates the
cost of a uniform rercenti'lge plan meeting its quality standards. Second, the
agency issues orders to X and Y according to the least-cost allocation, but
13.
\vould also requit'e monetary transfers to achieve a rroprotionate division
of costs equivalent to that which uniform treatment would produce. In our
example. uniform treatment requires 60% removal for both X and Y. at a cost of
$1/2 (.25) (600)2 = $45.000 and 1/2 (.05) (600)2 = $9,000, respectively.
Thus Y pays 1/6 of the total cost ($54.000) of the uniform treatment scheme,
whereas in the least-cost solution his cost is $25.000 (out of a total $30,000).
Since one-sixth of $30,000 is $5.000. X must pay Y $20.000.
Unfortunately. institutional constraints seem to rule out such possibilities
of reconciling efficiency and equity (this difficulty is well known to welfare
economists). Basic regulatory structures control the extent to which cost
minimization may be achieved and the way in which the clash between fairness
and efficiency is perceived and resolved. For instance, an agency adopting
the market solution confronts the efficiency and equity questions in somewhat
different terms than an agency using a regulatory approach. In the former case.
the crucial decision concerns the determination of the "right ll price of
pollution; whatever measures are then considered in order to reconcile the
resulting allocation with equity criteria. they must not distort market
incentives. In the latter case, uniform percentage reduction can be simply
12
mandated. even without knowledge of abatement costs.
Limits of Environmental Deregulation
The traditional approach to environmental policy is characterized by "an
almost exclusive reliance on detailed central regulation and on court enforcement
13
as the principal techniques for limiting the discharge of pollution."
Bureaucratic rigidity. economic inefficiency, lack of incentives to technical
innovation, and a proclivity to political manipulation and bargaining are
frequently mentioned causes of the unsatisfactory performance on the
traditional system. Deregulation -- greater use of markets and the price
system has been advocated a$ the appropriate remedy. But proof of
14.
"non-market failure" is not sufficient evidence that one $hould turn to
the market. As Charles Schultze reminds us, "In all cases~ the comparison
should be between an imperfect market and an imperfect regulatory scheme,
14
not some ideal abstraction."
A realistic comparison of effluent charges with standards reveals that
the advantages of the former system are less impressive than abstract
economic arguments seem to imply. first, as already indicated, computational
problems and difficulties in measuring many important benefits and costs
preclude the possibility of setting charges at the "correct" level, where
the marginal costs of discharge reduction at each source just equal the
marginal $ocial damages caused by that source. Second, as Clifford Russell
15
has argued, a system of ~niform charges is almost certainly incompatible
with discharge-standards target. Thus, an environmental agency would have to
perform a separate calculation for each individual source of pollution (there
are about 60,000 such sources in the United States). In fact, each price
would have to be calculated several times by the very nature of the trial and
error ~ethod used in arriving at the proper charge. Third, there is little
to choose, in principle, between charges and standards in ternlS of static
efficiency since an efficient set of effluent charges may be viewed as the
dual solution of the problem of determining the discharge standards minimizing
the cost of achieving given ambient quality standards. This applies, in
particular, to the information needed to solve either the primal or the dual
problem. Also monitoring and implementation problems seem to be of approximat~ly
. 16
equal levels of difficulty in the two cases.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that a system of effluent
charges would be less open to political pressures and bargains than a
direct regulatory approach, as so often suggested by advocates of charges.
All the available empirical evidence indicates that the setting of charges is
17
as much a political process as the setting of standards. Effluent charges
do enjoy one clear advantage over direct regulation: by lifting air and water
out of the category of free goods the system creates important incentives
for polluters to change their technologies in ways that would economize on the
use of the environment. This is, of course, an important property; but it
is equally important to realize that there are many situations where the logic
of marginal comparisons of benefits and costs is not even applicable.
Consider the case in which no negative external effects seem to be
present, simply because people are unaware of the dangers of the situation.
For example, a number of heavy metals like cadmium or mercury are highly
toxic but their effects are detected only after they have accumulated, in
kidneys or other human organs, above a certain threshold. Here economic
analysis would suggest a status quo policy since no externalities are present,
whereas biological criteria recommend positive action. Moreover, in the case
of non-degradable pollutants like cadmium, and many types of radiation, the
damage arises from an essentially non-reducible stock, so that only incremental
damage results from the flow of pollution. Now, one of the crucial
assumptions in a cost-benefit or market approach to pollution control is that
the pollution level may be varied in any direction. However, in the case of a
non-degradable pollutant, the marginal damage function can only move in an
upward direction, since the stock of pollutant already present in the
environment cannot be reduced within time periods that are meaningful for
policymaking.
15.
Especially in a dynamic context, environmental standards may be
beginning, fixing it at the output level where the waste generated equals the
initial assimilative capacity of the environment. Thus, "where the context
takes on dynamic externality features or where biologically harmful pollutants
cumulate, cost-benefit should give way to standard setting based on a cautious
. 19
attitude to epidemiological and other physical information."
The Uncertain Logic of Standard Setting
But is a "cautious attitude to epidemiological and other information ll
sufficient to provide a rational basis for standard setting? Standards cannot
be established on purely scientific and technical grounds any more than values
can be deduced from facts. In the past, standard setters have sought
legitimacy for their decisions by wrapping them in a cloak of scientific
respectability, but the courts and informed public opinion are becoming too
16.
17.
sophisticated to be so easily misled. For example, a section of the 1963
Clean Air Act instructed the Secretary of HEW to "compile and publish
criteria reflecting accurately the latest scientific knowledge useful in
indicating the kind and extent of such effects which may be expected from
the presence of such air pollution agents (or combination of agents) in the
air in varying quantities. II In the next section, however, political judgment
rather than scientific knowledge is the guiding principle: liThe Secretary
may recommend to such air pollution control agencies.•• such ~riteria of
air quality as in his judgment may be necessary to protect the public health
and welfare." This ambiguity in the conception of what environmental quality
20
criteria should be was to be the source of considerable controversy. In
particular, the first standard for SOx, establishing a recommended level of
annual average concentration of 0.015 ppm, was greeted by a storm of controversy.
The scientific basis looked im'pressive at first sight the main part of the
document consisted of summaries of almost 350 studies on the effects of SOx on
man, animals, plants, and materials. But critics were quick to point out that
not all the evidence was equally reliable; that the summaries of the studies
drew conclusions which the studies themselves did not; that the recommended
level was based on only two or three studies whose conclusions were, moreover,
open to doubt; and, finally, that the derivation of the standard from the goal
of protecting the most susceptible segments of the population had not been
made explicit. In part as a consequence of such criticism, the 1970 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act introduced the notion of threshold value -- a level of
ambient concentration below which it is assumed that no damage occurs to
health. Congress directed EPA to use "scientific evidence" to determine
threshold values for pollutants assumed to have them (502, CO, NOx' particulates
and oxidants), and to take those values minus !Ian adequate margin of safety"
as primary standards. But despite the appeal to scientific evidence, the
18.
notion of threshold value has been aptly described as a "politically
convenient fiction which permits the law to appear to require pollution
21
damage to be reduced to zero."
Regulatory decisionmaking in other health-related areas also relies
heavily on threshold values. For example, food containing a potential
carcinogen, but which does not enter the food supply as an additive governed
22
by the Delaney clause, may be sold only if levels of the substance are
below a certain value, tenned a tolerance. HO\'I is the acceptable dai"ly
intake (ADI) determined in practice? The standard toxicologic procedure
involves the notion of a "no observed effect 1eve1" (NOEL), \'/hich EPA has
defined as lithe level (quantity) of a substance administered to a group of
experimental animals at which those effects observed or measured at high
levels are absent and at which no significant differences between the group
of animals exposed to the quantity and an unexposed group of control animals
23
maintai'ned under identical conditions is produced."
Other methods of risk assessment assume the absence of a threshold,
extrapolating downward from the observed level to a risk level considered virtually
safe. Many mathematical dose~response functions may be used in the extrapolation.
Unfortunately, while the choice of function has a major effect on the "virtua11y
safe dose" (more than 100,OOO-fo1d, according to the Food and Drug
24
Administration Committee on Safety Evaluation ), there is no firm scientific
basis at present for choosing among them. Even the convenient assumption of
low-dose linearity lacks convincing scientific support, as shown by the
intensity of the controversy following the attack by Gofman and Tamplin on the
radiation standards used in the 1960's (the subsequent tightening of those
standards has been made possible by technological advances rather than by any
19.
significant improvements in laboratory results, or in statistical and mathematical
techniques). After carefully reviewing different methods of carcinogenic
risk assessment, Jerome Cornfield comes to the conclusion that:
Although many observed dose-response curves are consistent
with the existence of thresholds ..• no finite set of
dose-response observations could establish this. All present
safety evaluation procedures, whether involving the use of NOEL's,
or of some favored non-threshold dose-response function with a
II virtually safe ll level, must be regarded as mathematical
formalisms whose correspondence with the realities of low-dose
effects is, and may long remain, largely conjectural. But regulatory
decisions must be made, and formalisms with more theoretical or
experimental support, or both, should be preferred to those with
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less.
Who should evaluate the evidence? The regulatory decisionmaker assisted
by his advisors? Independent experts? Scientific "judges?" And which
procedures and rules of evidence ought to be used? Such questions are implicit
in the widespread demands for greater public access to the decisionmaking
processes of regulatory agencies and for improvements in the quality of agency
deliberations. Before discussing some possible answers, it may be useful
to examine the underlying epistemological issues.
Trans-scientific Issues in Standard Setting
Disagreement among experts is a pervasive characteristic of many policies
with important technical or scientific components. Expert A disagrees with
the arguments presented by expert B, but finds it difficult or impossible to
disprove specific points. Both experts soon come to recognize that the
complex technical issues about which they must express an opinion require
20.
perceptions that cannot be expltcitly articulated~ and patterns of reasoning
that are alien to thei.r dis.cipli.nary· traditions. For eX~l1lple, {llos.t
scientists who have worked on setting radiation standards have severely
criticized the arguments used by Gofman and Tamplin in support of a ten-fold
reduction in federal standards without~ however~ being able to demonstrate
cle~r-cut technical errors in their analyses. Rather, the criticism has
been directed at the plausibility of the assumptions made by the two
researchers, at the alleged arbitrariness of their selection of data, and at
. . 26
their IIl ack of professionalism. 1I
Problems relating to the determination of the health effects of low-level
radi.ati.on are examples of questions which Alvi.n Wei.nberg has termed IItrans-
scientiftc ll ; questtons of fact that can be stated in the language of science
but are, either in principle or in practice, unanswerable by science. As
We.inberg poi,nts out IIIn so far as public policy involves trans-scientific
rather than scientific issues, the role of the scientist in the promulgation
of such poli,cy must be different from his role when the issues can be
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unambi guous ly ans\'/ered by science. II
When different scientists put different interpretations on, or draw
different conclusions from the same body of data; when they disagree about the
relevance or strength of the evidence and the plaus;ibility of hypotheses;
when their preference for a given model (say, the linear model of dose-effect
fOf radiation exposure) is based not so much on technical grounds as on the
fact that it i.s the IllOSt conservative model for purposes of public safety; when
arguments are evaluated not on their intrinsic merits, but by appeal to the
majority of professional opinion, and the credibility of the opponent becomes
at least as important as his competence -- we feel that the generally accepted
21.
paradigm ·of scientific inquiry is no longer applicable, and that we are
dealing with a new game whose rules are not yet clearly understood, let
alone explicitly formulated. The amazement of the policymaker who discovers
how elusive the notion of "scientific evidence" can be, and how
discretionary the choice among competing models, matches the alarm of the
traditional scientist who fears that the principles of scientific method
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may be contaminated by the atmosphere of the adversary process.
The uneasiness of the scientist is understandable; for the notion
that truth, or at least agreement, may emerge from the clash of conflicting
opinions marks a significant departure from beliefs and attitudes that have
dominated scientific thinking for more than three hundred years. In a
famous passage of his Regulae ad., Directionem Ingenii, Descartes wrote:
"Every time two men make a contrary judgment about the same matter, it is
certain that one of them is mistaken. What is more, neither of them
possesses the truth, for if one of them had a clear and precise view of the
truth, he would be able to expound it to his opponent so as to force the latter's
conviction. II Bacon demanded that all preconceived notions, opinions, even
words "be abjured and renounced with firm and solemn resolution," and
condemned "disputation" -- the art of dialectic argument created by the Greeks
and further developed by the scholastic philosophers. Similarly Galileo,
in the words of Ernst Mach, IIwith a superb indifference to the dialectic arts and
sophistic subtleties of the Schoolmen of his time, turned the attention of
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his brilliant mind to nature. II Modern scholarship has shown that Galileo
and other great scientists of the past were well aware of the value of
persuasive arguments and of a skillful use of evidence in winning scientific
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battles. But in the context of the present dtscussions, this is not as
important as the fact that in the prevailing opinion, scientific disputes
are resolved by interrogating nature rather than by appealing to human judges.
22.
Actually. the belief in the power of science to provide unambiguous answers
to precise questions is more characteristic of people without a scientific
background than of working scientists. Many legislators and administrators
expect unqualified yes-or-no answers from their scientific advisors. and it
is often asserted that open disagreement amon~ experts can only confuse
policymakers. Yet those same policymakers can tolerate high levels of
conflict and ambiguity in dealing with political and social issues. Is it
because policymakers are often unwilling to make the effort necessary to
master the details of complex technical arguments? Perhaps. but significant
attitude changes can be expected to take place as public criticism
continues. and as reviewing courts subject to more searching scrutiny the
empirical ~nd analytical basis for an agency's discretionary policy choices.
and measure its jU$ttfications against the recorded evidence.
Adversary Procedures
Since many of the technical issues arising in environmental standard
setting are trans-$.cientific. the reSQlution of conflict concerning scientific
evidence and analyses is a problem of crucial importance to the regulatory
bureaucracy. Efficient procedures of cQnfltct resolution must reflect the
cognitive characteristics of trans-scientific issues. Since these issues are
debated by opposing arguments and argumentation is essentially a dialectic
skill. an adversary procedure appears to be the natural format for trans-
scientific debates. Adversary procedures are IIthose formal. legal or quasi-
legal proceedings at which proponents. both scientists and non-scientists. of
opposing views are heard before a body or an individual who is empowered to
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render a decision after having heard the conflicting contentions. II
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The procedure provides incentives for the adversaries to present the
strongest arguments in support of their respective positions, while
disciplining them by cross-examination and by forcing them to answer the
specific questions posed by the judges. The assignment of precise roles
facilitates the orderly flow of information and the systematic, step-by-step
construction of the "case." The excesses of demagogy that are common in
less structured debates are prevented by the rules of procedural etiquette.
If these represent the more obvious advantages of the adversary procedure,
what are seen as its shortcomings? The following list includes, I believe,
the most common objections:
1. It i~ not an appropriate method for discovering truth
2. It paralyzes decisionmaking
3. Instead of encouraging convergence, it intensifies the
polarization of viewpoints
4. It di scrimi nates agai nst those who do not command adequate experti se
5. It can be manipulated in favor of the financially or politically
powerful
6. Legislators and administrators cannot be expected to immerse
themselves in the technical details of a case as a judge does.
The rationale for the last statement is not clear. In the case of tax
laws and some of the more recent environmental legislation, for example,
legislators have shown considerable ability in handling highly technical
subjects. In fact, carefully structured adversary proceedings represent a
natural sequel to the traditional system of congressional hearings. On the
other hand, as I have already indicated, regulatory and even executive agencies-
have come under pressure from the courts to set out their decisions in
"proper form,1I by introducing formal hearings \tlith sworn testimony, rights of
cross examination, judicial review of the evidence, and so on. If it is
true that liThe adversary procedure is likely to be used increasingly in
modern, liberal societies in their attempts to weigh the benefits and risks
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of modern technology, II \o.Je can expect the present trend to\'lard more
formalized procedures in regulatory decisionnlaking to gain momentum in the
future.
Of course, the opportunity costs of the added procedural constraints
can be high in terms of delay and administrative complexity. In the United
States it now takes ten or twelve years to bring a nuclear power plant from
the planning stage to cOnlmercial operations -- nearly twice what it took a
decade ago. Yet, when the technical and value basis of a regulatory decision
is controversial, such costs should be reduced by improvements in procedural
design rather than by an expansion of the agency's discretionary power. In
fact, this philosophy underlies recent proposals for streamlining the
licensing process of nuclear power plants by limiting the number of times
the same objection can be raised, and granting utilities prior approval for
power plant sites and standardized reactor designs. True, the amendments to
the 1972 Clean Water Act currently being considered by the U.S. Congress seems
to move in the opposite direction, since they eliminate formal hearing
requirements and give additional discretion to the EPA administrator. Whether
the short-run efficiency induced by these measures will be sufficient to
compensate the increased likelihood of subsequent litigation remains to be
seen. In more general terms, the widespread view that regulatory decisionmaking
is already too burdened by procedural requirements is not supported by the
evidence. Thus, a recent survey of twenty-two major federal regulatory
24.
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agencies found that in only nine of them is expert cross-examination of
experts permitted (usually, under various restrictive conditions), and in
only one agency -- the International Trade Commission -- cross-examination
of experts occurs fairly often. The Environmental Protection Agency does
not permit cross-examination, while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission permits
23
it, but uses it only seldom.
Procedural rules can be manipulated in favor of special interests,
but so can any other institutional arrangement~. If anything, the
openness of adversary proceedings should make manipulation more expensive
and at the same time more risky. It is also true that differentially
distr;bu~dresources (including money and technical expertise) are valued
differently under alternative institutional arrangements. The problem of
assuring that all parties are effectively able to make use of the procedural
possibilities open to them is a real one, but this is a pervasive problem,
not one peculiar to a particular procedure. Naturally, a regulatory ag~ncy
should try to redress any inequality in the positions of the contending parties,
and several methods for achieving this have been discussed in the literature.
The two remaining objections to the use of the adversary procedure -- that
it is not a suitable method for determining truth, and that it intensifies
the polarizatton of viewpoints -- will be evaluated in the following pages.
The Proposed Science Court
It is important to make a clear distinction between adversary proceedings
and the science court recently proposed by a number of scientists. The
science court is only one among several possible institutional embodiments of
the adversary procedure. Many scholars who favor an expanded use of the latter
method have reservations about the usefulness of a science court.
26.
As proposed by the Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on
Anticipated Advances in Science and T.echnol~gy in 1976, the science court
is to be concerned solely with questions of scientific fact, not of social
value. The goal is
To create a situation in which the adversaries direct
their best arguments at each other and at a panel of
sophisticated scientific judges rather than at the
general public. The disputants themselves are in the
best position to display the strengths of their own
views and to probe the weak points of opposing positions.
In turn, scientifically sophisticated outsiders are best
able to juxtapose the opposing arguments, determine
whether there are genuine or only apparent disagreements,
and suggest further studies which may resolve the
differences.
In this way, it should be possible lito describe the current state of
technical knowledge and to obtain statements founded on that knowledge, which
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will provide defensible, cred'ible, technical bases for urgent policy decisions. 1I
There are three stages in the science court proceedings. First, the
significant scientific and technological questions associated with a controversial
policy issues must be identified. By definition, an issue is a decision
pending before a governmental agency. However, the science court would not
consider the entire issue, but only what it considers its most important (and
controversial) scientific and technical aspects.
The second stage is represented by an adversary hearing, open to the
public, governed by a disinterested referee, in which scientist-advocates of
the opposing scientific positions argue their cases before a panel of
scientist-judges. In addition to presenting their cases, the advocates
have the opportunity to cross-examine opposing advocates and to criticize
their arguments. The judges themselves are established experts in areas
adjacent to the dispute.
In the third stage, after the evidence has been presented, questioned,
and defended, the panel of judges issues a report in which the points of
agreement among the advocates are noted, and judgments on disputed
statements of fact are given. The report may also suggest specific research
projects to clarify points that remain unsettled.
These, in brief, are the goals and modus operandi of the proposed
science court. A three-day colloquium on the proposal held in the Fall of
1976 and attended by 250 lawyers, administrators, industrialists, and
scientists and other academics, raised considerable interest. In the opinion
of its organizers, the meeting was to be the first experimental test of the
science court idea although, in the words of a participant, "proponents
appeared to be well committed to what seemed more like a demonstration
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project than an experiment."
As the guidelines make clear, the court (or "quasi-court") will only
examine, and decide upon, questions of scientific fact, where by "scientific
fact" is meant "a result, or more frequently the anticipated result, of an
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experiment or an observation of nature. II Thesestatements raise a number of
problems. First, the court must select, from all the scientific and
technical questions relevant to the policy issue under consideration, those
it considers most significant. But this is obviously a value judgment, not a
factual statement. Even the separation of the technical from the political
or ethical aspects of the problem may imply a more or less conscious value
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judgment. A similar question -- the separation of "efficiency" from "equity"
considerations -- has been debated for a long time by economists. Today a
majority of professional opinion feels that in a policy context such a
separation is either impossible, or strongly biased in favor of the status ~.
27.
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The same arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to the fact-value dichotomy in
the present context. (Incidentally, the epistemological premises underlying
the science court idea also imply a sharp separation of facts from theories.
But according to many contemporary philosophers of science, facts are
IItheory-laden,1I since in all the experimental techniques of the scientist,
theories are involved.)
Second, the narrow notion of scientific fact adopted by the proponents
of the science court would exclude from its proceedings all questions of a
trans-scientific nature. For example, in setting radiation standards it is
quite important to decide whether or not the genetic response to low-level
radiation is linear. However, to determine at the 95 per cent confidence
level by direct experiments whether 150 millirems will increase the Illutation
rate by ~ per cent would require about 8 x 109 mice, so that in practice, the
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question is unanswerable experimentally. To take another example, consider
the following proposition: IIAn acceptable version of the statement L"if X occurs,
then Y may occur"! must specify a finite probability which could be refuted by
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a possible experiment." Suppose one expert claims his calculations show that
. ,
the total probability of a catastrophic reactor accident is of the order of 10-7/
l'eactor/year. With such a small probability there is no practical possibility
of determining this failure rate experimentally. One can only use various
mathematical, statistical, and analogical arguments to evaluate the plausibility
of the calculation. Now, if trans-scientific questions like the ones just
mentioned are ruled out of court, why are adversary proceedings among scientific
experts at all necessary? As long as the facts can be established by the usual
procedures of science, there is little need for scientist-advocates, and even
less for scientist-judges.
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Concerning evidence, the report of the task force states that lithe
applied rules of evidence will be the scientific rules of evidence and
not the legal rules of evidence. II But while there is an elaborate law of
judicial evidence, scientists have not found it necessary to codify the
rules of scientific evidence .. One reason for this apparent paradox has to do
with the quality of the evidence itself: complex and often ambiguous in the
law, relatively simple and usually of high quality in the sciences. Moreover,
the law of evidence and indeed the entire legal system, reflect the obligation
of the judge to give judgment in any circumstances, while no such obligation
is imposed on the scientist. Now, complexity and ambiguity of the available
evidence, and the need to reach a conclusion in all cases are also characteristic
features of regulatory decisionmaking. This is not meant to suggest that
the lavi of evidence is immediately applicable in debating trans-scientific
questions; rather, that unarticulated rules of scientific evidence are not
sufficient) and that a more formal approach is needed. But then the idea
of scientist-judges loses much of its plausibility. As physicist Barry
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M. Casper writes:
The notion that a scientific background is required to
weigh the claims of experts is difficult to reconcile
with the evidence of recent debates such as those over
the ABM and the SST. It is not necessary to master the
detailed workings of these systems in order to judge
even the technical points at issue if one has the
opportunity to hear articulate advocates present their
cases and respond to opposing arguments. A careful
reading of the public records of the ABM and SST debates
indicates that there is rarely significant disagreement
over "scientific facts." When apparent disagreements over
these facts occur, they generally can be traced to differences
in assumptions.
Paul Doty has pointed out that in order to make the contributions of
technical experts more relevant to the policy process, a reasonable balance of
attention should be given to both the arguments that depend on detail and
the wider issues that depend on experience, judgment, and perception of
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the political context. Only those responsible for the final decision
the regulators themselves, rather than scientist-judges -- can provide this
necessary balance.
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Conclusion~
The preceding discussion makes clear that in the env~ronmental field, as in
other areas of public pol~cy, there are no unambiguously superior policy tools.
In devising a comprehensive approach to pollution control, it would be foolish
to forego the advantages associated with a system of effluent charges~
particularly in connection with the question of incentive~ for technological
innovation. But it would be an even mQre serious m~stake to believe that the
prevailing regulatory approach can be completely replaced by charges and other
price-like mechanisms. Environmental deregulqti.on -.,. i.f by th,is, is meant a
system of market i,ncentives which is rich enou~h to cover every kind of pollution
problem -- is not a feasible alternative. At any rate, the conflicting demands
of efficiency and equity can only be reconciled by political means. Hence,
whatever th.e technical properties of the tools that are used, actual policy
results will be lar~ely conditioned by political pressures and bargains.
Direct regulation is, and will remain, an essential component of
environmental policies. Thi,s statement can be supported by three' types of
considerations: institutional, administrative, and informational. Institutionally,
the process of standard setting is well ad~pted to political and bureaucratic
reali,ties in a way 'in which pollution charges and rights, for example, are not.
Administratively, direct regulation is unavoidable when qui.ck action must be
taken in response to sudden emergencies or to environmental situations that may
result in irreparable damages. From the point of View of the information requirements
of environmental policymaking, standards -- being essentially empirical
guideline~ summarizing the available scientific, technical, and economic evidence
can be used without the precise knowledge on costs, damages, and benefits that
is required by more sophisticated methods.
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Certainly the rationality of the standard-setting process leaves much to
be desired. This has led many critics to advocate the abandonment of standards
as the principal method of pollution control. A more realistic approach
consists in attempting to improve current practices without rejecting their
basic logic -- at least until the viability of alternative methods can be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Major improvements seem possible in at
least two directions, through better procedural design. First, more attention
should be given to different methods of achieving alternative distributions
of bargaining power among the different participants in the policy process.
One method, exemplified by the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act, is to
empower any citizen or private organization to sue any private or public body
for its environmentally harmful actions. Another possibility is class action
-in courts. Hhen individuals or organizations can sue on behalf of large numbers
of similarly affected citizens, the benefit-cost terms of using the courts
are significantly altered in favor of the drunaged parties. Second, the
utilization of empirical data and scientific knowledge by regulatory agencies can
at best be characterized as haphazard. This has led the courts in the United
States, but apparently also in Germany and Japan, to impose on regulatory agencies
strict procedural requirements for the evaluation of evidence, the
representation of conflicting opinions, and the examination of a richer set of
alternatives than were originally considered by the regulators. In the United
States this has led to a "paper hearing" procedure that combines many of the
advantages of a trial-type adversary process (excepting oral testimony and
cross-examination) while avoiding undue delay and cost.
There is considerable evidence to show that the requirement that a
regulatory agency explain i~ detail the factual and methodological bases of its
conclusions can significantly improve the quality of environmental decisionmaking.
What is even more significant, an open record that encompasses the evidence and
conclusions of the agency and its opponents, and includes responses by the
agency to criticism of its decisions, can considerably increase the legitimacy
of those decisions.
t~hen the truth, correctness, or fairness of a decision can be detenmined
unambiguously, the manner in which the decision is reached is largely
immaterial; only results count. But when the factual and value premises are
uncertain or controversial, the formal characteristics of the decision' process
its procedures -- assume a new significance. Legal or quasi-legal procedure is
not so much a criterion of truth as a device to ensure that acceptable decisions
are reached, whether or not solutions can be calculated in a logically
impeccable manner. A system that must guarantee the decidability of all
emerging issues cannot at the same time guarantee the correctness of each
individual action. For this reason, the crucial problems facing environmental
policymakers today have to do more with good procedural design than with the
search for strategies satisfying abstract criteria of optimality.
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A POLICY F~~1E~ORK FOP THE STANDARD-SETTING PPOC~SS
INTRODUCTION
The standard-setting process has a socio-economic and
political basis. This stateMent has been ma~e previously by
r~ajone and Holden. r1aj one has noten the following points in
line with this thesis [1]:
a standard cannot be set on a purely scientific basis;
a standard provines only an appearance of precision
and hence of "scientific" character;
a stannard always represents an im~licit evaluation
of human well-beinq;
a stannard is only one of other alternative means of
regulation;
the institutional framework often determines the
decision on a standard;
self-interest of requlatees moves them to attempt to
modify the terms of the regulator, including any
standards set.
In addition, Holden has noted that regulatory processes, including
standard-setting, are based on a bargaining process bet~.,een
regulators and regulatees [2]. As an example of the political
nature of standard-setting Schon notes that an attempt to set
standards in the lumber industry for the "2x4" developed More
political response than any other issue in the recent history of
the U.S. Department of Commerce [3]. Lumber producers both large
and small, building interests, federal agencies, state governMents
as well as U.S. Congressmen and Senators were all engaged in
attemoting to influence the thickness standar0. of the "2x4".
Schon posits that a system of "dynamic conservatism" builds up
around a certain technology that exists to ?rotect that technology
whenever it is threatened with, say, standaras that mioht initiate
any loss of market, influence or position [4].
A key attribute of enerqy production as an issue which arouses
and focuses attention is its location at a particular site. Both
the need for energy development and its attendant benefits and
costs are perceived in local terMs, even thouqh such developMent
has large overall national benefits and costs as well. ~fuat
heightens the energy issue even more at the local level is the
use of nuclear power which is not restricted by location put
is shiftable among a variety of locations, while petroleum or
coal must be developed in situ where it is found. ~fuerever a
nuclear power station is placed both benefits and risks are
heaped on a particular site regardless of the overall benefit-cost
ratio to the nation.
-2-
Both the site and the energy technology appeal to the "pro-
tective instincts" of the 9articular social qroups or actors t~at
array themselves arounn each component. Those local actors
who stand to gain from the c.evelopment of energy at a site ally
themselves with those interesten in embe~ding ann extending
that energy system in the overall economy. Those local actors
who do not perceive direct economic benefits or share energy
values stemming from that energy system (say, nuclear) will see
themselves as bearing the total risk of such a development and
oppose it. Those oriented to the site tend to be those motivated
by environmental and traditional technology values well em-
bedded in the existing social system. The premise for conflict
tends to be that if those in the locality do not pursue their
own interests then their interests will be ignored by those
at the national level who are more oriented to the technology
than to the site. What precipitates an incinent or conflict
is a specific proposal to place a nationally a?proved technology
on a particular site. This proposal places site-oriented qnd
technology-oriented values into conflict where each set of
actors attempts to protect the values inherent to the social
systems surrounding the technology and the site. This emphasis
on a specific project at a specific site tends to shortcut
broader discussions of goals and alternative means.
TECHNOLOGIES, ENVIRONM.ENTS AND THP.EATS
In an:attempt to display the basic ppocesses involved in
the 9rotection of a technology and a site Figure 1 was constructed.
It is a process that does not try to model the nrotection process
per se but rather attempts to simply portray an overview of
key aspects in local actors res90ndin~ to a threat to some
technology through an effort to regulate it.
At anyone time society has both energy and environmental
values and needs that must be met through whatever technologies
and sites that exist. The existing energy production system
embodies all of the technology and social value systems necessary
to perpetuate that production source over time in meeting the
energy demands of the economy it serves. The existing environ-
mental system also embodies all of the
r
technology and social
value systems necessary to maintain the local employment and
livinq base over time at the existincr ~ocale. In the case of
environmental values such awareness ca grow around a traditional
technology supporting some existing ec nomic activity on a site
sustaining a way-of-life such as single-family fishing dories
or trawlers. The existing technology becomes traditional through
the social system that builds up around it at that site. Often
an entire community will be based on the one existing technology.
Because of the close ties of this technoloqy to the society
it supports that society becomes protective of the technology
and its place of use and develops some assessment capability
for determining threats to that technology and hence to their
-3-
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-4-
way-of-life and overall environ~ental values. Should any
external threats be perceived or actually felt responses are
generated in either a direct threat to the offending parties,
a direct approach to the regulator concerned, an alternative
technology for meeting the problem which, in turn, must be
approved by that regulator, creation of a-new regulator or some
combination of all of these responses.
In the case of society's energy values some existing tech-
nology can be creating some set of problems or other inadequacies
in fulfilling these needs and values. Given the nerceivec energy
demands or resolution of these problems a new technology is
generated through research and ~evelopment of some pilot plant.
Over time this technology is approved by some regulator and be-
comes adopted as the accepted new way of meeting society's
energy needs. At this point a new social system develops in
the energy bureaucracy as well as in supporting institutions to
maintain the status of this adopted technology. The protection
of this technological system is fostered through an assessment
capability that determines whether threats, either external or
internal, exist and generates a set of res~onses. If the threat
is seen as external from another social-technological system
based on, say, environmental values then responses are formed
to counter this threat. The regulatory body that approves and
authorizes technologies of, say, energy is often the focal
point for such conflict. Responses can be external to the
regulator, a direct attempt to fix the existing regulatory
stance or provide a new technological ca~ability for meeting
regulatory shifts. Internal threats are generated within the
energy system from some competing energy source.
The kinds of responses that affect the ener9Y system and
its regulator from those with, say, environmental values,
include some of the following:
change society's energy values (external threat)i
ban the new technology (external and regulatory threat);
pursue adoption of an alternative technology (external
technological threat);
attempt to create another or change the regulator
(external threat to regulatory and energy system);
create new standards for technology (technological threat);
change existing stanoards for approval ann acceptance
(technological threat).
Each of these responses are often attempted in concerti however,
the thrust of this paper is toward standard-setting and it is
interesting to note the role of standards in such responses
above. Either setting new standards or changing existing stan-
dards can provide major channels for those opposed to accepted
energy values. This acceptance, of course, includes those in the
energy system as well as those regulating it via apnroval of the
new energy technology.
-5-
Those in the energy system also respond to such threats;
however, these threats are normally corrfinen to the regulator
with whom they have evolved a rapport. Such responses inclune:
counter environmental arguments directly to regulator
ask for standards to be createrl
ask for a tightening of existing standards
generate newer technology internally.
Again standards can play a role in the responses of those supporting
a, say, large energy system. Again the responses are either
setting standards where none existed or tightening existing stan-
dards as a means to forestall further actions from environmen-
talists.
THE CONCEPT OF ACTORS
Thus from Figure 1 and the above rliscussion it is readily
seen that a system of protection does r.evelop around a set tech-
nology. This protective system includes a wide range of actors
that have essentially the same set of values or core beliefs
in the technology as a means to achieving their economic and
personal goals. Such actors for an energy system would normally
include:
industry characterizing the energy source;
supporting industry, incluning contractors and suppliers;
supporting unions, workers and company towns;
supporting research and development institutes;
supporting journalists and publications;
government regulator;
allied government units, including energy, finance, and
industry;
allied international governments and agencies;
affiliated financiers;
infrastructure suppliers and contractors;
public utilities;
consumer associations, including innustry, co~merce and
home;
political representatives associate0 with the energy
source;
local govenments in towns centred around the energy
source.
As can be readily seen this actor array includes a wide spectrum
of support for an energy system. This array, while apparently
unlinked in any organizational fashion, ~~ouln center around a
set energy technology that meets their prevailing energy and
economic values and needs. The existence of some external threat
to the energy system is the basis for bringing together these
seemingly disparate parts into a cohesive system for protecting
the technology on which all depend for their identity and live-
lihood.
-6-
One important factor running through the above is the concept
of actors and associated values as demonstrated via the degree of
favorability toward the technology and the negree of involvement
with it. Figure 2 attempts to show the array of possible actor
groups which influence the outcome of a,:say, petroleum develop-
ment programme [5].
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Figure 2 -ACTOR CLASSIFICATION FRAHm"lORK
The left-hand column represents actors with varying levels
of involvement who are all favorably disposed to the development
programme. As the degree of involvement decreases the specificity
of the supportive relationship will likely change from intimate
knowledge of the development activities on the part of core
actors to more generalized supportive value orientations on the
part of "supporting exogenous actors".
The middle column represents a "mixerl" attitude or value
orientation. Actor types would include:
1. Neutral actors.
2. Should-be actors.
3. Independent actors who theoretically are without a priori
value positions. Such actors may conduct "objective"
analyses. Regulatory agencies whose concern is the
"national interest" would be classified as independent
actors.
4. Conditional actors who depend on decisions of other
actors (as well as own decisions) these actors may be
either favorably or unfavorably disposed to a develop-
ment programme.
The right-hand column of the framework consists of those
actors opposed to the development programme: the adversaries
and rivals. Reasons for opposition will vary among such actors
and be related to their own particular objectives and the sit-
uation or context in which they are located. Rivals and adver-
saries·demonstrate varying degrees of involvement. Even those
peripheral to the policy system may significantly affect that
system including the petroleum programme. Clearly, decisions
in the international sphere such as the OPEC oil price increases
have had an impact on petroleum development in the North Sea.
In order to clarify the actor classification framework a
description of each actor-type follows.
Core Actors
This group has continuous and intensive involvement in
the technological development programme. Though other
actor-types may make fundamental decisions it is usually
the core actors who initiate a programme via one or more
fundamental decisions. Core actors are usually fewer in
number than other actor-types though core actors may
change as the development programme evolves through
major phases (e.g., exploration, production, trans-
portation, etc.).
Allied Supporting Actors
These actors are characterized by a positive or favor-
able orientation to the development programme. Their
activities enhance the development programme. Supplying
of goods and services, provision of infrastructures,
enabling decisions, passage of legislation, and so on,
are examples.
Independent Central Actors
Actors of this type have a degree of independenee or
autonomy from both the proponents and adversaries of a
given development programme. Their autonomy may be
either constitutionally or legally-based or a function
of an "objective" information p::>sition, i.e. performing
their own research, information-gathering and inter-
pretat.ion.
Middle Range Actors
This actor type has moderate involvement in the develop-
ment programme and may have favorable, unfavorable or
neutral attitudes to the development. An actor is
classified middle range for several reasons:
1. chooses only moderate involvement,
2. has expertise peripheral to programme,
3. has limited legal basis for involvement,
4. lacks information especially from other key actors,
thus position not sufficiently well developed to
qualify as another actor-type, or
5. is waiting for decisions by others to determine or
declare position.
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Transitional Rivals and Adversaries
This group of actors consists of those who, for reasons
of expertise, power, resources and information, have only
moderate involvement and are declared rivals or adver-
saries of the technological development programme. Not
only may actors be emerging as rivals and adversaries
but also, given a fundamental decision against the pre-
vailing programme, former "core" or "allied supporting
actors" may shift to rival or adversary status, while
those who were formerly rivals and adversaries assume
"core" or "allied supporting actor" status.
Strong Rivals and Adversaries
Such actors are characterized for the most part by having
developed viable alternate technological programmes. To
the extent that two or more development programmes are
recognized (one of which is that of the core actors) and
are similarly feasible, then strong rivals will exist.
Strong adversaries might include political organizations
who may be central to the development programme in terms
of power but ideologically opposed to the particular
technological-economic programme mix.
Exogenous Rivals and Adversaries
This group of actors is outside the technology policy
system, certainly in its day-to-day, week-to-week
functioning. Exclusion may be on a geopolitical basis
(e.g., another country). They are opposed to the pre-
vailing development programme, ~nd they may support an
alternative programme which mayor may not differ tech-
nologically.
Exogenous Independent Actors
These actors are seen as exogenous to the policy system,
usually for geopolitical reasons. Like "independent
central actors" they have an independent or autonomous
role due to constitutional or legal factors.
Exogenous Supporting Actors
1. Those actors who have definite links to "allied
supporting" and "core" actors and who though geo-
politically distinct from members of the policy
system may indirectly and significantly control
their actions (e.g., multinational corporations).
2. Those actors who are characterized both as marginal
to the developmen~ programme and supporting it.
Usually they can only be identified through soli-
citation or indirect representation of their views
(e.g., other countries with similar development
programmes) .
The actors classified as above provide a systems perspective
of the basic behavioral structure between the energy system and
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some other system, for example, environment as shown in Figure
1. This actor linkage and interplay, given the descriptions of
each position above, can be manifested in a variety of ways and
strategies.
ENERGY 'SYSTEM ACTORS
It is readily seen from Figure 2 that the interface of the
energy system with some other system, say, environment is com-
plex, representing numerous actors and decision-makers with
diverse, indirect and subtle positions, often containing con-
flicting objectives. Therefore, when considering individual
measures such as environmental standards, many of these actors
can be regrouped to demonstrate only the essential interactions
and interests.
Figure 2 ends at the point of attempting to display an
energy technology threat via some regulatory process. Figure
3 is an attempt at showing the actor array involved in the
standard-setting process. This figure places major actor
groups together into a system that links the groups expected
to participate in any regulation of a technological system.
Figure 2 has been useful in structuring the spectrum of actors
one could expect in such a regulatory process and provides the
basis for those actors in Figure 3.
The approach suggested by Figure 3 can be seen as basic to
some of the cases reported herein. An energy system defined on
the basis of actors shows the minimal actor configuration required
for an adequate solution to some threat or other problem of
interest. Each of these actor sub-systems comes into the energy
system on the basis of different values and for different reasons,
such as:
development actors:
value - profit or service potential
reason in system - generation of energy via approved
technology
regulatory actors:
value - assimilate opposing demands and approve
technology
reason in system - legislative/administrative authority
environmental expert actors:
value - professional and personal interest
reason in system - recognition of energy impacts
impactees:
value - preservation of environment/livelihood
reason in system - dissatisfaction with potential
outcome
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exogenous actors:
value - preservation of environment/energy systems
reason in system - treaty, international influence.
Each actor sub-system within the energy system can be seen
as a set of individual decision-making units that goes through
some decision-making process in its particular decision field.
Placed together these units provide a systems perspective.
These decision-making units, such as in the regulatory sub-system,
must define both their internal objectives and their alternatives.
Their own self-interest is usually predominant even if such
objectives are initially determined by an exogenous unit, i.e.,
a legislative body. The alternatives perceived by the unit are
those that mesh with their objectives. In determining alterna-
tives the unit must assess information and external actions and
events that define the value relevant dimensions of its alterna-
tives (and even of its objectives). Given its assessment of its
information and external constitutencies, the unit must then
evaluate the probable consequences of its potential decisions
against the consequences emanating from that decision for its
objectives. Part of the consequences include the value of the
decision to the other decision-making units or actor sub-systems
in the overall energy system. Finally, the unit selects the
decision seen as most "correct" given the above steps. This
procedure is readily recognizable as the rational model of
decision-making. The rational approach can be embedded in each
actor sub-system of the energy system to some perceived threat
but it does not follow that a search for a completely rational
solution will occur in the overall system, much less between
systems based on different technologies and social values[6].
ACTORS AND VALUES
In principle, there should be a unique correspondence
between the values describing the position of a single actor
category which can then be juxtaposed against other actors.
While Figures 2 and 3 suggest the kinds of values that each
actor grouping may hold, the values found are often very general,
overlapping and interrelated. In a complex and large-scale
energy programme such as found in the North Sea petroleum effort,
few actors were found with unique or single-dimensioned values.
Indeed, many central actors have attempted to become so broad
in outlook that the decision-making system can appear even more
diffuse. What emerges as a central issue is the defining of
the boundaries of the decision problem and the means for address-
ing separate policy issues, such as standard-setting.
For example, some of the kinds of values one could expect
to be included in the North Sea energy system would include
those listed in Table 1. These values are quite broad and must
be re-arranged via such devices as a goal tree in order to
understand their hierarchy and subsequent embedding.
-12-
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One clear observation is the deepening of values over time
as the particular energy programme proceeds. Determining a
stable development path for the economy as well as the environ-
ment in such a complex array of value positions can prove diffi-
cult. The time horizons of such values cannot be wholly relied
upon for guidance of policy responses as both short and long-
term contradictory objectives and expectations may exist within
the same value set such as short-term local public revenues from
oil companies versus long-term slanting and dependence of such
local economies.
Interplay of actors, and therefore interplay of controls
such as standards, results in indirect relations. For example,
ecology itself is not a value in which companies would be directly
interested, but environmental goals influencing company capital
and operating costs are of interest (which in turn are of no
direct importance to environmental bodies). Translating actors'
values into environmental standards cannot be done directly
witho~the intermediate steps of identifying products and impacts
associated with the various stages of the proposed development
programme. Next, these products and impacts must be arrayed
against the actors involved to determine their degree of interest
and influence in changing the outcomes. Finally, the mechanisms
for change or acceptance must be seen between all such actors
in both policy systems.
The important point here is to demonstrate the necessity
for a comprehensive systems perspective for understanding the
decision-making context in which each environmental measure is
embedded. The criteria of actor comprehensiveness as in Figures
2 and 3 can be used in deriving this framework. Out of
such a synthesis the appropriate boundaries for an analytical
approach can be derived for observing the essential elements
of the problem and structuring it for relevant analysis in its
systems context. Indeed, the environmental responses of standard-
setting, monitoring, planning, etc., emanate from the synthesis
just described.
ACTORS AND STRATEGIES
Actors tend to become involved in a specific site develop-
ment issue if they can expect to have some significant impact
on the outcome. The different levels of involvement and favor-
ability set forth the dimensions of the decision to invest effort
into attempting to support or shift the potential outcomes via
certain strategies. Those actors with local ties to the site
tend to focus on those avenues giving weight to the local point
of view such as the legislative representatives, while actors
having direct ties with the technology emphasize institutions
weighted toward technology such as the regulator or a specialized
legislative committee or agency.
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Establishing the focus of the energy system is in itself a
strategic consideration. Energy technology-associated actors
are often served by a narrow problem or issue definition which
limits the scope of information necessary, deflects attention
from broader issues, precludes participation of certain actors
and obscures connections with alternative means. Environmental-
oriented actors tend to define the issues more broadly to en-
compass other social and economic goals that are in conflict
with the goals which the offending technology serves and other-
wise open up the decision-making process to other actors and
related information. Purely site-oriented actors focus on their
economic livelihood and traditional lifestyle and tend to use
the traditional political process to impact on the regulator.
Consent-building and conflict containment represent two
major strategems used in responding to threats. Consent among
actors involves command relationships where direct control is
exercised as well as bargaining and persuasive modes of creating
agreement where no one actor has direct control. Whenever the
effective power base of an actor is insufficient to achieve their
desired level of protection and influence attempts are made to
create a coalition with allied actors. Such coalitions would
affect finance, information and could even modify the technology
itself through certain accommodations to the other actors forming
the coalition. Changing the image of the technology or adding
other components such as an environmental buffer zone are also
used to generate additional support. Creating or exploiting a
crisis is also used to build majority support whether from an
energy technology or an environmental point of view.
Containing conflict can also be used as a strategy should
little chance of an agreement among actors exist. Those actors
favoring a technological system work with their regulator to
routinize the acceptance process thereby rendering somewhat auto-
matic decisions. Technical "tests" are used as a means to ensure
an orderly development process and to avoid conflict. Ultimate
goals are avoided in such a process. Should significant opposi-
tion occur then additional components can be used to generate
acceptance or the threat of loss of the project altogether to
obtain greater local support among the beneficiaries. Actors not
tied to a local base of power, but who depend upon an amorphous
general public for support, can be isolated and excluded by
claims of irrelevance and their unwillingness to be accommodated
through the normal regulatory process.
ENERGY SYSTEM LINKAGES
Figures 4 and 5 show the interface between the energy and
environment systems in the UK and Norway. Both standard-setting
systems vary considerably even though their final standards are
similar. In the UK the energy system itself has final authority
for setting standards for chronic offshore oil discharges while
in Norway the environment system has such authority. Thus,
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greater pressures of an implicit nature could be brought to bear
within the energy system to keep standards from inhibiting the
pace of offshore oil development in the UK. The pressures here
can be thought of as "least possible change" pressures that
provide a basis for coping with pollution control demands by
outsiders or those in the environment system. Within the UK
energy system, informal information channels operate to meet and
diffuse changes or threats of change that would go beyond pollu-
tion control standards or generate standards beyond "practicable"
levels. Because the regulator in the UK is part of the energy
system and indeed is part of the very Division interested in
increased petroleum production it is interesting to find standards
similar to those in Norway. The one important leverage in the UK
is the individual applications for exemptions to the 1971 act
prohibiting all oil discharges offshore. No exemptions have
failed to be approved, however, and sanctions against oil com-
panies are not prevalent.
The environment system in the UK is on a much smaller scale
than the energy system, and does not include potential environ-
mental supporters and allies. Thus, these same external entities,
although ,often diffused, become potential adversaries to both of
the energy and environment systems. No formal links exist to
connect these potential actors and impactees to either system.
Therefore, since regular avenues are closed to them, other channels
must be created by them, such as confrontation or other non-
routine interventions in either system.
The environment system has only one direct channel to the
energy system, the advisory role of the Pollution Unit. Since
this unit has no executive authority it must rely on persuasion
in an informal working relationship with the energy stem to
influence its standard-setting on a case-by-case basis. The
only other links to the energy system from the environment system
were the information provided by pollution control equipment
manufacturers and the seminar for energy system participants
held by the Pollution Unit on such equipment alternatives. Both
of these links were conducted on a one-time basis.
In Norway, the energy system also over-balances the environ-
ment system, but environmental values are more deeply embedded in
the overall decision-making process that governs both systems.
The greatest differences in Norway include the regulator being
in the environment system, as well as having the authority and
expertise matched within the same agency. Supplementing its
resident expertise, the Pollution Authority maintains ties to
other government experts, as well as to potential adversaries,
the fishing and environmental organizations. Part of the reasons
for doing so is the uncertainty problem and the need to have
allies to offset the larger organized resources allied to the
energy system. Thus, a greater spectrum of expertise is avail-
able to the State Pollution Control Authority on a regular basis.
-18-
Missing links in both the UK and Norway energy-environment
systems would seem to be the private sector both within the
energy system and between the two systems. In the energy system
the largest constraint to having pollution control equipMent
installed on offshore platforms is the space constraint on such
platforms. Pollution control is seen by oil companies and plat-
form manufacturers as an "add-on ll rather than as an integral
part of the platform design and operation itself. Thus, it would
seem important to establish a link between platform and pollution
control equipment manufacturers. This link should serve as a
means for integrating designs and operational capabilities thereby
reducing constraints and costs of pollution control.
The other missing link would.appear to be between the pri-
vate pollution control equipment manufacturers and the environ-
ment system. Regular links would provide a better basis for
ascertaining availability and capability of such equipment by
those responsible for advising the regulator. In addition,
environmental research findings could be given to the pollution
control equipment manufacturers for redesigning performance
capabilities. Possible subsidies for development of new approaches
in the private sector could also be fostered.
Given the two systems in their present configurations the
direct beneficiaries and "sufferers" (impactees) include only the
oil companies and manufacturers of pollution control equipment.
Regulators' decisions only directly affect these two groups.
Fishermen and environmentalists have less direct and, indeed,
tenuous impacts from decisions by the regulators. The platform
decision is made entirely within the energy system with no environ-
mental inputs as to location or design. Only the add-on tech-
nology of pollution control is the issue to the regulator, oil
company and manufacturer.
WIDENING THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS
Table 2 presents a summary of many of the facets involved
in the process of setting standards for chronic oil discharges
from offshore platforms. Since much of the table is self-
explanatory, only certain highlights will be noted here. The
table suggests categories of information capsulizing key elements
of importance in the standard-setting process. Such information
is grouped under actors, choices, associated choices and hence
actors, choice criterion, uncertainties and conflicts.
It is interesting to see that the regulator, developer and
environmental experts have roles that exceed those of the impactees,
while exogenous actors provide general constraints to the national
systems. The impactees who have the greatest need for standards
and are part of the reason for the existence of such standards
have the least role in the setting of standards.
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From a systems perspective, the standard-setting problem
does not appear to be cast into the systems approach in either
country. The necessary perspective centers around the responses
by the energy and environment systems in a standard-setting
process. It is here that such criteria as comprehensiveness and
integrativeness can come into play. Comprehensiveness can be
defined in two ways:
a comprehensive set of actor groups or sub-systems
included in the standard-setting process, and
the full range (comprehensive) of environmental manage-
ment activities necessary to regulate the development
activities, including research, planning, requlation,
management and monitoring in support of standard setting.
Integrativeness can also be equally defined in two ways:
an integrated set of relationships between actor groups
or sub-systems, and
an integrated communication pattern giving similar
weighting to information generated.
To approach these two criteria, the energy and environment
systems would be expected to respond jointly to the challenge of
environmental management through the creation of the proper means
for achieving adequate resolution to environmental problems gener-
ated by energy activities.
"Muddling through" still characterizes some of the responses
of industry and government, such as industry providing no alter-
natives to a proposal or government merely reacting to industry
initiatives both of which only reinforce traditional patterns of
assessment and response. A cornmon pattern is to drift into joint
solutions to environmental problems between industry and govern-
ment where circumstance and expedience require or justify action
even before the inherent environmental complexities are made
clear. The wide array of actors and potential actors to become
involved in energy-environment responses appear to play a lesser
role than would seem warranted from the lack of environmental
information and alternatives known to exist. Drifting into joint
solutions among core actors with wide discretion and informal
relationships can distort the broader process of decision-making
where representative bodies should playa major role. Because
the government (majority party) can define the terms of its
relationship with outside interests, actors and pressure groups,
there is little requirement for these outside actor groups to be
concerned with or go through the Parliament. Such decision
strategies vis-a-vis other actors raise issues that affect the
decision-making or standard-setting system itself.
The systems perspective here emphasize comprehen-
sive and integrated responses to environmental management. It is
clear that such a response pattern would be qUite easy to set
-21-
aside since the results of a systems approach would not show in
the immediate future, except for accident responses which are
often soon forgotten by the public. While core actors do domi-
nate the decision-making system and do attempt to influence other
parts of the system to their viewpoint it is clear that other
actors are becoming more vocal. The actual persuasiveness of
other actors is still open to consideration. Nevertheless, as
core actors, both the oil industry and the requisite government
departments have begun to recognize the necessity of expanding
their information network, pressure points and feedback patterns.
In order for standards to be set in a conflict situation,
certain inter-system linkages should be developed. Some of the
linkages one could expect include:
integrated policy objectives and planning mechanisms:
the integration of environmental quality objectives and
planning precepts into the energy objectives and plan-
ning approaches at the highest level;
mUlti-disciplinary involvement: the involvement of
relevant, experienced professionals from a variety of
disciplines for generating a broader response spectrum;
public participation: the participation of a broad
spectrum of publics representing the relevant external
value dimensions of each system;
systems perspective: the perspective derived from a
systems analysis and synthesis for denoting the full
range of impacts, actors and responses;
reticulist role [7]: the creation of a special inter-
system role to provide a communications link between
policy systems for joint exploration of inter-linked
responses;
unified monitoring and communications system: the
development of a comprehensive and unified system of
data collection on the baseline, development impacts,
their effects and feedback to publics and actors in the
relevant policy systems.
Such inter-system links as these constitute examples of how the
energy-environment interface can be bridged. Taken together
these examples provide a technology assessment system capability
for obtaining the broadest possible assessment of the inter-
system implications of a major technologically oriented develop-
ment programme [8]. These inter-system linkages can occur through
and be integrated into most of the normal operations associated
with any major technology programme such as finance, personnel,
accounting, etc.
One key element that combines both a comprehensive view and
an integrative approach is that of the reticulist role suggested
by Friend, Power and Yewlett as noted above. The reticulist
becomes the system assessor of some major technological devel-
opment system. This role literally means networking judgements
which are reqUired in any policy system or decision network that
occupies the interface between two contiguous policy systems
such as development and environment.
-22-
The environmental management system in such a vast and
unknown area as, say, the North Sea is characterised by situations
which call for a joint energy-environment systems response. The
roles generated by the core actors of government and industry
have worked well to implement the development goals of these
actors, namely the maintenance of a rapid development pace and
increasing scale of development. However, this role has worked
only partially well in the overall environmental area, despite
efforts by the industry and government. The fact that impactees
and outside experts have a low profile in decision-making is
shown through the mismatch of roles. Such issues as the above
suggest that the decision-making system itself may not only be
lacking in such respects as including impactees from offshore
oil development and non-government affiliated experts, but that
it is not responding comprehensively nore in an integrated way.
A comprehensive technology assessment system would provide for
the inclusion of all actor groups arfected by offshore petro-
leum development [9]. Only those interests will be considered
in any assessment when all interested or affected parties are
directly involved in the assessment process.
-23-
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Summary
Public attention has frequently been directed to the large
accidental oil spills connected with tanker groundings or break-
ups and platform blowouts. The operational oil discharges con-
nected with offshore production platforms could, however, have
equally severe effects in the offshore environment because the
pollution occurs day after day as long as the activities that
produce it continue to operate. This study is concerned with
such discharges in the North Sea.
The study was focussed on the central actors involved in
the standard-setting process for operational or chronic discharges.
Each key actor was interviewed in depth to determine their
perceptions of the problem, the role of other actors, the alter-
natives considered and the interactions among actors. This
decision-making complex thus includes a variety of decision-
making units with varying abilities to influence the outcomes of
the standards. Regulator, developer and environmental expert
actors formed the basic focus for this effort.
The objectives of the regulators and developers are described
along with the alternative regulations, treatments and uses of
the environment that are considered. Then a comparison and eval-
uation is made of the decision process by which N~rwegian and U.K.
regulators arrived at 3tandardn.
Major findings include the near similarity of the standards
set even though the approaches to such standards are perceived
to be quite different in each country. Another finding is that
entrepreneurial endeavor for oil discharge treatment equipment
is a key parameter in deciding on standards since both countries
must rely on such effort for what is available. Lack of infor-
mation on the effects of oil in the sea is another finding along
with a minimal role for environmental quality factors in setting
standards. Such findings make it difficult to trace trade-offs
in the selection process for standard-setting. Finally, some
suggestions for improvements in this process are noted.
-v-
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Setting Standards for
Chronic Oil Discharges in the North Sea
1. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF OIL DISCHARGE REGULATION
IN THE NORTH SEA
Public attention and environmental concern with North Sea
oil operations have traditionally centered on tanker accidents
and oil blowouts from drilling and production platforms. This
emphasis on accidental oil spills is quite understandable con-
sidering the dramatic nature of such events, the publicity they
receive, and the damages they can do to the environment. Oil
slicks on amenity beaches and disabled sea gulls come to mind
when one thinks of accidental oil spills.
Meanwhile, another type of oil pollution has received rela-
tively little public attention: pollution through chronic (opera-
tional) oil discharges from ships and offshore production plat-
forms. Washing and ballast water are the main sources of chronic
oil pollution from ships. Production water from oil-water separa-
tion processes and displacement water from storage tanks are
routinely discharged from production platforms. Although acciden-
tal spills are more visible and can have a large and immediate
local impact, chronic discharges with low oil concentration levels
continue over the years and may have long term environmental effects.
The total amount of oil entering the sea through chronic
discharges is by no means small in comparison to accidental dis-
charges. Table 1 presents estimates of the United States Academy
of Sciences for the early 1980s. [1]
Table 1
Estimates of world wide oil pollution in the seas resulting from
from offshore oil activities
(tons per year; source: US Academy of Sciences, 1975)
ACCIDENTAL CHRONIC
TANKERS 150 000 200 000
PLATFORMS/ 150 000 50 000PIPELINES
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These discharges are part of a total of 4.57 million tons
of discharges from all sources including natural seeps, river
runoff, etc. The figure of 200 000 tons for chronic discharges
from tankers cited here refers only to ballast water, and it is
an optimistic estimate based on a strict enforcement of recent
international tanker regulations. According to the US Academy
of Sciences report chronic discharges from tankers are presently
more in the area of 1 million tons per year.
How do these world-wide figures translate into the North
Sea context? Estimates of the increase in oil pollution produced
by North Sea oil operations vary widely. An early report by the
Norwegian Ministry of Finance [2] stated a figure of 12 000 tons
of total oil discharges per 50 million tons of oil produced,
shipped, and stored. At present peak production estimates of
about 200 million tons for 1981, this would amount to approximately
48 000 tons of oil discharges per year, including accidental and
chronic discharges.
The Central Unit on Environmental Pollution (CUEP) of the
UK made some estimates of chronic oil discharges from UK opera-
tions including the Norwegian Ekofisk field. [3] Assuming rather
severe treatment levels for oily water they calculated that oil
operations would result in approximately 2000 tons of chronic
discharges per year.
Based on MIT statistics of accidental spill rates and amounts,
US Academy of Sciences statistics of chronic spill rates, and
North Sea statistics cited by two reports of the CUEP, [4,5],
estimates for chronic and accidental oil pollution resulting from
North Sea oil development in 1981 were made by the authors. These
are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Estimated increases in oil pollution resulting from North Sea oil
operations (tons per year)
ACCIDENTAL CHRONIC
TANKERS 1300 2400
PLATFORMS/ 5000 2200PIPELINES
Chronic oil discharges thus emerge as an equally severe
problem as accidental discharges if one looks at total discharge
figures.
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Some regulatory measures to reduce chronic oil discharges
from ships and platforms had already been taken by the UK and
Norway before North Sea oil production began. Both countries
follow the tanker regulations set forth by the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). [6] Oil discharges
from platforms were strictly forbidden by the Prevention of Oil
Pollution Act of 1971 (United Kingdom). [7] In practice, this
regulation became obsolete with growing oil development in the
North Sea. The initial solution to the dilemma that was posed
by the Act of 1971 was to issue exemptions to offshore operators
under the Petroleum and Pipelines Act of 1975. [8] This Act
allows an exemption to be issued to operators provided they use
"best practicable" means to reduce the oil content in discharged
water. But neither the strict prohibition of 1971 nor the loose
exemption rules of 1975 could be the final word about chronic
oil discharge regulations. More precise definitions of "best
practicable" means were needed.
With respect to offshore platform discharges, Norway faced
a similar situation as the UK. Norwegian pollution control
policy was to require operators to use "best applicable" means
to reduce the oil content in discharge water. But again there
was no firm rule or procedure by which the regulator could
establish or communicate what was meant by "best applicable"
means.
In both countries the main problem was to operationalize
their respective regulatory definitions. Both countries are
taking the route of setting standards on oil concentration,
although levels and application rules differ in each.
The following sections present an analysis of the processes
by which Norwegian and UK set standards on chronic oil discharges
from offshore production platforms, and how they apply these
standards in the day-to-day process of handling individual applica-
tions from oil developers. The information on which this analysis
is based was collected during two field studies in Norway and the
UK during which researchers, governmental officials and industry
representatives were interviewed.
The formal structure of the analysis borrows some elements
from decision theory and decision analysis. (See [9,10])
Decision theory has developed a set of tools which can be used
to aid decision makers in such complex tasks as setting and
applying standards. Among such tools are structural tools
(decision and goal trees), quantification methods (measuring
intangibles, quantifying uncertainty), and evaluation methods
(multiattribute utility methods) .
For a descriptive analysis of the Norwegian and UK standard
setting process the structural elements are probably as far as
one can go. In the following sections the decision makers and
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other actors involved in the standard setting process will be
described, including their goals, alternatives, and information
linkages. Then the actual decision process will be discussed
in terms of the information used to set standards and the insti-
tutionalt engineering, and economic constraints and criteria.
Finally, the paper will compare UK and Norwegian decision making
and point out some problem areas.
2. ACTORS IN THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS
Standard-setting is a socio-economic and political process.
This statement has been made previously by Majone [11] and
Holden [12]. Majone has noted the following points in line with
this thesis:
• a standard cannot be set on a purely scientific basis;
• a standard provides only an appearance of precision and
hence of "scientific" character;
• a standard always represents an implicit evaluation of
human well being;
• a standard is only one of other alternative means of
regulation;
• the institutional framework often determines the
decision on a standard;
• self-interest of regulatees moves them to attempt to
modify the terms of the regulator, including any
standards set.
In addition, Holden has noted that regulatory processes, including
standard-setting, are based on a bargaining process between
regulators and regulatees. [13] As an example of the political
nature of standard-setting Schon notes that an attempt to set
standards in the lumber industry for the "2x4" developed more
political response than any other issue in the recent history of
the US Department of Commerce. [14] Lumber producers both large
and small, building interests, federal agencies, state govern-
ments as well as US Congressmen and Senators were all engaged in
attempting to influence the thickness standard of the "2x4".
In regulatory decision making no simple decision making
framework can be readily adopted, since a number of decision
making units are involved. A complete system of actors that
could be included in a regulatory process may represent:
• regulatory actors,
• developers,
• experts,
• impactees,
• exogenous actors.
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For the present discussion only some aspects of these com-
plex "decision making units" are emphasized. The exogenous
actors, usually international institutions, often function as' a
constraint in regulatory decision making (e.g., the necessity to
meet international standards). The experts function in their
capacity to provide information pertinent to the regulation
problem (e.g., information on biological effects of oil dis-
charges) .
Figure 1 shows an attempt to delineate the potential actors
capable of being involved and impacted upon through chronic oil
discharges from offshore platforms and tankers in the UK. For
Norway (Figure 2) many of these actors are the same even though
some of the governmental actors have slightly different names
and responsibilities.
Before discussing the single actor groups in detail some
interlinkages between actor groupings should be mentioned. As
is readily discernible the development actors attempt to influence
opinion and regulation in both the international (exogenous
actors) and national (regulators) spheres. They have created
the Exploration and Production Forum (E&P Forum) and Offshore
Operator's Associations to perform the function of generating an
informal network into related policy formation systems. In
addition, other coordinating roles are occupied by the Central
Unit on Environmental Pollution (CUEP, UK) and the State Pollution
Control Agency (SPCA, Norway) which act as information sources
to the oil-related Energy and Trade Ministries and as coordinating
bodies in discharge control functions. The CUEP also acts as
liaison for environmental matters at the international level.
One could expect a priori that each of the five actor sub-
systems would be tied together for the setting of standards for
offshore chronic oil discharges. The following discussion will
show that the actual actor configuration, their, interlinkages
and contacts are in fact more limited. In the discussion a dis-
tinction has to be made between the setting of- guIdeline standards
and the actual day-to-day process of reviewing appli~ations to
discharge oily water. In Norway, the standards are set almost
exclusively on a case-by-case basis. In the UK, however, prior
to individual platform arrangements an attempt was made to create
some guideline standards that would provide the basis for day-
to-day regulations.
2.1 Regulatory Actors
Both governments attempt to organize their environmental
standard-setting process to interconnect with the offshore devel-
opers. Both countries have similar agencies to accomplish their
tasks. The major difference is that the UK relies on its
Petroleum Production Division to regulate offshore oil discharges
while Norway uses its State Pollution Control Authority.
Figure 1
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Figure 2 POTENTIAL ACTORS CONFIGURATION IN SETTING STANDARDS
FOR OFFSHORE CHRONIC OIL DISCHARGES IN NORWAY
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In the UK the CUEP performed the bulk of the work for
studying the chronic oil discharge problem and for working out
guideline standards. The main partner with which the CUEP con-
sulted during the process was the Petroleum Production Division
(PPD) of the Department of Energy, the division responsible for
implementing offshore discharge standards. Contact with local
regulators and authorities existed through the Scottish Office
and Her Majesty's Industrial Pollution Inspectorate for Scotland.
The Department of Trade was consulted in the standard-setting
process through its Marine Division which i·s responsible for oil
pollution from ships.
The Petroleum Production Division of the UK is in charge of
the day-to-day implementation and adjustment of standards (the
exemption to discharges under the 1975 act). In the process it
interacts with a variety of government actors, including the CUEP,
the Marine Division of the Department of Trade, as well as several
expert actors such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food and other divisions in the Department of Energy. However,
tllis process takes place exclusively in-house in an interaction
between key governmental actors.
In Norway the State Pollution Control Agency is responsible
both for setting standards and for implementing them. As of now
Norway has not decided to adopt firm standards for offshore plat-
forms but deals with discharge applications on a case-by-case
basis. Similar to the link between the CUEP and the PPD, the
SPCA interacts closely with the Petroleum Directorate and to some
extent with the Marine Directorate in its regulatory activity.
However, unlike the PPD, the SPCA also provides information about
discharges from proposed platforms to non-governmental experts,
impactees, and exogenous actors on a routine basis.
The main difference in the regulatory actors involved in
standard-setting between the UK and Norway is that in Norway the
central actors is the SPCA, an environmental actor; while in the
UK the main responsibility is in the hands of the PPD, an energy
actor aided in its research by the CUEP, a unit in the Department
of Environment. Furthermore, in the routine application of
standards to platforms the SPCA has a wider range of linkages
with actors outside of the industry-government sphere than the
PPD. Thus the UK has placed the standard-setting process for
offshore environmental protection directly into the agency that
has the responsibility for overseeing continued petroleum produc-
tion from offshore. Norway, on the other hand, has sought a
counter-balance in its standard-setting process.where an environ-
mental agency regulates oil company pollution instead of an oil
production agency.
2.2 Development Actors
The oil industry is the generic term for various development
actors involved in the standard-setting for chronic oil discharges
in Norway and the UK. The large private oil companies such as BP,
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Esso, Total, together with the national oil producers, the British
National Oil Corporation and the Norwegian STATOIL, form the main
body of what would fall under the heading of "developer". Included
also are the various contractors (equipment producers, shippers,
etc.), non-company operators and, in particular, the treatment
equipment manufacturers.
In CUEP's research on determining the basis for offshore
standards the oil industry was involved at several stages. First
of all, they provided data to the CUEP about equipment avail-
ability, equipment performance, etc. Treatment manufacturers
were contacted for this CUEP study, to provide data on costs and
performance ranges of oily water treatment equip~~nt. Second,
they were involved through representatives in a pUblic seminar
which was held at Heriot-Watt University [15] in which the main
issues related to chronic oil pollution standards were considered.
Yet the oil industry feels that their involvement in setting
these guideline standards was limited.
The oil companies and platform operators are in direct con-
tact with the respective regulation agency (SPCA in Norway and
PPD in the UK) in questions of oily water discharges from a
specific production platform. The companies submit a design
proposal or equipment specification with operating characteristics
to the regulator for approval. This is then reviewed, and either
accepted or modified. Furthermore, the SPCA and PPD are in con-
tact with treatment manufacturers, when it comes to specific
questions relating to treatment or monitoring equipment for a
specific platform.
2.3 Expert Actors
Various governmental and non-governmental experts are involved
in the standard-setting process both in Norway and the UK. In
the work of the CUEP on chronic oil discharges the Sea Fisheries
Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
(MAFF) provided expertise about the possible effects of chronic
oil pollution on fish and other marine organisms. The Warren
Springs Laboratory provided technical expertise on oily water
treatment. University researchers and expert councils, such as
the Nature Conservancy Councilor the National Environmental
Research Council, were not directly involved in the analysis of
chronic oil pollution by CUEP.
Experts are to some degree involved in the case-by-case
standard-setting in the UK and Norway. The PPD sends the dis-
charge application of the operator to various governmental groups,
including MAFF, Warren Springs Laboratory, and the Marine Division
of the Department of Trade. These applications are reviewed and
commented on by experts from these Departments. The SPCA sends
applications for discharges not only to governmental experts,
but also to fishery union experts, and non-governmental environ-
mental experts.
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Thus the main difference between the UK and Norway with
respect to the involvement of experts in chronic oil discharge
standard setting is that the PPD relies solely on in-house
expertise, while the SPCA also includes experts from outside of
government. The confidentiality of the operator's report as
well as the desire to maintain a good working relationship was
mentioned as the main reasons for keeping the review within
governmental agencies in the UK .
. 2.4 Impactee Actors
Potential sufferers of chronic oil pollution include the
fishermen and possibly the consumers of fish. Also included are
coastal residents, tourists, the tourism industry, and local
governments who may suffer from oily or tarred beaches. A
different type of impactee are ecologists, conservationists and
environmental groups who may not be directly impacted upon, but
their values (high evaluation of rare species, birds, etc.) are
affected.
In the CUEP research on guideline standards these impactees
had a possibility to be heard at a public seminar held by the
CUEP, but they were not directly involved in the process of
elaborating discharge standards. In the review process by the
PPD the impactees are not involved, although some governmental
experts could be interpreted as representing their personal or
professional interests (e.g., biologists from the MAFF). In the
Norwegian review process some impactees are involved; for example,
fishery organizations receive discharge applications for comment.
2.5 Exogenous Actors
Exogenous actors involved in the basic work on standards by
the CUEP were the SPCA and IMCO. Both were informed but not
directly involved in the standard setting process. The EEC
played a special role as an exogenous actor, since some member
countries which share non-oil North Sea resources could poten-
tially be affected by chronic oil pollution. The EEC has pushed
for rather stringent across-the-board standards.
In terms of the routine review of discharge exemptions
exogenous actors playa more limited role. The PPD and the SPCA
have contact but do not inform each other about every discharge
exemption case. There are contacts between the SPCA and the
Nordic environmental convention, but it is not clear to what
extent these contacts include actual discharge application reviews.
Although the above sections indicate all five actor groups
were involved in the setting of standards and in the day-to-day
review of discharge applications, the "core actors" are the
regulator and the developer. Although the impactees have little
direct involvement in the standard-setting process, the considera-
tion of their interests by the regulator makes them an implicit
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part of the process. In the further analysis of the objectives,
alternatives and decision making processes this paper will there-
fore concentrate on these three groups.
3. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF REGULATORS, DEVELOPERS AND IMPACTEES
The area of value and objectives has a much less firm data
base than do the alternatives noted in the next section. It is
usually difficult to elicit from the literature or from more or
less informal discussions a good picture of goals and objectives
for actual decision making. Therefore, some of the following
arguments will be rather hypothetical.
3.1 Regulatory Objectives
Environmental control agencies of the UK and Norway list at
various places goals and means for meeting environmental objec-
tives. Table 3 shows that the UK and Norway have relatively
similar goals and means for meeting environmental objectives.
Both the UK and Norway give credence to the best practicable and
best available means for meeting their environmental goals res-
pectively. The UK defines "best practicable" as the ability to
prevent or control pollutants as far as is practicable regarding
local conditions, financial implications and current technical
knowledge. [16] Best practicable is seen as distinct from the
best technological since it accounts for economic and other
implementation problems. Norway defines "best available" as the
use of the best available technology known internationally but
constrained by the costs of such technology. [17] Thus both
countries virtually end up with the same definition. [18]
Further regulatory objectives are related to the pressures
and constraints put on the regulator from the legal system and
from international and administrative demands. Qualitatively
speaking any regulation should:
• be easy to manage (implementation and control) ;
• fit into international agreements and rules;
• fit into the national legal and policy framework.
In the UK case such objectives worked rather as constraints.
There had been much concern about fitting discharge regulations
into international rules and policies. For platform regulations
the international community put pressure on the regulator in the
form of intern~tional conventions that suggested the early adop-
tion of rather stringent uniform oil discharge standards for the
North Sea. The constraints set by the legal framework in the UK
were largely defined by the Pollution Acts 6f 1971 and 1975.
In addition, regulatory constraints were imposed through
national oil development policy which tended to prohibit regula-
tions which would seriously interfere with the pace and scale of
oil development defined by political bodies. In the UK the goal
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of rapid oil development could probably be considered an integral
part of the regulatory objectives since the regulator is part of
the Department of Energy.
In Norway the SPCA objectives may be considered more concen-
trated on the environmental side. Neither international agree-
ments about pollution nor national energy policy seem to have had
a large impact. However, the manageability criterion may have
played a larger role in Norway which does not have a large
research or regulatory capacity to set standards and enforce them
regularly. The regulation of offshore platform discharge standards
in Norway is still a one-man operation in the SPCA.
3.2 Developer's Objectives
Two objectives may be of over-riding importance to the devel-
oper: minimization of investment and operational costs for pollu-
tion control equipment and minimization of ·possible sanctions or
costs due to violations of regulations. These objectives are in
direct conflict. Good equipment is expensive but ·insures against
violations of regulation or possible compensations to impactees.
While the cost of pollution control is easy to quantify the
cost for violation of regulation are not clear cut. However, it
was clear from discussions with environmental control officers
of the oil companies that the oil industry was highly concerned
about possible violations of governmental regulations. The
effects of such violations are, of course, not only monetary in
terms of additiona~ costs for equipment, penalties, shut-down
costs, etc., but they also relate to a worsening of the working
relationship with the regulatory agencies.
The environmental control officers which were contacted in
this study also pointed out that it was in the oil companies'
interest to minimize oil pollution from production platforms.
It is not clear, however, how this objective actually enters into
the offshore operators' decision making about pollution control
equipment and operation. It is probably fair to say that,
although the oil companies' concern about pollution is genuine,
it enters into the actual decision making rather through considera-
tions of compliance with regulation and general public sentiments.
The immediate environmental concern is therefore discussed in
detail only for the impactees.
3.3 Impactees' Objectives
The fishery side is concerned about minimizing a possible
loss of fish catch due to chronic oil pollution and about mini-
mizing the risks of chronic toxicity and tainting of fish. An
additional objective may be to minimize dirtying of equipment.
Tourists, tourism industry, local governments and beach residents
have identical objectives: preventing oil and tar balls from
reaching the shore waters and amenity beaches. The public at
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large as consumers of fish and other marine organisms should have
virtually identical interests as the fishing industry. Environ-
mentalists and ecologists are impacted more in their perceptions
and values and therefore have the additional objectives of mini-
mizing ecological disturbances due to chronic oil pollution as
well as minimizing mortality risks to rare marine species.
Figure 3 puts these objectives together under the explicit
definition of the UK objectives set out by the Department of
Environment. [19] The basic structure of the impactee objectives
is similar in Norway, although the general values and sentiments
of the "Norwegian way of life" may shift some of the priorities
as compared to the UK case.
4. ALTERNATIVE REGULATIONS, TREATMENTS AND USES OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Each actor group has its specific set of alternatives: regu-
lation alternatives, development alternatives, and environmental
responses and alternatives (excluded here are the impactees whose
perceptions are impacted by the development but who do not
actively use the environment).
4.1 Regulatory Alternatives
Figure 4 presents in a logical decision tree some of the
alternative means to regulate chronic oil discharges from offshore
production platforms. It also shows the path that the UK and
Norway have taken and where they ended. These alternatives span
the widest range that could possibly be considered by the respec-
tive regulators, the PPD and the SPCA.
The actual alternatives considered were, of course, much
more limited. In the research on chronic oil pollution control
by the CUEP the main focus was on average and maximum emission
levels, that is, on the required average performance of the oily
water treatment equipment and the maximum which should not be
exceeded a given percentage of the time. The question that the
CUEP addressed in its research was mainly: which average and
maximum level appears reasonable under environment, engineering,
economic and political considerations? Extreme alternatives
such as no regulation at all or of a total prohibition of dis-
charges were never seriously considered.
The Non~egian SPCA considers standards on average performance
in connection with total effluent volume as the main regulatory
tool for oil pollution; however, in its case-by-case application
of regulations to platforms it reverts, in practice, to an equip-
ment specification and approval regulation. Maximum performance
may be considered by the SPCA in the future.
Several other alternative regulatory means arise in such
case-by-case regulation. These include:
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• the information requested by the oil company for the
discharge application (e.g., cost, estimated performance
figures, effluent volume, location of discharge, distri-
bution of discharge, monitoring procedures, etc.);
• the circulation of applications for review (e.g., should
non-governmental groups be involved or not);
• choices of the monitoring and inspection procedure to be
imposed on the oil company;
• alternative sanctions for noncompliance.
4.2 Developer's Alternatives
Turning now to the substantive decision alternatives of the
offshore operator, Figure 5 presents a logical decision tree
including the kinds of treatment processes, equipment, and
operating rules to run that equipment. In addition to the choices
outlined in Figure 5, the operator has an additional choice not
to discharge the oily water at the platform, but rather to pump
it by pipeline to the shore where it can be treated or discharged.
The primary treatment branch which is followed through in the
figure is the most typical for offshore platforms. Sometimes it
is coupled with secondary gas flotation or filtering equipment.
For detai~s of the equipment, the reader is referred to [20].
It is interesting to note that the oil companies virtually
excluded the extreme alternatives from their considerations;
that is, either no treatment at all or very severe treatment
(biological or pumping oily water to the shore for treatment).
Plate interceptors have become good operating practice allover
the world and the offshore operators accept them as a practical
way to treat oily water discharges.
Biological treatment is considered infeasible for offshore
platforms, both by the operators and by the regulator. [21] The
reason mentioned is the large size of biological treatment facil-
ities (up to 4000 m3 for a treatment volume of 10 000 tons per
day). It is, however, not clear whether biological treatment is
technically infeasible or whether it is feasible only at a very
high cost. Concrete platforms with large storage volumes up to
100 000 tons should, in principle, be adaptable for biological
treatment. Also it should be feasible from an engineering point
of view to build a separate platform for a biological treatment
plant, of course, at a substantial cost increase.
4.3 Impactees' Alternatives
The impactees alternative uses of the marine environment do
not span a wide range. Fishermen can pursue either "business as
usual" or divert fishing activities away from potentially polluted
areas. The likely action is not to divert since it appears that
fish are attracted by platforms. However, safety zones are
established around platforms to avoid direct conflicts between
these activities.
-18-
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From present data and the scale of development it does not
appear that shorelines are affected by chronic oil pollution from
offshore platforms. Therefore, it is unlikely that tourists or
beach residents would have to take recourse to such extreme
alternatives as to move to non-polluted areas.
Although all groups have, in principle, the additional alter-
native of putting pressure on the regulator and the developer
either through direct petition or through various forms of public
and legal action, no such actions seem to have been considered
yet by any of the impactees.
5. THE DECISION PROCESS IN STANDARD SETTING
While the previous sections described and discussed the
elements of standard-setting for chronic oil discharges in terms
of actors involved and their objectives and alternatives, the
following section will describe the linkages in terms of informa-
tion flows, procedures, and data base in the actual decision
process for setting chronic oil discharge standards.
5.1 UK Standard Setting
Although the PPD issued discharge exemptions on a temporary
basis as soon as the first production platforms began operations,
the actual standard-setting process began only in 1975 with the
research done by the CUEP. This research aimed at identifying
guideline standards which would satisfy the environmental policy
criterion of enforcing "best practicable" means of pollution con-
trol, in line with engineering, economic, environmental, and
political objectives.
It soon became clear to the researchers involved that the
uncertainty about biological effects made the setting of discharge
standards on a purely biological basis virtually impossible. The
fate, turnover, and effect of oily water emissions have been
reviewed by several authors [22,23,24] but no firm conclusions
can be drawn. In the North Sea it appears that effluents with a
concentration of 50 ppm or less generate ambient oil concentration
levels which are hard to detect against the background hydro-
carbons in the sea water. Even at a highly polluting platform in
the Ekofisk field, no noticeable oil concentrations were found
away from the emission source.
Some marine biologists would agree that reasonable effluent
volumes with 50 ppm oil concentration and with good dispersion
characteristics will not lead to any direct harmful effects on
marine organisms. Some oil company experts argue even stronger.
From their experience in the Gulf of Mexico no short or long term
effects could be shown even at higher effluent concentrations.
Independent marine biologists are more cautious: they leave open
the possibility of long term cumulative effects of low oil con-
centration in water or short term and medium term behavioural
effects such as on spawning behaviour.
-20-
Because of this uncertainty about biological effects of oil
in the sea water, the CUEP concentrated its effort mainly on
estimates of total amounts of oil discharged in the North Sea and
on technical feasibility, costs, and performance of oily water
treatment equipment. By making rather stringent assumptions
about treatment levels (25 ppm), production rates, transportation,
and storage the CUEP calculated that approximately 585 tons of
oil will be discharged from UK platforms in 1981. [25] In this
study an independent estimate of 2,200 tons per year was made for
the whole North Sea from all production platforms. The difference
cannot be explained by the additional platforms in the Ekofisk
and the Statfjord field alone. It appears that the UK estimate
is based on far too optimistic assumptions. Even the estimate
of this paper may be below actual performance figures. Platforms
exist in the Norwegian sector which are estimated to discharge
more than 800 tons of oil per year at peak production levels.
On the technical and economic side the CUEP studied in detail
various oily water treatment equipment. A summarized version of
the results is presented in Table 4. The performance figures
could only be given in ranges since equipment manufacturers, oil
companies, and independent researchers differ, often substantially,
in their assessment of equipment performance. This uncertainty
about actual performance played, in fact, a large role in standard-
setting. Equipment manufacturers typically cite very good perfor-
mance figures, while the oil companies doubt that these figures
can be achieved in the field. In discussions with oil company
representatives views were expressed that the figures used by the
CUEP may be too optimistic. They feared that standards set on
the basis of such optimistic figures could not be achieved in
practice.
The study by the CUEP naturally did not mention any political
objectives in setting standards. However, it should be clear
that international pressures would have required standards set
in the range of international acceptability (currently such
standards vary from 10 ppm in Japan to 50 ppm in the US) .
The CUEP study implies that standards of 30-40 ppm should
be achievable with currently used technology at a reasonable cost.
The conclusion of the CUEP study was, among others:
"Data suggest that an average oil concentration of
30-40 ppm is achievable with present technology.
A maximum effluent oil concentration· of 100 ppm
should not be exceeded more than 2% of the time.
New developments of existing systems for use on
platforms may be able to reduce the effluent oil
concentration to an average of 20 ppm, but these
systems have not yet been fully evaluated." [25, p.22]
The translation of these guideline standards into the case-
by-case standard setting for individual platforms is done by the
PPD. An application for an exemption to discharge is forwarded
to the PPD from the oil company wanting to build the platform.
Information is requested by the PPD from the company such as
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monitoring data from around the proposed platform site, the pro-
duction aspects of the platform, volumes of oil to be treated,
and location and depth of discharges. This information is then
summarized and circulated to the organizations as described
earlier, all of which are within the UK government. Comments
received are then used as the basis for the PPD in setting oil
discharge standards.
Contacts between the oil company and the regulator are
informal. If the application is not acceptable as is the regu-
lator can only suggest problem areas and cannot tell the company
what it should do to correct the situation. This problem exists
because the regulator may have to advise the Secretary should
the company decide to appeal the regulator's ruling. Thus the
PPD only recommends the limit of discharge (maximum average,
maximum to be exceeded four percent of the time, maximum volume
per day, etc.,) and the conditions necessary to obtain an exemp-
tion. Monitoring procedures are determined by the PPD. The
granting of the exemption and the conditions under which it is
granted are also circulated to the same organizations for comment.
Again standards are set on a case-by-case basis. Information on
such standards and discharges is available to the public ex post
facto in 'the annual reports published by the Department of Energy.
The PPD in conjunction with the CUEP has evolved six basic
operating principles:
1) provision of certain basic information on oil treatment
alternatives on offshore platforms to oil companies,
2) emphasis on pollution control equipment since the effects
of oil in the marine environment are not well known,
3) emphasis on good pollution control equipment being
installed to meet the agreed standard of discharge,
4) maintenance of good informal working relations among
government departments and between government and
companies,
5) setting of good monitoring procedure as part of the con-
ditions to obtain an exemption for oil discharges,
6) burden of proof for not installing treatment devices is
shifted to companies since they must apply for exemption.
In January 1977 eight production platforms operated in the
UK sector, six of which produce oily water discharges. The
exemptions which have been granted so far were generally based
on a standard of 40 ppm average oil concentration for production
platforms with a large discharge volume (greater than 100 000
barrels Of oily water a day) and a maximum of 100 ppm not to be
exceeded 96% of the time. Platforms with smaller effluent
volumes are required to treat oily water down to a level of 50 ppm
average oil concentration. One platform has been granted an
exemption although its oil concentration is on the average higher
than 50 ppm.
-23-
These decisions indicate only slight deviations from the
CUEP proposal. Most notable is the change from 98% to 96% for
excess maximal perfor~ance. It is unclear by what process this
change occurred.
110nitoring is used in the UK to provide a data base for
standard-setting. Oil companies are given responsibility for
such monitoring. Each platform is to be monitored twice a day
by the company having operational responsibility. The PPD deter-
mines the method of monitoring and the method of analysis. Twice
a month the platforms are inspected by the PPD, but since heli-
copter space must be reserved in advance no surprise inspections
are possible. The results of such monitoring are subjected to
analysis by a government laboratory. The expenses of such
analyses are borne by the companies involved.
5.2 Norwegian Standard Setting
In the Norwegian case no research was carried out to deter-
mine guideline standards. However, several reports to the Storting,
the Norwegian parliament, [26, 27] indicate the positions which
the Norwegian government takes with respect to oil discharges
and possible environmental effects. As mentioned before, the
estimates for total oil discharges from North Sea oil development
are more pessimistic than the ones generated by UK governmental
researchers. Also the overall impression from these reports is
that the potential environmental effects of oil are taken much
more seriously than in the UK. In fact, environmental considera-
tions had a strong influence on the Norwegian decision to halt
development North of the 62nd parallel.
The SPCA sets and revises standards for offshore platforms
against this background on a case-by-case basis, revising its
position as the process goes along. The SPCA requests information
from the oil company wanting to discharge oily water from offshore
drilling and production platforms. The oil pollution control
equipment used to reduce oil discharges is included as part of
the application for the platform. The information requirements
include:
• production process: amounts of oil to be produced, how
the oil is to be handled, where oil pollution points
exist, amounts of other wastes to be produced;
• monitoring process: how marine environment around platform
is to be monitored;
• location of platform offshore (location is non-negotiable);
• function of platform: drilling for what kinds of petroleum,
how petroleum is transported;
• storage of oil: where and how;
• effluent treatment: displacement water, production water,
drainage water collection and treatment plus treatment
costs.
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The above information is then summarized, shown to the oil company
first, and then sent to the organizations noted earlier for com-
ment within eight weeks. Once comments are received they are
used to guide the SPCA in its standard-setting process. Contacts
between the oil company and the SPCA are informal, and they meet
together to discuss the tentative standards before they are
finally set. When the SPCA meets with the oil company both the
Oil Directorate and the r1arine Research Institute are invited.
Generally, discharges are allowed if the operator uses
equipment that reduces the oil content in the effluent down to
50 ppm. However, the SPCA considers tightening up this standard
in the future. Although no firm data are available about actual
performance yet, it appears that the total volume of oil dis-
charged may be substantially higher in Norway than in the UK due
to large volumes of displacement water discharges. Also, some
platforms in the Ekofisk field still use relatively poor treat-
ment equipment.
The SPCA has adopted five basic operating assumptions:
1) a wide circulation of information of pending platform
applications even though little hope exists that the
impactee or exogenous actors will have information of
use to the regulator,
2) an emphasis on pollution control equipment rather than
on standards per se since the effects of oil in the
marine environment are not well known,
3) an emphasis on working with the oil companies in the
platform design stage to allow pollution control equip-
ment to be integrated into the platform design itself,
4) if pollution can be technically controlled the SPCA is
interested in reducing such pollution if at all possible
and reasonable to do so,
5) given the lack of information on effects of oil in the
marine environment the environment is given a strong
bias to preserve future options.
One particular problem for the SPCA is its relative newness
in regulating offshore oil activities. It has had little expe-
rience in dealing with multi-national companies. It also does
not have the manpower and information resources available to it
that such companies have. Therefore, its knowledge of alterna-
tives is reduced and it attempts to depend on other bodies for
information and for valuations of such information.
In addition, monitoring procedures are established. The
oil companies are asked to do baseline monitoring in the vicinity
of the platform location before construction occurs in coopera-
tion with the Marine Research Institute. During the actual pro-
duction phase monitoring continues at fixed points around the
platform, again the company taking primary responsibility in
cooperation with the ~1arine Research Institute. Only levels of
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oil discharges are collected. These figures and samples are
then sent to be evaluated by the Marine Research Institute and
the Fishery Research Institute. The former institute also con-
ducts an independent monitoring program on oil levels monthly.
The complexity of hydrocarbon compounds and the relationship of
oil with other pollutants makes evaluation of monitoring results
(as well as setting standards) difficult. Also companies are
reluctant to do continuous monitoring and then send such data to
independent institutes for fear that their own figures would be
used against them. The greatest problem in Norwegian monitoring
appears to be a lack of a common monitoring framework using a
wide variety of biological and ecological variables tied together
into a systems approach.
5.3 Biological Information for Standard-Setting
While both countries have adopted monitoring programs as a
part of their standard-setting process it is clear that a major
gap exists in the availability of adequate information on the
long-term effects of chronic oil discharges on marine organisms.
One would like to answer questions for such a consequence assess-
ment as: Given normal fishing operations and no oil development
what is the amount and quality of fish catch that the fishing
industry can expect? To what degree do different levels and
amounts of chronic oil pollution reduce the amount and quality
of the catch? To what degree does chronic oil pollution endanger
the ecological balance in the marine environment? To what degree
does chronic oil pollution contribute to dirty fishing equipment
and to producing dirty shore waters and oil slicks on amenity
beaches?
The basic answer to these questions from scientists, regu-
lators and managers was: we do not know. There seems to be an
enormous uncertainty with respect to biological effects of oil
that is discharged at low but constant levels into the sea waters.
Ambient oil concentrations are hard to detect against background
hydrocarbons in the sea. Even at a highly polluting platform in
the Ekofisk field (at least 10-30 tons of oil are being discharged
there monthly) which is located near a very large herring spawning
ground, marine biologists can not claim that there are effects of
oil on fish.
The process from emission to the fish or marine organisms
into the food chain is uncertain: the fate and turnover of oil
once released is currently beyond measurement. But in the judge-
ment of marine experts reasonable effluent volumes with 50 ppm
discharged offshore with good dispersion will not lead to any
direct harmful effects on fish and marine organisms. On the
other hand, marine biologists do not reject the possibility of
behavioural effects of small amounts of oil pollution (e.g., on
spawning behaviour) and of long-term cumulative effects on fish
and in the food chain. An additional source of uncertainty
arises onshore, where synergetic effects of oil together with
other pollutants from refineries and other industries may occur.
-26-
The high uncertainty about the effects of biological effects
created another source of opinion conflict among the various
decision making units involved in the regulation problem. Experts
from the offshore operators side claim no effects whatsoever with
present treatment levels. Some marine biologists and fishery
representatives warn of the potential long-term effects.
In the light of such uncertainty and the importance of this
issue one would expect both countries to have staged a comprehen-
sive marine research program on effects of oil pollution.
Although the problem of oil pollution in the North Seas was known
several years ago, up to now the research responses to reduce
this uncertainty have been slow and rather ad hoc.
The main result of the uncertainty about biological effects
in the Norwegian regulation setting was a rather pessimistic view.
The pessimism with respect to consequence estimates has, of
course, several other supporting sources: the strong Norwegian
sentiment favouring fishing and the general policy of slowed
development of the oil fields. The first sources makes a pessi-
mistic assessment of biological effects a political necessity,
the second factor allows the pessimism to be translated into
rather strict standards and regulations. Practically, this
pessimism is related to the environmental policy to use best
technical (applicable) means to prevent chronic oil pollution.
In the UK regulation the uncertainty about biological
effects resulted in a shift from environmental considerations in
regulations to equipment performance and cost considerations.
Rather than starting - like the Norwegian regulators claim -
with a worse environmental case attitude, UK regulators asked
which efficient treatment equipment can be implemented without
imposing too high a cost to the developer. This consequence of
the uncertainty about biological effects is compatible with the
prevailing UK objectives of rapid oil field development and the
general environmental policy to use "best practical means" in
reducing pollution.
6. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Comparing Norway with the UK it is clear that certain simi-
larities and differences exist in their standard-setting processes
for offshore oil discharges fro~ platforms. Table 5 is an attempt
to summarize the differences between Norway and the UK. Since it
is generally self-explanatory little necessity exists for elabo-
rating on the information in this table. The similarities between
these two countries include the following points:
• emphasize treatment equipment;
• standards tied to equipment;
• standards (equipment) set on a case-by-case basis;
• standards set in vicinity of 40-50 ppm;
• attempt, to work with company in design stage;
Table 5
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COMPARISON OF REGULATORS OF OIL. DISCHARGES CONNECTED
WITH OFFSHORE PLATFORMS IN THE NORTH SEA
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORWAY AND UK
NORWAY
• regulator is pollution
control authority with
emphasis on environment
• regulator had to create
regulatory structure
• impactees asked for comments
• regulator open with
inforrna tion
• problem viewed as
environmental with emphasis
on fish impacts
• no research on treatment
alternatives
• pessimstic estimates of
total amount of oil
discharges
UK
• regulator is petroleum
production unit with
emphasis on energy
• regulator had to redesign
regulatory structure
• impactees not asked for
comments
• regulator keeps information
confidential
• problem viewed as political
and technical
• published one paper on
treatment alternatives
• optimistic estimates of
total amount of oil
discharges
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• monitoring process tied to dischnIge permit;
• responsibility on company to monitorj
• energy unit inspects monitoring.
One key finding is that both countries must wholly rely on
entrepreneurial endeavour for oil discharge treatment alterna-
tives. Neither country is attempting to initiate a research
program to develop technological treatment alternatives; nor are
these countries testing such equipment for performance ranges.
In addition, the standards set depend directly on such
treatment equipment as is shown below:
• availability: existence
• capability: performance
• practicability: size and price.
Given a lack of information on biological and chemical effects
of oil on the marine environment both regulators have turned to
practical solutions to their regulatory function. Key factors
include the platform space available for containing such treat-
ment equipment on the platform as well as the cost of such equip-
ment, which has been reported as approaching ten percent of total
platform cost. Given this high cost and the lack of data on
negative effects of oil in the marine environment it is surprising
that the oil companies appear so willing to install treatment
equipment. It would be very difficult for the regulators to
state their case on a strong research basis.
Another important finding is that the degree of severity of
oil discharge standards offshore affects oil discharges near-
shore or onshore as well. If the offshore standard is low, say
0-20 ppm, and if it is coupled with a rigorous offshore monitoring,
inspection and sanction program then one could expect that dis-
charges might occur elsewhere in the company's operations closer
into or onshore. Therefore, given a cost constraint to the com-
pany a tightening of operations in one place can mean a loosening
of operations in another place which may have greater environ-
mental effects.
The last major finding is the lack of a role for the actual
quality of the environment in the setting of discharge standards
offshore. In no case discussed did the environmental quality
appear to be a significant factor in the standard-setting process.
There appeared to be no fundamental change in location, design,
technology or operation of any offshore project based solely on
environmental quality criteria. Rather in each case standards
were tied directly to performance of treatment equipment avail-
able for installation on platforms. Data other than for treat-
ment equipment comes from physical aspects of the North Sea such
as winds, currents, etc., rather than from any biological or
ecological data.
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Each of these regulators have quite different perceptions
of the other. For example, the SPCA sees the UK as linking its
standards to the assimilative capacity of the site whereby treat-
ment equipment is used only when the expected pollution levels
will exceed the capacity of that site. On the other hand, the
CUEP and PPD see Norway as being very unreasonable in forcing
companies to adopt the latest equipment available regardless of
cost. As seen from the earlier discussion neither perception is
correct.
The analysis of the standard-setting process about chronic
oil discharges in the UK and Norway leads to several recommenda-
tions as to how the regulators could possibly improve their
standard-setting process. While actual performance cannot be
evaluated yet, the regulators' decision making intentions and
capabilities have been identified and discussed.
In reviewing and updating oil discharge standards it will
be necessary to continually monitor ambient distributions and
effects on marine organisms. Therefore a comprehensive research
program should be organized to assess changes in ambient oil
concentrations close and far away from platforms and terminals.
In addition, a stronger effort should be made to study the bio-
logical effects of oil in the North Sea. As a starting point,
marine biologists should be encouraged to state and quantify
what they know and what they do not know about biological effects
and assess at least the extreme upper and lower limits of detri-
mental effects from offshore marine pollution. The data from a
comprehensive marine research program could then be used to up-
date the information already expressed in present knowledge.
Secondly, it would be advisable to maintain an ongoing file
of possible regulatory and treatment options as reference points.
At the moment the regulators are forced to evaluate only the
technical design proposal made by the developer. The regulator
himself does not have sufficient in-house research capacity to
come up with specific alternatives to change proposed treatment
plans. Consequently, most regulatory decisons will remain patch-
work. If the regulator cannot maintain a file of possible treat-
ment alternatives for platforms, the developer should be requested
to submit several proposals at different discharge levels for the
regulator to select among them.
Thirdly, the regulator should make more explicit his own
objectives in dealing with oil discharges, both in terms of
internal regulation objectives and in terms of trade-offs between
development and environment. Measures of these objectives could
then continually be used to analyse present standards and regula-
tions. They could also be used to communicate between central
and local regulators and to solicit more useful responses from
reviewers in the discharge application review process.
Fourth, there may be some benefit in quantifying some of
the intangibles, at least by marking them against reference events
or reference alternatives. For example, one may think of quali-
tatively comparing the assumed biological effects of several
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amounts of oil spills with discharges from platforms, both against
a "no development" alternative. The step from such a qualitative
comparison to a judgemental scaling of effects is not very large.
Such quantification could then be updated continually on the basis
of new information and lead to faster responses in changing stan-
dards and regulations.
Fifth, public participation and advocacy in the standard
setting and regulation process could be improved. By this is
meant both a higher involvement (for example in the UK review
process of discharge applications) and a more structure~ dialogue,
(in eliciting preferences and opinions from environmentalists and
fishery representatives). Public participation should be made
part of the decision making process rather than operating mainly
as an insurance against future complaints and criticism.
All of these suggestions amount to a more comprehensive and
integrated system for environmental information collection,
evaluation and decision making. While these proposals are costly,
considering the highly uncertain future effects of chronic oil
discharges, they may turn out to be less costly than future
efforts and strains to avert a possible disaster.
The systems perspective of actors in a socio-economic-
political process emphasizes comprehensive and integrated res-
ponses to environmental management. It is clear that such a
response pattern would be quite easy to set aside since the
results of a systems approach would not show in the immediate
future, except for accident responses which are often soon for-
gotten by the public. However, the evidence in this study shows
that the record is mixed. Nhile core actors do dominate the
decision-making system and do attempt to influence other parts
of the system to their viewpoint it is clear that other actors
are becoming more vocal. The actual persuasiveness of other
actors is still open to consideration. Nevertheless, as core
actors both the oil industry and the requisite government depart-
ments have recognized the necessity of expanding their information
network, pressure points and feedback patterns.
The environmental management system in such a vast and
unknown area as the North Sea is characterized by situations which
call for a joint energy-environment systems response. The roles
generated by the core actors of government and industry have
worked well to implement the development goals of these actors,
namely the maintenance of a steady development pace and increasing
scale of development. However, this role has worked only partially
well in the overall environmental area, despite efforts by
interested parties in industry and government. The fact that
impactees and outside experts have a low profile in decision
making is shown through the mismatch of roles. Such issues as
the above suggest that the decision making system itself may not
only be lacking in such respects as including impactees from
offshore oil development and non-government affiliated experts
but that it is not responding comprehensively nor in any integrated
way. A comprehensive technology assessment system would provide
-31-
for the inclusion of all actor groups affected by offshore petro-
leum development. [28] Only those interests will be considered
in any assessment when all interested or affected parties are
directly involved in the assessment process.
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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the problem of noise pollution control
for the super-rapid Shinkansen trains in Japan. The approach
of the paper is a structured policy analysis based on an identi-
fication of actors, their objectives, and decision alternatives.
Such actors include, the Environmental Agency of Japan, the
Japanese National Railway Corporation (JNR) , and the various
residents groups fighting Shinkansen noise pollution. The
structural part of the analysis elaborates a set of possible
objectives and alternatives for pollution control, and discusses
the decision making intentions of the actors involved. Two
specific decision processes are then described in detail: the
decision process of the Environment Agency to set noise standards
for Shinkansen trains and the actions of the Association against
Nagoya Shinkansen Public Nuisance against JNR.
Findings are derived from comparing the results of the struc-
tural analysis (possible objectives and alternatives, main deci-
sion making intentions) with the actual decision making. A main
finding is that the Environmental Agency intended to set environ-
mental quality standards (targets) but instead set enforcement
standards (rules). These enforcement standards were evaluated
and selected as if they were quality standards, that is purely
on the basis of environmental information. Other information on
the cost, engineering, national economic impact of regulation,
which should have been considered for enforcement standards, was
neglected. Another finding is the reactive role of JNR in the
standard setting process as well as in the interaction with the
Nagoya Association. JNR perceives Shinkansen noise largely as
an engineering problem with engineering solutions responding to
regulations. JNR's reactions were based on a desire to maintain
the status quo (maintain train speed, comfort, safety) and to
keep future development options open. The Nagoya Association had
an impact on the decision making process of the Environment Agency
and JNR only indirectly, since Japanese environmental decision
making does not provide for direct inputs from impactees. The
Association managed to enlist a variety of governmental and union
supporters for their cases to stop Shinkansen noise, but failing
to effectively interact with JNR and the Environment Agency, it
finally began a court case against JNR which is still pending.
Overall, the findings of this study are a lack of comprehen-
siveness in the objectives and alternatives considered by the
actors involved in the decision making and limited interactions
between the main decision making groups. The discussion argues
for using formal tools to improve standard setting decisions.
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF NOISE POLLUTION
CONTROL FOR SHINKANSEN TRAINS
Like other types of pollution, noise can disturb, irritate,
hurt and even damage. But few other pollutants cause such im-
mediate and obvious aggravation as noise. The effects of noise
range from slight disturbance of sleep or conversation, over
physiological distress, to psychosomatic stress symptoms, and
even physiological damage to the hearing system. There is
another characteristic feature of noise pollution: people who
suffer from noise usually quickly identify its source, complain,
and try to stop it. In fact, in the last few years noise was
the single largest source of complaints about environmental pol-
lution in Japan. Statistics show that in 1974 noise clearly domi-
nated air, water, and other types of pollution with ~4,000 com-
plaints. As one high official of the Environment Agency summa-
rized: "Noise pollution, particularly of transportation pollution,
has become the most important difficult problem at present"
(Hashimoto, 1975, p.l).
Hashimoto especially singled out transportation noise be-
cause there has been massive action by citizens and political
groups against noise from highways, railways, and airports. The
most dramatic case was probably the battle against the new Narita
International airport in Tokyo. Citizens and radical political
groups have prevented the start of operations there for several
years. Less dramatic, but with equally severe effects was a legal
battle involving Osaka International Airport which citizens won in
1974. The court put severe restrictions on frequency and timing
of jet flights. Residents also have begun protest action to
fight highway noise. A law suit was filed in 1974 by the resi-
dents along the Kobe-Osaka Freeway. In this list of protest
targets railways are n9t missing. In fact, the Shinkansen has
been one of the most criticized sources of noise pollution in
Japan.
Nobody denies that the Shinkansen is noisy. With its speed
up to 210 km/hour it can reach noise levels around 110 dB* Jet
planes (from a good distance) and sledgehammers (from nearby) are
louder, motorcycles are comparatively quiet. To give some reference
points: the interior noise of some cars at high speeds can be
around 80 dB, at busy street intersections the noise level is
about 70 dB, in quiet residential areas at night the noise level
may be 30 dB. Between 30 and 60 dB sounds are usually not
* The decibel scale (dB) is the fundamental measure of noise which
reflects approximately the human perception of loudness. Some-
times a weighted scale dB(A) is used which also takes different
frequencies of noise into account. Other measures are the phone
and the sone scale as well as physical measures of sound intensity.
For details, the reader is referred to Beranek, 1971.
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considered "noisy", unless the environment or the sound itself
has some peculiar characteristic.
"Residents in a distance of up to 100 meters from the tracks
may be substantially disturbed by Shinkansen noise. Complaints
about Shinkansen noise over the last few years confirm this.
Table 1 shows the distribution of complaints and petitions against
the Shinkansen between 1964 and 1975 on the highly populated
stretch between Tokyo and Osaka. Noise and vibration cleariy
dominate the picture. But people and residents have not stopped
with complaints and petitions. New lines of the Shinkansen like
the Tohoku-Juetsu Shinkansen are sites of residents' protests.
Residents have formed organizations such as the "League Against
Shinkansen Pollution", and "Association Against Nagoya Shinkansen
Public Nuisance", and the "Protest Group Against Shinkansen TV
Interference", to represent their interests against Japanese
National Railways (JNR). In one word: The Shinkansen has be-
come a major target of environmental criticism and protest in
Japan.
The growing conflict between JNR and residents caused regu-
latory agencies to act. Before the establishment of the Envi-
ronment Agency in 1971, several regulatory and legal actions had
been taken against noise pollution in Japan, primarily on the
industrial and workbench noise sector. With the birth of the
Environment Agency (EA) noise pollution control measures were
enacted rapidly: in 1972, the Director of the EA recommended
to the Ministry of Transportation and JNR to take "urgent steps
on Shinkansen noise abatement".
Table 1: Complaints against Shinkansen Noise (Tokyo-Shin-Osaka)
~ 1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 75On Total
Noise 9 13 16 6 2 2 1 2 3 6 5 12 13 90
Vibration 11 16 19 9 3 5 1 2 5 1 6 9 0 87
Noise & Vibration 10 13 7 10 5 3 3 17 8 16 36 41 6 175
Wind Pressure 2 4 1 1 2 10
Interference on TV -
Others 1 4 4 6 6 1 6 6 1 1 11 10 10 67
33 50 47 32 16 11 11 27 17 24 58 72 31 429
Source: Yorino, 1977b
At the same time a special committee in the Central Council
for Control of Environmental Pollution (the advisory body to the
EA) began to study the problem of noise pollution from transport-
ation sources. Environmental quality standards of 70-75 dB were
finally issued by the EA for Shinkansen noise in 1975.
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But the noise standards and JNR's efforts to comply within
the given time framework did not end the conflict between JNR
and the residents. The "Association against Nagoya Shinkansen
Public Nuisance" filed a law suit against JNR which is still
pending; the plaintiffs did not accept the EA standards and
still request stricter standards, slower speeds, and compensa-
tion. New construction sites of Shinkansens are again the issue
of strong public debate. At present nobody can predict the
outcome of this protest development. It appears that the noise
problem, already a major problem for JNR as well as residents
and the governmental regulators, may persist and become a main
obstacle for further development of the Shinkansen.
In the following sections the decision process of JNR, the
EA, and residents groups will be analysed to structure the deci-
sion problem of noise pollution control, to describe the decision
process of the three actor groups, and to identify sources of
conflict. The data for this study were collected during a three
week field study in Japan. All major actors were interviewed in
depth. No actual measurements were taken, and the quantifica-
tions reported are largely from the literature. An analytical
approach will be used to structure the noise control problem
which has already been applied to studying the problem on chronic
oil pollution control in the North Sea (Fischer and v. Winterfeldt,
1978). The approach is a structured policy analysis of the deci-
sion process which generates a qualitative problem oriented pic-
ture of the pollution control problem by answering such questions
as: Who is involved? What are the objectives? What are their
decision alternatives? These structural elements of the decision
making are then put together in an actual description of the in-
formation processing, evaluation, and decision making of the
actors involved in the noise control problem. The focus will be
on the decision making of the Environment Agency when setting
environmental noise quality standards, and the Nagoya Association
in combating Shinkansen noise pollution, since JNR's role in the
process seems to be largely reactive to governmental and citizens
actions. After discussing and evaluating the decision process
of the Environment Agency, JNR and residents groups, methods to
improve decision making for such pollution control problems will
be discussed.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE NOISE POLLUTION CONTROL PROBLEM:
ACTORS, THEIR OBJECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVES
Regulatory actors, objectives and alternatives
The historical, legal, and organizational framework for
environmental pollution control in Japan is described elsewhere
(see, for example, Environment Agency, 1976; Hashimoto 1975).
Here, only the two main regulatory bodies involved in noise pol-
lution control for Shinkansen trains will be discussed: The
Environment Agency and its advisory body, the Council for Control
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of Environmental Pollution. The Environment Agency reports
directly to the Prime Minister and the Parliament. Decisions
such as environmental standard setting are made on recommenda-
tions of the Director of the Environment Agency by Cabinet
orders. The legal framework for such decisions is formulated
in the Basic Environmental Law for Environmental Pollution Con-
trol Measures (1967) and in special laws such as the noise re-
gulation law of 1968.
The bulk of the information processing, evaluation and
decision making on noise standards was performed by the Council
for Control of Environmental Pollution. This Council is sub-
divided into three organizational layers: the General Meeting,
the subcommittees and the expert committees. Expert committees
are the research bodies which sponsor, collect and evaluate
studies on special pollution problems and make recommendations
about standards to the subcommittees. These recommendations
have to be made purely on a scientific basis. The subcommittees
are the political advisory bodies to the General Meeting and the
Director of the EA. In their recommendations they have to con-
sider the technical and scientific facts and recommendations sub-
mitted by expert committees and olitical, economic and other
possible factors which influence stan ard setting. The u timate
decision is then made by the Director of the EA or by the Cabinet.
The Council began studies on noise pollution control for
Shinkansen trains in 1972. Its subcommittee on noise and vibra-
tion control consisted of 15 members, including represenatives of
JNR, the EA, the Institute for Public Health, the Ministry of
Transportation, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI). An expert committee was formed in 1972 to study the prob-
lem of Shinkansen noise in depth. This committee had 11 members,
all experts in noise pollution problems. 6 university professors,
a member of the National Institute of Public Health, a member of
the National Institute for Noise Problems belonged to this commit-
tee as well as experts from JNR, the automobile industry, and other
industries. For implementing standards the Environment Agency has
to rely on local governments and city environmental or police
bodies. It should be noted that in this organizational set-up
for noise pollution control decision making (as in other environ-
mental decision making cases) no direct participation by the
sufferers of pollution is provided for.
The Council is probably the regulatory actor which strongly
shaped the decision on noise standard setting. To understand the
objectives of the Council and the Environment Agency in setting
noise standards one has to examine the Basic Law for Environmental
Pollution Control of 1967. This law provides a common goal for
integrated control measures based on environmental quality stan-
dards (EQS). EQS have the role of targets, desirable states to
be achieved some time in the future .. They are distinguished
from enforcement standards (ES) which are direct regulatory
tools for managing a particular pollution problem by putting
enforcible limits on emmissions or total amounts of pollution.
The noise regulation law of 1968 provides such enforcement
standards for industrial noise, automotive noise and construc-
tion noise (see Environment Agency, 1976).
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Considering environmental quality standards for Shinkansen
noise first, the goals and objectives for such standards should
have the character of desired states of quietness in the sense
of "Maintaining and protecting human health and conserving the
living environment" (Environment Agency, 1977). More concretely,
noise quality standards should be set as to prevent adverse
effects of Shinkansen noise on human health .(damage to hearing),
psychological well being (increased stress symptoms), and normal
human activities (rest, conversation, etc.).
For enforcement standards economic, technical, and political
objectives may be considered besides environmental objectives.
Improvement of the transportation sector, governmental policy
objectives of "balanced growth of the economy", agreement with
international standards, reduction of complaints may be among
the political and economic objectives of the regulator when
setting noise enforcement standards. The economic and political
objectives could possibly have an important influence on enforce-
ment standard setting. The national government has formulated
a policy to study in depth the environmental impact problems of
the Shinkansen before further extensions are to be considered.
In effect this means a delay of further development of several
years. The major objective behind this move may not only be
the concern about the environmental condition, but also concern
about whether the benefits of the Shinkansen extensions would
justify the enormous load on government spending. Possibly
enforcement standards could thus be used to motivate restric-
tions on further developments of the Shinkansen.
Figure 1 is an attempt to structure the potential objec-
tives of the Environment Agency and its Council when setting
enforcement standards for Shinkansen noise. Only the environ-
mental objectives of the upper part of Figure 1 should be con-
sidered when setting environmental quality standards. As will
be shown later, the actual goals and objectives implicit in
the decision making of the Environment Agency and its Council
had a quite different structure, concentrating in particular
on the reduction of complaints about noise.
What are the alternative regulatory means to achieve these
goals? If one considers only standards as a tool, the main dis-
tinction is between EQS and ES. But there are many other dimen-
sions on which, for example, enforcement standards can vary, in-
cluding the measure on which the standard is defined, the maxi-
mum level, the monitoring and inspection procedure, area and
zoning definitions, and time limits for the fulfilment of the
standards. Figure 2 presents in a tree form some of the poten-
tial alternatives for noise regulation for Shinkansen trains
including some alternatives to standards such as speed control
and incentives. Further alternatives could include:
o differential standards for different areas (hospitals,
light residential, industrial);
o differential target periods for achievement of standards
(according to the state of construction of the Shinkansen,
different areas, different base noise levels).
Minimize disturbance
"-- of other human
activities
Sleep
Minimize disturbance~ Conversa-
~ or residential life tion
l.-- ---'~ Reading
Minimize disturbance
at places where spe-
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required
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Figure 1: Regulatory Objectives for Shinkansen Noise Pollution
Control
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Development actors, objectives, and alternatives
Three main bodies participate in the development of the
Shinkansen: the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of
Construction, and the Japanese National Railway Corporation.
The Ministry of Transportation is the main political body res-
ponsible to the Prime Minister and the Parliament in questions
of planning, development, and construction of all national rail-
ways. Both JNR and the Ministry of Construction are involved
in constructing railroads, with JNR usually taking the leading
role. Train operations and maintenance are the task of JNR
alone.
Noise pollution control for old lines as well as the devel-
opment of noise abatement technology for new lines is JNR's
task. Research and development on noise pollution abatement
technology is done largely by JNR's Railway Technical Institute
with coordinating roles taken by JNR's environmental department
and its environmental committee. The environmental committee
is composed of members of most JNR departments. The environ-
mental department has 17 members which are exclusively engineers
or professionals in technical services. The basis for JNR's
pollution control program is described in Yorino (1977b).
The objectives of JNR in the noise pollution control deci-
sion making are structured in Figure 3. The main distinctions
are between service objectives (speed, reliability, visibility),
cost objectives (investment and operations), and compliance with
regulation objectives.
JNR and the Ministry of Construction stressed very much
the objective of maintaining a high train speed as the essen-
tial feature of the Shinkansen. Speed reduction to reduce
noise was therefore never considered as a response to complaints
or regulations. Although JNR officials claim that noise reduc-
tion is a genuine objective of JNR, none of JNR's decisions in-
dicates that noise reduction measures would have been taken
without regulation. Therefore, the main influence on JNR's de-
cisions to reduce noise is by the regulatory compliance objec-
tive which stand in conflict to the cost and service objectives.
It appears that JNR reacts to proposed and adopted regulations
by first maximizing the service objectives and then searching
for solutions which minimize cost. This interaction of objec-
tives tends to push JNR's decision making in the direction of
maintaining the status quo and reacting only slowly to outside
forces.
JNR officials including those of the environmental department
perceive the noise pollution problem as purely technical to be
solved by its engineering branches. This fact is reflected in
the proposed s~lutions to noise pollution control which are
described in Yorino (1977b). For existing lines measures con-
sist mainly of bUilding sound barriers and sound proofing at
the track. If these steps are not sufficient, further sound-
proofing is done at the receiver, and ultimately houses are being
-9-
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invstment
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maximize train speed
(minimise speed reduc-
tions for noise control)
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Fu'rURE
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OPTIONS
maintain flexibility for
future Shinkansen development
development
Figure 3: Potential Objectives of JNR in Decision Making for
Noise Pollution Control
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relocated. For new and planned lines JNR has made several re-
search efforts to improve rolling stock, track, and structures.
These developments include noise reduction technologies such as
vibration proof wheels, ballast mats, slab mats, bridge hooding,
etc. (see Yorino, 1977b). There are some more fundamental means
to reduce noise pollution which are not seriously considered by
JNR. Speed reduction in highly populated areas is the most im-
portant and simple way to reduce noise pollution. Routing is
another important factor by which exposition of noise sensitive
areas could be avoided. At present it appears that JNR has not
made any decisions on speed reduction or routing on an environ-
mental basis alone.
Figure 4 puts together some logical alternatives for noise
pollution control (and for meeting possible standards). Further
details are given in Yorino (1977b) who also evaluates the ef-
fectiveness of the various measures.
Impactee actors, objectives, and alternatives
Impactees are in the first place the residents along the
lines of the Shinkansen who suffer from noise pollution. While
these residents would benefit from noise regulation, the users of
the Shinkansen and local businessmen and governments could possi-
bly suffer from noise regulation. For example, if JNR should
decide to slow down the train in highly populated areas, the in-
creased travel time would reduce the benefit to the users. Also,
noise abatement measures are costly and may eventually lead to
higher fares. Finally, citizens actions may prevent the building
of new lines from which local governments and businesses could
benefit. Thus the sufferers of noise pollution and the benefi-
ciaries of Shinkansen operations should both be included in the
analysis of the impactees of noise pollution and noise pollution
control measures.
The present analysis will, however, concentrate on the resi-
dents, since users, local business men and governments will have
interests which are highly related to those of JNR, and they act
as supporting actors of JNR rather than independent actors with
own objectives and alternatives. Although in some cases local
governments have entered informal bargaining procedures with JNR
(for example to get a Shinkansen terminal in return for an ap-
proval of JNR's development plans) there has not been much active
involvement of the users and local authorities in regulatory de-
cision making on noise control.
Residents along the Shinkansen lines who may suffer from
noise pollution can be identified in various ways:
o those who are exposed to certain noise levels
o those who complain
o those who are organized in protest groups
Residents within up to 100-200 meters away from the track are prob-
ably exposed to disturbing noise levels above 70 dB. There are
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no precise estimates of the number of residents living within
such a band along the presently existing lines, but some in-
dications can be given. In Tokyo, for example, the Tokyo
Metropolitan Environmental Institute estimates that 25,000
people in residential areas and 15,000 people in commercial
areas live within a 200 meter band. The total number of "affec-
ted" residents along the Shinkansen line may well be in the
hundred thousands.
The complaint statistics cited before do, of course, not
reflect such large numbers. A better way to identify impactees
is therefore by looking at organized groups. The most prominent
group is the Nagoya Association (the "Association against Nagoya
Shinkansen Public Nuisance"). This association was set up follow-
ing several individual complaints, petitions, and small organiza-
tions such as the "Citizens group against Shinkansen TV inter-
ference". The association now ~epresents 2,000 households, set-
tled along a 7 krn stretch of the Shinkansen in Nagoya.
The objectives of these residents are:
o reduce Shinkansen noise to a non-disturbing level;
o aid people with special diseases and illnesses
o receive compensation for residents who have been
exposed to Shinkansen noise
While the first goal is another more general formulation of the
environmental objective of the Environment Agency (see Figure 1),
the last two objectives are special objectives representing the
self interests of the residents.
The alternative actions by which residents can move against
JNR in order to achieve these objectives can be characterised by
a series of escalated steps of protest:
o complaints by individuals
o petitions of groups to local governments,
prefectures, the EA or JNR
o organizations of various forms
o legal litigation with alternative requirements
for solving the noise problem
o extra legal protest actions
As will be seen in the following sections, these steps have been
taken by the Nagoya Association, except the most radical step of
taking extra legal protest actions.
THE DECISION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY TO SET NOISE STANDARDS
While the previous sections described in a structured way
the elements of the noise control problem for Shinkansen trains
(actors, objectives, alternatives), the following two sections
will put these elements together in a discussion of the actual
-13-
information processing, evaluation, and decision making at the
hand of two main issues: the setting of noise standards by the
Environment Agency, and the legal action by the Nagoya residents.
Stress will be put in this analysis on the priorities among ob-
jectives selected, the limited view of alternatives, the infor-
mational base to evaluate alternatives against objectives, as
compared to the intentions of the decision making actors.
When the expert committee on special noise in the Council
for the Control of Environmental Pollution began its investiga-
tion on Shinkansen noise its intention was to set environmental
quality standards. In terms of the definition of environmental
quality standards by the Environment Agency and the Basic Law
on Control of Environmental Pollution this would imply that
o only environmental objectives should be considered
to evaluate standards, but not technical, economic,
and political objectives:
o alternatives which characterize enforcement
standards (timing of fulfillment, area speci-
fications) should not be part of the standards.
But in fact, as will be shown the decision process of the expert
committee and the Council resulted in enforcement standards.
In addition, this standard was set on·the basis of information
required for an environmental quality standard. This observa-
tion is not trivial since it indicates a departure from national
environmental policy and implies that the information taken into
account when setting the standard was insufficient.
As a first step the expert committee reviewed the present
state of Shinkansen noise pollution. These results are docu-
mented and discussed, for example, in Environmental Agency (1973),
Hashimoto (1975), and Yorino.(1977a and b). The general outcome
of these studies was that Shinkansen noise levels range between
75 dB and 120 dB. At about 25 miles away from the source (see
Table 2) JNR claims that the maximum noise level is 110 dB.
Next, the expert committee issued studies on the effects of
noise. The primary intention of these studies was to establish
the relationship between noise and complaints not to identify
the psychological and physiological effects of the Shinkansen
noise. One could of course argue that complaints are an indica-
tor of more indirect and less observable effects, and that the
absence of complaints would indicate an absence of effects.
However, no such arguments were made by the decision makers in-
volved in the process of standard setting. Rather the noise-
complaint relationship was considered a main driving force it-
self for the stadarn setting decision.
Several studies on noise versus complaints produced results
which are exemplified in Figure 5. In general there appears to
be a relatively slow rise in complaints between 50-65 dB. From
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Figure 5: Complaints versus Noise Level
*Source: Environment Agency (1975)
"complaint" is defined as one of the
following responses:
"occasionally experienced disturbance"
"rather frequently experienced disturbance"
"frequently experienced disturbance"
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65 dB onwards complaints begin to rise rapidly. If one wanted
to set standards on the basis of such noise-complaint relation-
ships, one would attempt to either set the standard such that
no complaints occur, or such that complaints are relativelv
stable below that standard, arguing for some sort of a thresh-
hold effect. The threshhold idea was apparently assumed by most
of the experts involved in the standard setting, in the sense
that they believed that there is a "normal" background level of
complaints which has little to do with actual disturbances.
With such a position the problem naturally shifts from identi-
fying a noise level with zero complaints to identifying a noise
level at which complaints just reach "background" rates.
No studies on economic, technical, or other questions were
performed or issued by the expert committee. JNR had done some
such studies (see Yorino 1977a and b), particularly on the tech-
nical feasibility and effectiveness of noise pollution abatement,
but they were not considered in the deliberations on standards.
This "neglect" is, of course, in line with the intention of
environmental quality standards, although such studies would
have been necessary to evaluate enforcement standards. Cost
estimates were made by JNR, although they have not been made
public. In individual discussions JNR experts estimated that
a reduction of the noise level down to 80 dB would increase in-
vestment cost by 9% and a further reduction to 70 dB would in-
crease investment cost by 13-14% (see Figure 6).
Studies on the effect of train speed on noise levels existeq
but were not explicitly considered by the expert committee. Fig-
ure 7 exemplifies the basic result of such studies: There is an
almost linear drop in noise between 200 and 100 km/h and a small
rise at levels between 50-60 kID/h. At least this is the intuitive
impression from looking at the data. The interpretation of JNR
and other experts of this data is different: on the basis of
a priori considerations about the relationship between speed
and noise, these experts hypothesised that the relationship be-
tween noise and speed must be logarithmic. A least square fit
would then lead to the curves shown in Figure 7. Such a log-
arithmic relationship was also a main argument for JNR to re-
fuse slowing down as a tool for reducing noise: JNR claims
that the noise reduction would be only slight between 200 and
100 km. If one looks at the fitted curve, this is true. If
one looks at the data points it is not.
Having reported now on qUite a number of available data
which have not been considered by the expert committee it seems
surprising that standards were set purely on the basis of the
noise-complaint relationship. In 1975 the expert committee re-
commended (and the Council accepted) to set a standard of 70 dB
for the mainly residential areas, and of 75 dB for mixed resi-
dential and commercial areas. The rationale behind this recom-
mendation was that at a noise level between 70 and 75 dB approx-
imately 30% complaints was achieved. The study group maintained
that only substantial reductions of the noise level would lead
-17-
% increase in
investment cost
20%
10%
, 14-15% increase
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,
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'-.: of 80 dB
,
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Figure 6: Increase in Investment Cost versus
*Noise Level (Sanyo Line)
*YORINO, private communication
dB
(A
)
10
0 90
•
m
e
a
s
u
re
m
e
n
t
a
t
tr
a
c
k
o
m
e
a
s
u
re
m
e
n
t
a
t
o
p
p
o
si
te
tr
a
c
k
80 70 60
• •
I
01
'0
0
0
t-
'
co
.
-
-
0
-
-
-
I
..
0
~~
00
CD
85
+
20
lo
g
v
/2
00
0
~
80
+
20
lo
g
v
/2
00
I
I
1
I
I
I
50
-
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
km
/h
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
F
ig
u
re
7:
T
ra
in
Sp
ee
d
v
e
r
s
u
s
N
oi
se
S
ou
rc
e:
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t
A
ge
nc
y,
19
77
-19-
to any further reductions of the complaints. On the basis of
Figure 5 such conclusions appear rather bold. In addition, one
would have to ask, whether 30% complaints are actually accept-
able from an environmental quality standards point of view.
But further recommendations by the expert committee dispel-
led all thoughts that quality standard were being set. These
recommendations included area specifications for the implementa-
tion of the standards as well as time limits for JNR to comply.
So in fact they were turned into enforcement standards, although
the literature still calls them environmental quality standards.
(see Hashimoto, 1975). The Environment Agency accepted the re-
commendations by its council and the standards went into effect
in September 1975.
JNR, being represented in the expert committee and in the
subcommittee had suggested 80 dB as an alternative to the stan-
dards which were finally accepted. These suggestions were based
partly on economic considerations, partly on an evaluation of
recent technical studies. JNR especially doubted (and still
doubts) that 70-75 dB can be achieved with present technology
on "noisy" structures such as steel girder bridges. JNR had,
as indicated before, taken a firm stand on not slowing down as
a means of reducing noise and apparently such a measure was
never a serious issue in the expert committee.
Since the setting of the standards JNR has made major ef-
forts to meet the time limits for the standards in areas with
noise levels higher than 80 dB. As a first step a string of
sound barrier walls were built. In 1974 these efforts cost
JNR, for example 15.1 billion Yen. They reduced the noise level
by about 5 dB and JNR estimates that all existing lines now meet
a' level of 80 dB or less except for some steel girder bridges.
As to the future JNR is uncertain whether it will be able to meet
the standards in the prescribed period of time.
As is readily discernible there were no direct inputs or
any participation by the impacted residents along the Shinkansen
lines during this whole process of standard setting. Residents
have in the meantime fought a quite different battle of protest
and lawsuits. This process will be discussed next.
THE DECISION PROCESS OF THE NAGOYA ASSOCIATION TO COMBAT
SHINKANSEN NOISE
This section is largely based on a discussion with two
lawyers representing the Nagoya Association against Shinkansen
Public Nuisance. It is a descriptive account of the main steps
in the battle between the Association and JNR in which the re-
sidents tried to achieve their objectives described in Figure 4.
-20-
The first complaints by Nagoya citizens reached the Nagoya
city council in 1964 shortly after the beginning of operations
of the Tokaido line. At issue was a 7 krn stretch which is ele-
vated and runs partly over steel girder bridges. In a first
significant move, 110 Nagoya residents jointly delivered a com-
plaint and a petition for support to the Nagoya City Council.
In 1967 the Nagoya Council, after performing own noise measure-
ment and confirming high noise levels, asked JNR to take mea-
sures on noise pollution abatement. JNR responded in March 1970
by announcing that sound barrier walls would be installed at
three points along the controversial 7 km stretch. Meanwhile
several small residents groups organized into associations to
fight Shinkansen noise.
In 1971 these organizations united as the "Association
against Nagoya Shinkansen Public Nuisance" which comprised
about 2000 households, and is subdivided into seven neighbour-
hood associations. At the same time JNR began installing sound
barrier walls at several points, mainly in hospitals and school
areas.
Between 1972 and 1974 several meetings between the Associa-
tion, JNR, the Mayor of Nagoya, and prefectural officers as well
as the Environment Agency took place. The initial request of
the citizens was that JNR should increase sound barriers over
the whole 7 km length. Later the Association began to take a
firmer stand:
o the Shinkansen should be slowed down in order to
bring noise and vibration down to non-disturbing
levels;
o special measures should be taken by JNR to aid
ill and old people.
JNR's offer in turn was to take steps to reduce the noise down
to 80 dB, but flatly refused to slow down. 80 dB was not con-
sidered acceptable by the residents. JNR agreed to examine the
special cases of sick and old people, but up to 1977 no such
case was resolved.
The local city and prefectural governments took action at
the end of 1972 by formally supporting the Association and re-
questing JNR to slow down in the 7 km stretch. In August 1973,
finally, a group of 20 lawyers was set up by the Association to
begin legal action against JNR on behalf of 570 residents. The
case requested specific measures to be taken, once more raising
the stakes in the fight between JNR and the residents:
o noise levels should not exceed 65 dB between 7 a.m. and
9 p.m.;
o noise levels should not exceed 55 dB at other operating
times;
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o the area to be considered was 100 m of both sides
of the track along the 7 km stretch;
o for each plaintiff JNR should pay 1 Mio Yen
compensation;
o JNR was to carry the cost of the court case.
New residents could join the case provided they lived within
100 m of the track and joined within 3 years after the case was
opened. Since the lawyers worked on a no-fee basis costs of
joining were small, but there was no dramatic increase in the
number of plaintiffs in recent years.
The standards which the Association requested were based
on similar material as the one that the Environment Agency used
for their standard setting. No independent research effort was
made to substantiate the claim of the residents that levels
above 55 dB (or 65 dB during the day) were disturbing. The set-
ting of noise standards in 1975 therefore was a major event in
the court case. The Association did not believe that 70-75 dB
would stop the disturbance and pursued the case after standards
were set. However, there is now some pessimism with respect to
the outcome of the case since the lawyers believe that the judge
will orient himself towards the EA material on quality standards.
JNR's response to the case in its first court session in
1974 was to deny the request on the grounds that they were
"totally unreasonable". This tough stand was somewhat toned
down in the following months. JNR argued that 65 dB could not
be achieved with presently available technology without a slow
down and thus a substantial delay of trains (in fact, the delay
at the 7 km stretch from slowing down from 200 to 100 km/h would
be less than 5 minutes. However, by slowing down an important
precedent would be set which is in conflict with JNR's objec-
tives). JNR proposed to remove and relocate all houses within
20 m of the line. After the standards were set, JNR proposed
(as the standards require) to implement 80 dB standards within
three years.
The case now is still pending. A judgement is not expected
before the summer of 1978. But the movement of residents, and
local governments has already shown some effects which were not
expected. One of the two labour unions of JNR expressed its
support for the Association and asked train operators who are
members of this union to slow down their trains to 100 km/h on
the controversial stretch. The result was that 50% of the trains
drove at a much slower speed and reduced the noise level in spite
of JNR's tactics.
The decision process shows that the residents had quite
different objectives and action alternatives in mind than the
EA and that they went head on against JNR after initial requests
failed to produce any results. It also demonstrates the gradual
-22-
escalation of both objectives (from sound barrier improvements
to standards and compensation) and of tools (from complaints to
legal litigation). JNR's role was as reactive in this process
as it was in the process of standards setting. It appears that
this strategy was successful in saving time, but it clearly
raised the stakes.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION: TOWARDS MODELLING
STANDARDS SETTING DECISIONS
The analysis of actors, objectives, and alternatives in
noise pollution control was meant to demonstrate the wide span
of elements which could or should have entered into the decision
processes. Looking at actual information collection evaluation,
and decision making of the Environmental Agency, the Japanese
National Railway Corporation, and the Nagoya Association it be-
comes obvious that not all these elements were considered, that
information was neglected, that evaluations were partially bi-
ased, and that the interactions between the three decision
making groups was limited.
In this discussion the decision processes of the three
groups will first be analysed and evaluated in terms of their
own intentions entering into the decision making. The discus-
sion will conclude with some suggestions how decision and game
theoretic models may aid regulators and other decision makers
in pollution control decision problems.
The organizational set up for standard setting decisions
in the Japanese Environment Agency has some unique features
which reflect the original intention of the EA to set Environ-
mental quality standards rather than enforcement standards:
o clear separation of expert analysis and expert
judgement for questions of health, and environment
on the one hand, and the political decision process
on the other;
o main location of the decision making in the expert
bodies of the Council (expert committee, subcommittee)
with consensus forming and checking functions located
at higher levels (EA, Cabinet);
o participation of many experts from industry and
government, but exclusion of impactees.
For environmental quality standards this organizational set up
seems to work rather well: the main task is for experts to
identify risks and hazards, and to recommend acceptable pollu-
tion levels from an environmental and health point of view.
All other decision layers would then judge the expert recom-
mendation mainly on the basis of political feasibility, and
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perhaps on some rather general economic and technical consid-
erations. For enforcement standard setting this process could
also work well, if the expert committee would consider all
scientific aspects of the standard setting problem including
economic and technical aspects. Given this information on
environment, health, economic, and technical issues the higher
decision making layers could then make trade-offs, add political
judgements and make final decisions.
However, as was mentioned before, the main problem with
the noise standard setting decision process of the Environment
Agency was that studies and evaluations were done as if envi-
ronmental quality standards were set, while in fact the outcome
was enforcement standard. What would have been an appropriate
analysis for quality standards, falls short for enforcement
standards:
o only limited alternatives were considered (no consid-
eration of the effects of slowing down, zoning, house
removal, incentives, etc.);
o information on health, costs, broader economic and
transportation system impacts, technical aspects
etc. were not considered;
o the standards were evaluated on the basis of very
limited information on noise-complaint relation-
ships and a relatively arbitary standard was set.
These shortcomings are to some degree recognised by the decision
makers in the EA and JNR. Yorino, for example, states that
"this ambiguity (about standards as a target or a tool)* seems
to have been not properly cleared at the discussion of environ-
mental quality standards for the Shinkansen noise. It also
seems that ... (questions of) ... , the impacts of the national
economy in the light of the prevailing economic situation,
how far other kinds of noise are controlled, how about the
living standard of the nation, etc. all not having been properly
studied. II (1977b, 18).
JNR's decision making in the standard setting process and
in its negotiations with the Nagoya Association was largely
reactive. It does quite well reflect JNR's desire to maintain
the staus quo and not to forclose any future development options.
JNR's reactive decision making was characterized by the following
features:
o the noise pollution control problem was seen as a
problem of inventing technical solutions to respond
to regulations, rather than as a problem of devel-
oping plans and procedures for abating noise pollution;
o routing and slowing down were not considered as noise
control measures;
* Insertion by the author
-24-
o slowdown effects on noise reduction were played
down in spite of scientific evidence;
o comfort, speed, reliability, and national economic
importance of Shinkansen were stressed;
o JNR's alternative suggestions for standards and
noise abatement were often made to gain more time.
Once standards were set in 1975, however, JNR acted qUickly
to implement the measures necessary to comply and to develop
research and technical skills to meet the future requirements.
Yet this response is still purely technical and no attempts
have been made to develop a comprehensive environmental manage-
ment program for the Shinkansen.
The Nagoya Association probably had the most difficult
role in the decision process on Shinkansen noise pollution con-
trol. The main obstacle for the Association was the lack of a
direct input into governmental decision making on noise stan-
dards. It therefore had to fight an independent battle and it
is still highly uncertatn whether it will meet its objectives.
The Association did manage to enlist support from local and
prefectural governments and labour unions. It did attempt to
interact with a broad array of actors, but it apparantly was
not very effective in its individual bargaining with the EA
and JNR. Perhaps the Association could have obtained some im-
provements early in the 1970s (suggested by JNR were sound
barriers on the whole stretch) but the residents chose to es-
calate and raise the stakes. The most problematic point in
the Associations decision making is the request for fixed
standards in the law suit. Since the Association does not have
its own research material to back these standards, the judge
may well follow the EA arguments and make the official standards
a basis for the case. In retrospect it would have been wiser to
leave the burden of proof that the Shinkansen does not disturb
to JNR rather than offering an opportunity for being challenged
to prove that 65 or 55 dB are non-disturbing levels.
While each actor group had its own decision making diffi-
culties and shortcomings, the major problem with the decision
making on the Shinkansen noise appears to be the lack of com-
prehensiveness in the consideration of objectives and alterna-
tives, and the lack of interaction between the decision makers
involved. Both shortcomings are clearly demonstrated in the
difference between what could have entered the decision making
(alternatives, objectives, information) and what actually did
enter it. One may conceive of various ways to improve the de-
cision making for future standard setting cases, including in-
stitutional, procedural, and methodological innovation. Public
participation, science courts, decision and game theoretic
methodologies could be considered. Possibilities of improving
the institutional aspects of standard setting and regulation
are, for example, discussed in reports by the Academy of Sciences
of the US (1975) to the National Research Council (1977).
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Formal approaches to improve standard setting decisions are pre-
sented for example for the case of water pollution in Dorfman
and Jacoby (l970), for noise in Loucks (l977). A decision theo-
retic model to improve standard setting and pollution control
decisions has been developed and applied to chronic oil discharge
standards (v. Winterfeldt, 1978a and b). It begins where this
paper leaves off: by hierarchical structuring of objectives
and alternatives for the three generic decision making groups,
the regulator, the developer, and the impactee group. Stress.
is put in this structuring on breadth and comprehensiveness of
objectives and alternatives.
In the quantification part the uncertainties and values of
the three decision making groups are then quantified by judge-
mental probability distributions and utility functions. The
main outputs of the model are the optimal (in the decision model
sense) responses of the developer and the impactee to a given
regulation, and an evaluation of regulation, the developer's
response, and the impactees' response in terms of their own
objectives.
The application of this model to chronic oil discharge
standard setting showed that there can be some benefit from
structuring the problem rigoroursly: new alternatives are dis-
covered, alternatives included for reference provide interest-
ing cornerstones, attempts to operationalise objectives provide
new ideas on the structure of goals. Also, several insights
can be gained from quantification and model run: sensitive
decision points can be identified, dominated strategies can be
uncovered.
But perhaps the most useful application of decision theo-
retic models and ideas is their use as tools for creating a more
rational dialogue between different decision making units. A
decision model can aid regulators, developers and impactees to
communicate their values and uncertainties in a more precise
way, to identify where the sources of conflict are, and to as-
sess the consequences of changing model parameters according to
the specifications of the actors involved.
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THE STANDARD SETTING PROBLEM
The incre3sed public awareness of the
risks and hazards of modern technolo-
~ies h3s led to a variety of regula-
tory actions to reduce detrimental
effects of developMent and production
processes on human health, safety and
~sychological well being. These reg-
ulatory actions include banning of
certain industrial activities, emis-
sion taxes, standards and equipment
specifications. Among these, stan-
dard setting has evolved as one of
the most widely used regulatory tools
to reduce environmental pollution.
The regulatory decisions in standard
setting include a choice of the Mea-
sure on which a standard is to be de-
fined (e.g., the average concentra-
tion of a chemical in a defined medi-
um), the level of the standards (the
maximum permissible amount), the mon-
itoring and inspection procedure, and
possible sanctions for violations.
Regulators and scientists who have
been involved in such decision pro-
cesses admit that the task is exceed-
ingly difficult and that the results
of regulatory deliberations often
lack a sound scientific basis.
The rain factors that complicate
standard setting decisions are the
following:
• There usually exist substantial
uncertainty about the effects of
pollutants on human well being.
Experts differ widely in their
judgements of pollution effects.
• Standards have to be set in the
light of conflicting objectives
such as environmental, engineer-
ing Rnd economic objectives.
Many objectives are hard to quan-
tify and some can even be diffi-
cult to express precisely.
• The regulator is usually not a
single decision maker, but vari-
ous administrative units and ex-
perts interact in standard sett-
ing. In addition, different
groups with often conflicting
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interests are affected by regu-
latory measures.
• Effects of pollution and regula-
tion are distributed unevenly
over time. Crucial trade-offs
have to be made between costs and
benefits today, and costs and
benefits in the future.
TO overcome some of these difficul-
ties, several forma1 techniques and
analytical approaches have been sug-
gested alon~ which the regulator
could organize his information col-
lection and evaluation tasks. Sever-
al 'uthors have suggested and applied
cos_-benefit analysis to standard
setting and regulation (1,2,3).
These techniques are often criticised
for being too rigid and formalized
and for being unable to match the
complexity of the standard setting
problem (4). Less formal policy ana-
lyses of standard setting problems on
the other hand (5,6), can provide in-
teresting insights in the general
nature of the standard setting deci-
sion problem but are often of little
help for solving the very practical
problems of the regulator.
This paper presents a decision aiding
system for improving the standard
setting process which settles some-
where between rigid cost-benefit ana-
lysis and policy analysis. The deci-
sion aiding system takes the regula-
tor and his standard setting problem
as a starting point. The system con-
nects several decision theoretic
tools and techniques in a decision
theoretic model which allows the reg-
ulator to structure the standard set-
ting problem, to quantify uncertain-
ties, intangibles and values of the
groups involved in standard setting
and to identify an acceptable solu-
tion. The decision theoretic model
is not a usual optimization model in
the sense that some real world system
is modelled and optimized. Rather it
is a cognitive roadmap along which
the regulator and his experts can
organize their thoughts, preferences
120 D. von Winterfeldt
and information.
THE GENERAL DECISION THEORETIC MODEL
Figure 1 presents in qualitative
terms the tasks that a decision maker
should go through before making a
decision (7,8). First, the decision
maker has to identify the decision
unit for which he assumed the deci-
sion making responsibility. Second,
the decision maker has to define the
goals and objectives of this unit.
Third, the decision maker has to de-
fine the alternative courses of ac-
tion by which these objectives can be
achieved, the possible external
events and actions that may influence
his actions and the information
sources available to him. For each
alternative, external event and in-
formation he should then assess the
probable consequences. Finally, he
has to evaluate these consequences
against his objectives, and on the
basis of these assessments, he can
evaluate his action alternatives.
Then he can decide either to collect
more information to improve the pre-
cision of his prediction or to direc-
tly select the best action alterna-
tive.
Fig. 1. Schematic representation
of decision making tasks
These qualitative considerations are
formalized in Fig. 2. In the ellip-
ses the decision theoretic tools are
listed which can aid the decision
maker in the respective tasks:
• Goals trees structure general
supergoals and operational objec-
tives (attributes) in a hierar-
chical monner (9).
• Decision trees map out the logi-
cal decision alternatives and
link them to external actions,
events and information variables
(10) •
• Judgemental probability methods
and models aid the decision maker
and his experts to quantify their
uncertainties (11).
• Hultiattribute utility models and
techniques aid the regulator to
evaluate consequences which are
uncertain and vary on several value
relevant attributes (12).
Fig. 2. Formal representation of
decision making tasks
I~otation:
DU: Decision Unit
A Decision Alternatives (a£A);
o Set of Objectives (0.£0;
i = 1,2, ... ,n); 1
C Value relevant consequences
(C~lAn; c£C);
S External actions or events
(Sj£S; j = 1,2, ... ,m);
E : Information sources (e£E);
EU: Expected utility (EU(a,e».
The formalized output of the deci-
sion tree and judgemental probability
analysis is a probability distribu-
tion p over the external actions or
cv~nts S, which assigns a probability
p(Sj) to each element in S. The
modc>l assuml'~; that the events and
external actions are mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive. The other out-
put of these estimation tasks are
probability density functions
f(~la,S.,e) defined on C, which are a
quantit~tive expression of the deci-
sion maker's remaining uncertainty
about consequences given an act, ex-
ternal event and his information.
The output of the goal tree and mult~
attribute utility analysis is a
v. Neumann and Morgenstern utility
function (13) u(~) which is defined
over consequences C. v. Neumann and
Morgenstern utility functions have
the property that they preserve the
order of the decision maker's pref-
erences over C and that their expect-
ation preserves~he preferences over
probability density functions f de-
fined over C. Given u(£), p, and
f(cja,S.,e) the expected utility of
an-acti6n a given e can be computed
m
EU (a , e ) JJ [ I: P (S . Ie) • ( 1 )
C j x 1 )
. f(cla,S.,e»)u(c)dc.
- ) --
This expected utility is then an app-
ropriate index for ordering actions
a based on information e.
Given these functions the expected
utility maximization model allows the
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Fig. 3. The regulator-developer-
impactee model
Regulator, Developer,
Impactee decision unit;
Alternatives of regula-
tor, developer and impac-
tee (typical elements:
r,d, a,) ;
Objectives of regulator,
developer and impactee:
Consequence spaces
(typical elements:
gR,gD'~A) ;
Expected utilities of
regulator, developer and
impactee;
Total expected utility of
reg ula tion;
Possible sanctions;
Detection submodule (see
text) ;
Possible pollution levels
Dose-Response submodule
(see text).
R,D,A,
Notation:
RU,DU,IU
AEU
L
DO-RE
The linkage between the developer unit
and the impactee unit is established
through levels L of pollution result-
ing from production or operations
which change the consequences of the
impactees. This view is usually re-
presented in the dose-response models
of environmental pollution and
55
DET
°R,OD,OA
CR,CD,CA
possible pollution level. The model
assumes that the external event "det-
ection of viola b ons" together with
the resulting sanctions change the
developer's cons~quence distributions
and thus his evaluation of development
activities .
These three decision maklng units
interact in standard setting as pre-
sented in Fig. 3. Each unit has its
own alternatives, objectives, conse-
quences, estimation and evaluation
tasks which follow the schematic out-
line of the previous section. The
linkages are created through the ex-
ternal event boxes of Figs. 1 and 2.
The model does not specify external
events for the regulator. But regu-
latory action creates the possibility
of external events for the developer.
Given a standard, monitoring and in-
spection procedure and sanctions for
violations, the developer faces the
possibility that he will incur sanc-
tions if violations are detected, un-
less he introduces measures to reduce
THE REGULATOR-DEVELOPER-IMPACTEE
MODEL
In standard setting the decision
making problem is complicated by the
fact that several decision making
units are involved in the decision
making process. The general decision
theoretic model above is adapted to
these circumstances by postulating
that ill standard setting three main
decision units interact: the r·egulator
unit, the developer unit, and the impactee
unit. The regulator unit is defined
by the administrative unit which has
the responsibility for setting a
standaLd. The developer unit is de-
fined as all those decision units
whose production and operation deci-
sions are restricted by the regula-
tion. The impactee unit is defined
as those groups or organizations who
are potential "sufferers" from the
respective development actions. The
decision problem of the regulator is
to set a standard which balances the
opportunity costs imposed on the
developer against the potential bene-
fits for the impactees.
Particularly the expected value of
perfect information, and the expected
value of sample information (14) can
be computed, if the cost of informa-
tion is included as an attribute in
the consequence space C. Further
sensitivities of the model can be
analysed by changing the utility fun-
ction u or the probability density
functions p and f.
EU(a.,c) ~ max EU(a,e)
A
• perform a value of information
analysis by recomputing the ex-
pected utility for different in-
formation sources.
decision maker to
• select the action a· with the
highest expected utility based on
information e:
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max EUD(d,r,e R) (11)D
Finally, the model computes the total
expected utility of r as a weighted
average of the expected utility
accruing to the regulator and the
subsequent maximum utilities accruing
to the developer and the impactee:
N
f fl l: P (n Id, sl ,8m, e R)C n =0 qD q
fD(£Dld,ss,nq,e R)]'
uD(£D)d£D (9)
EUA(a,d,e R) = fflff(lld,e R)·CA L
.fA(£Ala,l,eR)]·
,uA(£A)d£A (10)
To express all expected utilities as
a function of r, the model postulates
that the developer and impactee maxi-
mize the guesses of their expected
utility given rand d. The maxima
d(r) and a(d) are defined as
The model assumes further that the
regulator can construct the functions
u ,uD,uA and the probability densityf5nctions fR,f D, and fA (as speci-fied earlier) On the basis of his
information eR' The regulator can
then determine his expected utility
EUR and his guesses of the expected
utility EUD and EUA as follows:
EUR(r,eR) = fff(£Rlr,eR)uR(~R)d£R (S)CR
Probability density func-
tions over the respective
consequence spaces CR,CD,CA
(fR£F R; fD£F D; fA£FA);
v. Neumann and Morgenstern
functions over the respec-
tive consequence spaces
CR,CD,CA;
set of standard dimensions
and levels (sl£SL);
set of monitoring and in-
spection procedures
(sm£SM) ;
set of sanctions for viola-
tions (ss£SS);
set of treatment processes
to reduce pollution
(tp£TP);
set of treatment equipments
(te£TE) ;
set of treatment operations
(tolTO) ;
information sources of the
regulator, developer and
impactee (CR£ER; eD£ED;
e A £E A ) ;
number of detections of
cases in which the actual
level of pollution 1
exceeds the standard sl
during the time interval of
interest T (n = 0,1, •.. ,N) ;
probability 3istribution
over n ;
probab~lity density func-
tion over levels, given d;
SL
SM
SS
TP
TE
TO
For a mathematical formulation of the
model, the following further defini-
tions are made:
resulting health or other consequen-
ces. In the model this dGse-response
concept is formalized in the changed
consequence distribution for impac-
tees.
Rand D are defined as product sets:
AEU(r,e R) ~REUR(r,eR) +
+ ~DEUD[d(r) ,r,eR) + (13)
+ ~AEUA{a[d(r)] ,d(r) ,eR}.
The model defines the optimal regula-
tion r+ = (sl+,sm+,ss+) by
Further analysis could include a
sensitivity analysis with respect to
the main model parameters, and a
value of additional information
analysis.
AEU(r+,e R) = max AEU (r,eR). (14)R( 5 )
(3 )
( 4 )
fR(£R1r,e R)
N
r p(n Id,sl,sm,eD)
ng=O q (6)
.fD(£Dld,ss,nq,eD)
SL x SM x SS
TP x TE x TO
R
D
Based on these definitions, the stan-
dard setting model postulates the
following decompositions of the pro-
bability density functions fR,f D, and
fA:
fR(£R1r,d,a,e R)
(7)
.fA(£A1a,l,eA)dl
POSSIBLE USES OF THE MODEL
The decision theoretic model for
standard setting consists of various
elements: structural submodules
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(three unit decision making, goal
trees and decision trees), estimation
submodules (judgemental probability
models and techniques), evaluation
submodules (v. Neumann and Morgen-
stern utility functions), and an
overall optimization model which is
adapted to the three decision unit
situation in standard setting. These
submodules together constitute a
decision aiding system which can help
the regulator in standard setting
decisions. Each of the submodules
has its own usefulness for decision
aiding, for guiding the information
collection, aggregation, and evalua-
tion tasks in standard setting.
The structural submodules provide the
regulator with a framework for his
analysis of the standard setting pro-
blem. The view of the decision pro-
blem as an interaction of three deci-
sion making units helps the regulator
to use the decision tree and goal
tree approaches effectively to deter-
mine in a formal way which alterna-
tives, objectives and consequences
are relevant for the regulation pro-
blem.
The estimation submodules give the
regulator an opportunity to guide his
information collection tasks, quan-
tify the uncertainty of the experts
which provide information, and to
aggregate and communicute these quan-
tified judgements. Furthermore, the
Bayesian view of judgemental pro-
bability in the decision model
allows him to integrate future infor-
mation about technologies or effects
of pollutants.
The evaluation submodules help the
regulator to quantify intangibles,
and to make trade-offs and evalua-
tions explicit. Vague concepts of
"priorities" or "desirability" are
replaced by quantitative judgements
of values and utilities through
v. Neumann and Morgenstern functions.
The mathematical model that optimizes
the regulatory decision presents the
regulator with a tool to analyse a
variety of questions interactively
with the computer. :or example, the
regulator may want to perform a value
of information analysis to determine
if it is worth to fund a research
study on the effects of a pollutant
on human health.
Whether or not these possible uses
can be realized depends on the
answers to the two questions:
• Do the model structure and
assumptions make sense?
• Can the functions f and u
actually be constructed in a real
standard setting situation?
These questions can best be answered
through real world applications of
the model. Within our research on
standard setting at IIASA such an
attempt is presently being made by
applying the syste~ to setting stan-
dards on chronic oil discharges from
North Sea oil production platforms.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a decision theoretic model which was
developed to aid regulatory agencies in standard setting and
regulation tasks. The one stage three decision maker model
encompasses the decision making of a regulator, a developer, and
an impactee unit. Each decision unit is assumed to follow a
basic decision model, which is a combination of a probability
model, a difference value judgment model, and an expected utility
model. The developer unit is linked to the regulator unit
through possible detections of violations of a regulation and
sanctions. The impactee unit is linked to the developer unit
through pollution generating events stemming from the developer's
actions, and the subsequent damages which may result from
pollution.
This basic regulation model is then specified to safety
and emission standard setting. Central in these specifications
is a signal detection model which characterizes the uncertainty
with which the regulator will detect or miss violations of his
regulation. A multistage conditional probability model links
the developer's actions, pollution generating events, amounts
of pollutants, and possible effects on impactees.
-v-
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INTRODUCTION
Setting standards such as emission or ambient standards
on chemicals polluting the air or the water is one of the most
widely used regulatory tools to limit the negative effects of
industrial activities on human health, safety, and psychological
well being. Scientists and administrators in regulatory agen-
cies who have to set such standards agree that the tas.k is
exceedingly difficult. There usually exists a vast amount of
uncertainty about the effects of pollutants on human well being.
Crucial trade-offs have to be made among multiple objectives
which are often conflicting such as engineering, economic,
political and environmental objectives. Conflicting interest
groups are involved in standard setting each backing their case
with different expert reports.
Since standard setting decisions are important, recurrent
and exceedingly difficult, several attempts have been made to
develop procedures along which a regulator and his experts can
organize their information collection and evaluation tasks.
Several authors have suggested and applied cost benefit analysis
to solve the problem of standard setting and regulation (see,
for example, Dorfman and Jacoby, 1970; North and Merkhofer,
1975; Karam and Morgan, 1975). But decision makers and scien-
tists are often skeptical about the use of cost benefit analysis
for such complex problems. The main reasons for this skepticism
are that many values can not be expressed in Dollar terms and
that the political character of the decision process is not
taken into account (see, for example, Holden, 1966; Majone,
1976; Reports by the US Academy of Sciences, 1975; and by the
National Research Council, 1977).
To aid regulators and scientists in standard setting tasks,
therefore, new procedures and methods are called for. These
procedures could include new institutional mechanisms (e.g.
pu·blic participation, science courts, etc.) and new "softer"
modeling approaches (e.g. decision theory and game theory).
This paper concentrates on the second type of procedural
innovation. It presents a formal decision theoretic model that
was designed to help regulators to structure a standard setting
task, to express uncertainties in a quantifiable form, and to
evaluate alternative regulation and standards in the light of
conflicting objectives. The paper is addressed mainly to
decision theorists and operation researchers who are interested
in the quantitative aspects of the model. Readers interested
in the qualitative model structure are referred to von Winter-
feldt (197 8), and Fischer and von Winterfeldt (1978).
-·2-
The paper is organized as follows. First the general deci-
sion theoretic model for a single decision maker will be devel-
oped. Readers familiar with measurement and decision theory
on the level of DeGroot (1970), Fishburn (1970) and Krantz,
Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971) may wish to skip this part.
The second section adapts the single decision maker model to a
regulation model in which the decision making of a regulator,
developer (producer) and impactee (sufferer) unit are linked.
The third part of the paper details the general regulation
model to the specific circumstances of standard setting.
BASIC DECISION MODEL FOR A SINGLE DECISION MAKER
The following mathematical fonmtiation of the basic decision
theoretic model is a modified version of the usual expected
utility model (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) which is devel-
oped, for example in Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961), DeGroot (1970)
and Fishburn (1970). It differs from the basic expected
utility formulation in two aspects: first, it does not assume
that conditional on event and action combinations final conse-
quences can be predicted with certainty, but it leaves the
possibility that there is a residual uncertainty about final
consequences; second, it does not directly construct a von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern utility function, but rather constructs it
through an additive difference value function which can be shown
to be functionally related to a von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility function.
Let A be the set of decision alternatives (courses of
action) with typical elements a,b E A. Let S be a set of mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive events with typical elements
n
s,tE S. Let C = X C. be a subset of tRn which characterizes the
. 1 11=
possible consequences of act-event combinations. Typical ele-
ments of C are n-dimensional vectors c, d. Finally, let Z be
the set of possible information sources with typical elements
y,z EZ.
The model assumes that the decision maker and his experts
can quantify their uncertainty by a judgmental probability dis-
tribution (pd) over events and a probability density function
(pdf) over consequences:
1) A probability distribution p which assigns to each event
s ES a probability P (sla,z) depending on information source
z and act a.
2) A probability density function f which assigns to each point
c EC a pro~ability density f (cla,s,z), depending on an act a,
event s and information source z.
The residual uncertainty expressed in f can often be re-
presented by independent marginal pdfs f .. Therefore the follow-
ing assumptions can be made: 1
I (~Ia,s,z)
where c. EC ..
1 1
n
= II
i=1
... 3 ...
I: (c.la,s,z)
1 1
(1)
The total uncertainty about consequences given an act a
and information source z can then be expressed by the following
pdf g
g(cla,z) = L
sES
n
p(sla,z) II
i=1
I. (c·la,s,z)
1 1
(2)
The set of all such probability density functions will be
called F with typical elements I ,gE F.
The model assumes further that the decision maker has pre-
ferences among probability density functions, which can be
characterized by the ordered set <F,~ >. The interpretation of
"/~g" is that "I is preferred to or indifferent to g". The
assumption which will be made in the following is that <F,~>
is an expected utility structure, i.e. that ~ obeys the axioms
of expected utility theory (see von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947; Savage, 1954; Fishburn, 1970). Therefore, there exists a
function u: C+~ such that for all l,gEF
I ?g
if and only if
fl (c)u(c)dc ~ fg (c)u(c)dC
C - -- C ---
(3 )
Next, the model assumes that the decision maker or his ex-
perts can express their strength of preferences of one conse-
quence over another, which can be characterized by the ordered
set <CxC, ~>. The interpretation of "(c, d) ~ (c' ,d' )" is that "the
degree of preference of cover d is larger or equal to the
degree of preference of clover dIll. In the following the assump-
tion will be made that <CxC,~> 1s an algebraic difference
structure i.e. that ~ obeys the axioms of algebraic difference
measurement (Suppes and Winet, 1955; Krantz, Luce, Suppes and
Tversky, 1971). It follows that there exists a function v:
C+~ such that for all ~,d,~' ,~'EC
(c ,~) ~ (~', ~' )
if and only if
(4 )
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Both functions v and u express some evaluation aspect about
consequences C, but there is no basis in the assumptions behind
(3) and (4) that would establish a relationship between them.
In particular there is no reason to assume that the expectation
of V preserves the preference order of f ,gEF. To distinguish,
u will be called a utility function, and v will be called a
value function.
The remainder of the model description for the single
decision maker will be concerned with establishing decomposition
forms of u and v and functional relationships between u and v.
In particular, independence assumptions on preferences among
pdfs and on preference strength judgments will be made that lead
to additive or multiplicative decompositions of u and v into
single consequence functions u. and v .. Some further assump-
tions will then be used to sho~ that the relationship between u
and v must be either linear or exponential.
The reason for this type of model formulation is largely
pragmatic. Assuming that v is additive, single consequence
difference value functions vi can be assessed through rather
simple preference strength judgments. Given that u and v are
related by a simple function, one can then construct a utility
function u from v by assessing the parameters of the trans-
formation either through sensitivity analysis or by asking a
few simple insurance type questions. Thus the construction
process, while ending with a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility
functio~ circumvents the sometimes awkward lottery assessment
methods which would have to be used otherwise. In addition,
this type of model has the advantage of separating clearly be-
tween concepts of "marginal utility" (which has a place in the
algebraic difference structure) and "risk attitude" (which has
a place in the expected utility structure).
As a first step the preference relation and the preference
strength relations are coupled. Preferences ~ are defined over
F, but they can easily be applied to C by defining
I
C 2: d
if and only if
f (c) = g (9.) = 1 and f ~ g •
Another induced preference relation can be defined by
"c ~ d
if and only if
(~'9.) ~ (d,d)
(5 )
(6)
I "Nothing guarantees that 2: = ?:. However, from a judgmental point
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of view this equality seems plausible. Therefore, the following
assumption will be made:
For all £,~ E C
I
C ~ d
-
if and only if
"c ~ d (7 )
-
If there are no ambiguities > will from now on be substituted
I "for ~ and ~.
From definitions (5) and (6) and from assumption (7) it
is obvious that there exists a functional relationship between
u and v and that this relationship must be monotonically in-
creasing:
u (£)~ u (~) if and only if
I (by 3 and 5)
c ~ d if and only if
- (by 7) (8 )
"
c ~ d if and only if
- (by 6)
(c,d) ~ (d,d) if and only if
(by 4)
v(c) ~ v (d) , for all c,dEC.
Thus u and v are both order preserving functions for pre-
ference over C and by the uniqueness of such functions (see
Suppes and Zinnes, 1963; Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky,
1971) two such functions must be related through a monotonically
increasing transfrrmation u=h(v).
Next, the assumption will be made that v is additive:
n
= E
i=1
v.(c.),
1 1
c. E C.
1 1
(9 )
In the appendix an independence condition for ~ is defined
and a proof is given that this independence condition is suffi-
cient for (9).
With respect to the decomposition of u, two possibilities
are considered in the model:
Either
n
u(c) = E u.(c.)
. 1 1 11=
( 10)
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or
n
1+ku(c} = IT
i=1
[1+ku. (c.)]
1 1
( 11)
(10) and (11) are the classic decomposition forms of u in
expected utility theory, and independence assumptions and
proofs for these forms can be found, for example in Fishburn,
1970; Keeney, 1974; Keeney and Raiffa,1976.
The uniqueness property of additive value functions (see
Fishburn, 1970; Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky, 1971) states
that any two additive order preserving functions defined on C
must be related by a positive linear transformation. From this
uniqueness property and assuming (9) and (10) the following
relationship between v and u results:
u = av + 8 for some a>O, 8E~ ( 12)
Again using the uniqueness property, but this time assuming
(9) and (11) an exponential relationship results:
u ;:::: 1 av+8 1k e -:K for some a>o,8 if k>o
a<o,8 if k<o
( 1 3)
In (13) a is a risk attitude parameter which, unlike usual
risk parameters (see Raiffa, 196B), is not confounded with
marginal value considerations. Marginal value considerations
are expressed solely in v. The relationship b~tween a and k is
that a>o if k>o and a<o if k<o. If k=o then (12) holds. These
results are proven and discussed in the appendix.
With definitions and assumptions (1) - (13) an evaluation
function U can now be defined on AxZ which is consistent with
a rational decision maker's preference and probability judgments:
n n
U(a,z}=! [L p(sla,z} IT f. (c.la,s,z}]h[ L v. (c.}]dc. (14)
'1 11 '1 11 -C sES 1= 1=
where h is either linear or exponential as defined in (12) and
( 13) •
Given the appropriate choice of the functions like p,t ,h,
and v the decision rule that logically follows from the assump-
tion made is:
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select a* E A with
U(a*,z} = max U(a,z}.
A
(15 )
Clearly one could also maximize over Z, the possible in-
formation sources. This would amount to a value of information
analysis. Within the proposed model this could be done provided
that the cost of information is included in the consequence
space C. More specific models which assume additive costs of
information and decisions could also be considered. Further-
more, additional information could be considered (e.g. a research
study, an independent expert estimate) and a so called pre-
posterior analysis of the value of additional information could
be carried out (see Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961).
The model allows a simple construction of the model func-
tions. Decision theoretic techniques are available to con-
struct pdfs, pds, and value functions in (14), and some of them
have been developed to a high degree of sophistication. To
construct pds odds comparison techniques can be used (see
Spetzler and von Holstein, 1975). To construct pdfs over conti-
nuous random variables one would use either of two techniques:
the fractile method (see Brown, Peterson and Kahr, 1974) or
direct probability estimation techniques (see Spetzler and von
Holstein, 1975). To construct the value function v rating and
weighting techniques can be used which approximate quite close-
ly the theoretically feasible techniques of using indifference
judgments about value differences (Edwards, 1971). Within model
(14) the transformation h from v into u is already so restricted
that a few questions about insurance behavior and risk prefer-
ences should be sufficient to assess the parameters of the ex-
ponential form. If the transformation h is linear, one can use
the value function directly as input into (14) without choosing
transformation constants a and 8, since utility functions are
unique up to a linear positive transformation (see Krantz et al.,
1971; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
THE DECISION MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
In regulatory decision making the decision theoretic model
described above becomes much more complicated, since several
decision makers (or better: decision making units, organizations)
are involved rather than an individual. These decision units
have their own objectives, alternatives, and opinions. In a
previous study on regulatory decision making (Fischer and von
Winterfeldt, 1978) five main decision units were identified
which enter into regulatory decision making. Generically they
are called here:
1. the regulator unit
2. the developer unit
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3. the im~actee unit
4. the expert unit
5. the exogenous unit
The regulator unit consists of the people and institutions
that have the responsibility for setting regulations as, for
example, the Central Unit for Environmental Pollution in the UK,
the State Pollution Control Agency in Norway, or the EPA in the
US. The developer unit is defined as all those people and
organizations whose span of decision alternatives is restricted
by the regulation. In the impactee unit all those groups are
combined whose activities or perceptions are impacted upon by
the development activities. The expert unit consists of re-
searchers and other experts that can provide information bearing
on the regulatory problem. The exogenous unit is defined as
those national or international organizations which constrain
the decision making of the regulatory unit.
A good first approximation to the regulation problem was
found to be achieved by considering the first three decision
units only, and by identifying the elements of the expert unit
with sources of information zEZ. The resulting regulator-
developer-impactee model has a structure which is schematically
represented in Fig.1.
Each decision unit has its own alternatives (as well as
sets of relevant events, information sources, consequence
spaces, pdfs, value functions, etc.). If the regulator decides
on a particular regulation alternative r, the decision making
of the developer will be influenced by the possibility of sanc-
tions if violations of the regulation r are detected. Thus the
developer will respond to a regulation r by an action d(r) which
may not be an action he would have taken without regulation.
Through pollution and their adverse effect on health and
well being the developer influences the decision making of the
impactee unit. In response to a developer decision d, the im-
pactees will choose an action a(d) which may not be the action
which they would have taken without the development activity.
The idea of the model is to determine optimal decisions
d(r) and a[d(r)] for the developer and the impactee as a func-
tion of r, together with the associated utilities UR(r) ,UD[d(r)},
UA{a[d(r)]}. Further aggregation or Pareto optimality analysis
may then be used to focus on a "good" value of r.
In the regulator-developer-impactee model each unit is
represented by model (14). The notational specifications are
given in Table 1. -
EVENTS & EFFECTS
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ALTERNATIVES DECISION EVALUATION
~--------l REGULATORY
DECISION
LTERNATIVE
DETECTION OF
REGULATION
VIOLATION
DEVELOPER
'---------1 DECISION
ALTERNATIVE
SANCTIONS
POLLUTION
GENERATING
EVENTS
IMPACTEE
DECISION
ALTERNATIVE
POLLUTION EFFECTS~--~
uA{a[d(r) }
Figure 1. Schematic Representation of the Regu!ator-Deve!oper-
Impactee Mode!
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Table 1. Notation for the Regulation Model
Set Element
Regulator's alternatives R r
Developer's alternatives D d
Impactee's alternatives A a
Regulator's consequences CR £R
Developer's consequences CD ~
Impactee's consequences CA £A
Regulator's events SR sR
Developer's events SD sD
Impactee's events SA sA
The functions, pds, and pdfs PR,PD,PA,fR,fD,fA,vR,vD,vA'
hR,hD,hA are also assumed. For simplicity the information
sources ZR,ZD,ZA are not spelled out any more and it is impli-
citly understood that all pds and pdfs of a decision unit are
conditioned on an element z from the information source Z
belonging to his unit.
Without specifying interlinkage models "detection of viola-
tion and sanction" and "pollution generation and effects" the
evaluation of acts for each decision unit according to model
(14) depends on the acts of other units, since p and fare
dependent on all acts: . .
u. (r, d , a)~J [l: p. (s. Ir , d , a) f . (~. Ir , d , a , s. ) ] . h. [v. (~. ) ] d£. (1 5 )
.s ES
. -.
where " " stands for R, D, and A respectively. Let Q and Q1• 0
denote the events "non-detection" and "detection" of a regula-
tion violation, and let s1' s2, .... ,SK be the set of pollution
generating events (e.g. explosions, normal operation of equip-
ment, etc.). The model defines SR = ¢, SD = {Qo,Q1} and SA =
{s1's2 .... '~}. The following crucial independence assump-
tions are now made to simplify (15):
(16)
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( 17)
( 18)
( 19 )
Verbally, these assumptions mean that:
(16) The regulator's consequences only depend on his own action;
(17) Detection probabilities do not depend on the impactee's
action;
(18) The developer's consequences do not depend on the im-
pactee's action;
(19) pollution generating event probabilities depend only
on the developer's action;
(20) The impactee's consequences do not depend on the regula-
tor's action.
Therefore (15) can be written as follows:
uR(r) =C~ f R (cRf r ) ·hR[vR(cR)]d~R
1
UD(d,r)=f [E PD (Qklr,d)fD(~Dlr,d,Qk)]hD[vD(£o)]d£o'C k=oD
K
UA(a,d)=J ~E l}..(SJ.ld)fA(~Ald,a,s.)]hA[vA(cA)]d~
CAJ=1 J
(21)
(22)
(23)
Independence of C., additivity of v, and the linear or exponen-
tial form of h le~d to a further refinement of (21) - (23). De-
fining the optimal decisions of the developer and the impactee
by
d(r): UD[d(r),r] ~ UD(d,r) for all dED
a (d): UA [a (d) ,d] ~ UA (a,d) for all a E A
(24 )
(25)
model (14) applied to all three decision units allows the deter-
mination of the optimal responses of the developer and impactee
to a regulation r as well as the associated utilities UR(r),
UD[d(r) ,r] and uA{a[d(r)] ,d(r)} for all three units as a func-
tion of r. A Pareto optimality analysis can now be performed
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on the V.' or, as a final step, one could postulate for some A.
with the optimal regulation defined as
r* : U(r*) ~ U(r) for all r E R (27 )
THE DECISION MODEL FOR STANDARD SETTING
Model (15) - (27) will now be adapted to the specific cir-
cumstances arising in environmental standard setting as a parti-
cular type of regulation. The regulator's alternatives R will
be further specified and the detection and consequence proba-
bilities of the regulator and developer will be decomposed.
First, the regulatory alternatives R in standard setting
are defined to consist of a set of standards SL, a set of moni-
toring and inspection procedures SM, and a set of possible
sandions for violations SSe Typical elements will be labelled
sl, sm, and ss respectively. The developer's alternatives D
are thought of as technological processes, equipments, and
operations to reduce pollution risks and hazards. The impactee's
alternatives are not further specified, and often treated as a
dummy variable, i.e. the impactees are considered "sufferers".
Two classes of standards can be distinguished: safety
standards are set by the regulator on D directly in order to
reduce the probability of undesired events SA; emission stan-
dards are set on amounts or rates of pollution in those cases
in which for any choice of dE D the event "normal operation"
can be taken for granted, but when such normal operations
generate a constant flow of pollution.
Safety standards are considered first. In this case SL is
defined as the set of all subsets of D. Consequently, if
s 1 E SL, then s 1CD. D is considered to exist of mutually ex-
clusive elements.
A violation of sl occurs if d~sl, otherwise the regulation
is adhered to. The model assumes that the regulator cannot per-
fectly discriminate whether dEs1 or d~sl, because of the limits
of his monitoring and inspection procedure smESM. Instead of d
the regulator perceives dED with a probability distribution
p(ald,sm) which depeQds on d and sm only. AA regulation viola-
tion is detected if d~sl, not detected if d Es1. Detection
probabilities (17) can now be specified:
(28)
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L: p(dld,sm)
a~sl
(29)
This formulation leaves the possibility open that the regulator
detects a violation (a~sl) when in fact no such violation
occurred (dEs1) and vice versa. In signal detection theory
(Green and Swets, 1967) these cases are called "false alarm"
and "miss".
The safety standards model assumes further that conse-
quences accruing to the developer as expressed in (18) depend
on regulatory action only through detections and sanctions:
The total consequence distribution is then
k = 0,1 (30)
Turning now to the consequence distribution of the impactee,
let 1ELC~ be an amount or rate of pollution which is considered
a random variable with pdf f (lis.).
J
The safety standards model assumes that, given 1, the con-
sequences accruing to the impactees do not depend any more on d
and s.:
J
(32)
Therefore, (2) can be written as
(33)
Event probabilities s. are assumed to be independent of im-
pactee actions aEA: J
(34)
Therefore the total consequence distribution for the impactee
unit is:
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K
= l: PA (s . Id) II (1 Is. )1p}~ Ia, I) d 1 •j=1 J L J (35 )
These specifications leave the regulator unit unchanged,
thus (21) still is the regulator's utility function. But sub-
stituting (31) into (22) and (35) into (23) gives new utility
functions for the developer and the impactee. The three full
utility functions for the safety standards model are
uR(r) = I IR(~Rlr) hR[vR(CR)]dCR (36)CR
UD(r,d) =1 {ll: p(dld,sm) ID(~lss,d,Qo) +
CD dEsl
UA(d,a)
. hD[vD(~)]d~
K
= I [E PA(s·ld) If(1ls.) .
C j=1 J L J
A
(37)
(38)
d(r), a[d(r)], arid U(r) are determined as in (24), (25) and (26).
The emission standard version of the model defines sl not
as a subset of D, but rather as an element of L. slEL is inter-
preted as a maximum admissible amount of emission. S'A is now
assumed to consist only of one element, say s1' the event of
"normal operation" of dED for all d. This leads to
PA(sjld) = 1 for j = 1
PA(sjld) = 0 for j ~ 1
Let 1EL~~ be the amount or rate of emissions under s1 and d
with pdf 1 (1Is1,d). Since s1 is the same for all developer
decisions d, it will from now on be dropped.
(39)
The regulator tries to establish whether l>sl (violation)
or 1~1 (no violation). However, his monitoring and inspection
procedure doe~ not provide him with perfectly reliable infor-
mation. Let 1 be a reading of emissions that the monitoring
and inspection procedure registers. Let g(lll,sm) be the re-
liability pdf that characterizes the quality of sm. Let q be
the state "violation occurs (l>sl)" and q1 the state 0
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" no violation occurs U~l)." The probabilistic relationship
between the violation and detection states Qo,Q1 ,qo,q1 can be
expressed in a fourfold table:
qo I q1!
Q
o Poo
!
Po1 Po (Qo)
!
I
PO(Q1)Q1 P10 , P11
Po (qo) Po (q1 )
Where the p .. 's are the joint probabilities and the marginals
are defined1Jas:
PO(qold,Sl) = pr[l~lld]
PO(q1/d,Sl) = pr[l>slld]
Po(Qold,sl,Sm) = Pr[l~lld,sm]
Po(Q1Id,sl,Sm) = Pr[l>slld,sm]
(40a)
(40b)
(40c)
(40d)
From the above definitions the marginal probabilities (40a) and
(40b) can be directly inferred:
f(lld)dl
fuld)dl
(41 a)
(41 b)
The consequences that accrue to the developer depend,
however, not on the true states of violation q but rather on
the states of detection Qk. These probabiliti~s ca~ usually not
be inferred directly. But with the knowledge of g(lll,sm) the
joint probabilities Pij can be determined as follows:
= J J f (11 d) g(l/l,sm) "Poo · dldl (42a)"l~l l~l
J J f uj d) g(lll,sm) "P10 = · dldl (42b)l>sl l~l
f (11 d) g(lll,sm) "Po1 = J J · dldl (42c)l~l l>sl
" J J f (11 d) g(lll,sm) "P11 = · dldl (42d)l>sl l>sl
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"1
1
" HIT"
"MISS "
---------.-
-'~ALSE-_
ALARM"
"CORRECT~­
REJECTION"
s 1 ;a-----~~---+---+-----
f (1 Id, sm) I
-------A------
gUll,sm)
Figure 2. Graphic Representation of the Probabilistic
Relationship between Violations and Oetections
(39-42)
The marginal probabilities of interest, po(Q ) and po(Q,),
can now be determined as 0
PO(Qold,sl,sm) =A f 'f fUld) . g(lll,sm) dldl , (43a)
l~l L
Po(Q,ld,sl,sm) = f f f(lld) . g(lll,sm) dldl • (43b)
l>sl L
These detection (non-detection) probabilities refer to a
fixed time interval 6t. One could assume that this time inter-
val is the lifetime of the plant. However, it is more realistic
to assume that 6t is some "normal" time interval of inspection
(e.g. one week). Then, over the lifetime of the plant T there
will be T/6t possibilities for such detection. Let n ~ T/6t;
assuming that detection probabilities are constant· over time and
independent, the probability of no detection during T, labelled
Qn .0' 1S
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(44a)
THe probability of at least one detection during T, labelled
Q1' is
The consequences accruing to the developer
pressed in f D are now assumed to depend only on(That is, as far as the developer is concerned,
is as bad as n):
(44b)
during T as ex-
d,ss, and Q~.
one detection
= [., J J fOld) • g(ill,sm) dldl]n.
l~l L
+{1-[ J J fOld) . g (l\l,sm) dldl]n} .
l~l L
(45)
As a further decomposition of the impactee's pdf fA is
concerned, the emission standards model follows the route of
the safety standards model as expressed in (35). However, in
emission standards, the picture gets simplified since PA(s1Id)
= 1. Therefore, (35) becomes
(46)
Equation (46) expresses the usual view of the pollution problem
as mediated through the levels of discharges into the environ-
ment. For each specific level probable consequences follow for
the impactees. Equation (46) is the first step in the direction
of decomposing the chain of events from emissions, over ambient
distributions to final value relevant consequences. One could
include another probability density function over ambient levels.
One could then condition the consequence distribution fA on
ambient levels, rather than on emission levels, and define the
total consequence distribution as a mixture of emission, ambient
-18-
and the respectively conditioned consequence distribution for
given ambient levels.
The full utility equations can now be written out for the
emission standards model:
UR(r) = J fR(~Rlr) hr[vR(~R)l d~R (47)
CR
UD(r,d) = J {PD(Qold,sl,sm)n fD(~Dlss,d,Q~) +
CD
+ [1-PD(Qold'Sl'Sm)nlfD(~Dlss,d,Q~)} .
(48 )
UA(d,a) = J U f (lid) . fA(£Ala,l) dll
CA L
(49 )
In summary, regulation alternatives were decomposed into
standards, monitoring and inspection procedures, and sanctions.
Safety standards were considered to be set directly on D. The
monitoring and inspection procedure was assumed to be fallible
leading to the possibilities of misses or false alarms in
regulation violation detection. This was the main vehicle for
decomposing f D. To decompose fA it was as~umed that pollution
amounts are fully determined by Sj' the pollution generating
events, and the developer decision d. Pollution amounts and
impactee action alone determine _.the prob.able consequences for
the impactee. The final utility equation for the ,s~fety-_
standards model are (36-38).
The emission standard model, (47) - (49) assumed that a
maximum level of emissions sl is set by the regulator, that
pollution generating events SA are reduced to "normal operation"
for each d, that actual levels produced by d are probabilistic
and can only be detected with error. This led to a rather
specific definition of detection probabilities and a decompo-
sition of f D. fA was decomposed as in the safety standard
model but it was simplified, since pollution generating
events were reduced to normal operations.
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POSSIBLE USES OF THE DECISION THEORETIC MODEL
The model that has been developed here is a decision
theoretic formulation of the regulatory decision problem in
.standard setting and it gives a stepwise solution of how a
regulator might think of going through the standard setting
task to solve the problem. The model prescribes an "optimal"
standard setting solution that is consistent with the decision
maker's preferences and opinions. However, the question
arises of how, the model can be applied in its full complexity
to a real problem, and what its main uses and limitations are.
There seem to be five ways in which a regulator could benefit
from the use ot the model. The model can help
to structure the regulation problem: .
to enable regulators and their experts to express uncer-
tainties, and_int~ibles in quantitative forms;
to make trade-offs explicit;
to identify a set of good regulatory solutions;
to allow a study of the sensitivities of the regulatory
solution. to conflicting opinions, values, and information.
Structuring the Regulation Problem
The model provides a cognitive structure or roadmap along
which the regulator can organize his thinking. Some of the
main distinctions that the model makes are those between con-
sequences, their values and probabilities, and between three
decision-making units involved in regulation. Even if none of
the further steps could be achieved (quantitative estimation
of probability density functions, quantification of values)
the model could already in this respect be an aid for the
regulator.
Enabling Regulators and Experts to Express Uncertainties and
Intangibles in a Quantitative Form.
In this presentation of the model the details of the actual
quantification procedures were not given, although some methods
were outlined on p.8. But through its simplifying assumptions
the model is designed such that regulators and their experts
can, in principle, perform the actual quantification tasks,
both on the uncertainty and the value side. The model requires
at no step to construct functions that would be very difficult
to assess in practice (although by doing so it had to make some
severe simplifying assumptions). The tools for such quantifi-
cation exist and have been extensively explored in the labora-
tory and in real world decision problems. It remains a task
of a model application to see how far one can go with the actual
quantification steps in standard setting and regulations.
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Making Trade-Offs Explicit
The model requires this directly by postulating quantita-
tive trade-offs within each decision making unit (the vi in
the additive value function v ), by postulating a parametrized
risk transformations (the h ); and by postulating trade-offs
among decision units (the Ai). Again, the question remains
whether these weights and parameters that reflect the trade-
offs can be realistically assessed. But the literature on
multi-attribute utility theory and its applications indicate
that a quantification of such trade-offs cari be feasible.
Identifying a set of good standard solutions
The general regulation model (21-23), the safety standards
model (36-38), and the emission standards model (47-49) all end
up with the three utilities accruing to the regulator, the
developer, and the impactee respectively, given that the latter
two units take actions which are "optimal" in the decision
theoretic sense. The search for a good standard solution can
begin with an examination of the optimal developer and impactee
responses d(r) and a[d(r)]. Then a Pareto optimality analysis
can be applied on UR, UD, and UA to eliminate obviously unsatis-factory standards. Finally a weighting scheme such as (26) can
be used to further explore the changes in utility as a function
of r.
Allowing a Study of the Sensitivities of the Regulatory Solution
to Conflicting Values, Opinions, and Degrees of Information
In each step the values, trade-offs, and probability
density functions were made explicit based on a set of infor-
mation that the regulator had at hand. Each of these parameters
and information variables can be pushed around to see in which
areas the model is most sensitive. For example, one could run
the whole model based on some information provided by developers
or impactees, to see if such different information sources would
lead to different standard solutions. Furthermore, one could
analyze if different weights or trade-offs would change the
solution, etc. Finally, as an important output of the model
one can compute the value of perfect information (see DeGroot,
1970), and the value of sample information. This could then be
an important input for future budgeting decisions to set up re-
search programs to improve standards.
Decision makers and analysts will probably find many formal
and substantive limitations of the model presented here, ranging
from criticisms that it is an overformalization of a very com-
plex political process to specific criticisms of independence
assumptions made in the model. Probably the most persuasive way
to meet these criticisms are successful applications of the
model. Within IIASA's research on standard setting one such
application (on chronic oil discharge standards) has been com-
pleted, another one (on noise standards) is in process. In con-
junction with these applications a final evaluation of the model
presented here will be possible.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix the additive decomposition of an algebraic
difference function and the linear or exponential relationship
between a von Neumann and Morgenstern function u and the differ-
ence function v will be derived from behavioral axioms.
o
Let <cxC,~> be an
et al., 1971). Let c =
o 0
only if for all c.,d. EC.,c.,d.EC.,
1 1 1 J J J
holds:
(~' ,~') be
C. is said
·1
algebraic difference structure (Krantz
(c 1 , c 2' ... , c . , ... , c ) E C and let (c, d) ?v
1 n --
o 0
defined as (~'~) ? (~' ,~') and (c' ,~') ~ (c,d).
to be difference value independent of X C. if and
j~i J
j~i the following condition
0 0 0 0 co)[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' · .. , c i _ 1 ' c i ' c i +1 ' · . . , n
0 0 0 d. , 0 c~) ](c 1 ' c 2 ' · . . , c. l' c i +1 ' ·. . ,1- 1
0
"'"
0 0 0 0 dO)[ (d 1 ' d 2 , · .. , d. l' c i ' d i +1 ' · . . ,1- n
0 0 0
d i +1 , dO) ] (50)(d 1 ' d 2 , · .. , d. l' d. , · .. ,1- 1 n
Decomposition of v
Let <CxC,~> be an algebraic difference structure with
difference value function v as defined in (4). If for all i=1,
2, ... ,n-1, Ci is difference value independent of X C., then
there exist tunctions v. :C.~ such that j~i J
1 1
v(c) =
n
I:
i=1
v. (c. )
1 1
(51 )
It is clear that difference value independence is necessary for
(51) to hold. To prove sufficiency an approach by Fishburn
(1970) for additive utility functions is followed. Consider
the following n-1 indifference equations which are a result of
the difference value independence condition for arbitrary
o
c. ,c. , Eel'
1 1
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[ (c 1 ' 0 0 0 0c 2 ' c 3 ' ·.. , c i ' · .• cn)
0 0 0 0 0(c 1 ' c 2 ' c 3 ' · .. , c. , · •• c n ) ]1
~
[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' c 3 ' ·.. , ci' · •. c n )
0
• .• 9 n ) ] (52. 1)(c 1 ' c 2 ' C 3' · .. , c i '
0 0 0 0[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' c 3 ' ·.. , c i ' · .• cn)
0 0 0 0 0(c 1 ' c 2 ' c 3 ' ·.. , c. , · .• c n ) ]1
~
0
• •• C n )[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' c 3 ' · .. , c i '
0 0
• .. c n ) ] (52.2)(c 1 ' c 2 ' c 3 ' ·.. , c i '
0 0 0 0 C~)[ (c 1 ' c 2' · .. , c. l' c i ' c i +1 ' · .. ,1-
0 0 0 0 0 CO) ](c 1 ' c 2 ' · .. , c. l' c i ' c i +1 ' · .. ,1- n
~
0 0 0 C~)[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' · .. , c i _ 1 ' c i ' c i +1 ' · .. ,
0 0 0 0
cn)] (52.i)(c 1 ' c 2 ' · . . , c. l' c i ' c i +1 ' ·.. ,1-
0 0 0 0 CO)[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' ·.. , c i ' ·.. , C n-2' c n - 1 ' n
0 0 0 0 0 c~) ](c 1 ' c 2 ' · .. , c. , · .. , C n-2' C 1 '1 n-
~
0 0 0 0
cn)[ (c 1 ' c 2 ' ·.. , c i ' ·.. , C n-2' C n-1'
0 0 0 0 0
cn)] (52.n-1)(c 1 ' c 2 ' · .. , c. , · .. , c n - 2 ' C n - 1 '1
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since <cxC,~> is an algebraic difference structure from (4)
and (52) the following n-1 difference equations can be derived:
=
(53. 1)
=
o 0
v (c 1 ' c 2' c 3 ' •.. , c i ' ... , c n ) , (53. 2 )
00000
v (c 1 ,c2 ' ... ,ci - 1 ,el 'C i +1 ' .~.~. ;cn) -
o 0 0 0 0 . 0) =
v(c 1 ,c2 '··· ,ci - 1 ,c i 'c i +1 ' ,!.~ ,cn
(53.i)
o 0 000
v(c 1 ,c2 '···,c., ... ,c 2'c 1'c)-1 n- n- n
o 0 000 0
v(c 1 ,c2 '···,c. , ... ,c 2'c 1'c) =1 n- n- n
o 0 0 0
= v(c"c2,···,ci,···,cn_2,cn_1,cn) -
o 0 000
v(c 1 ,c 2 '···,c., ... ,c 2'c 1'C)1 n- n- n (53.n-1)
Adding up the left and right terms and cancelling the fourth
term of equation (53.i) against the third term of (53.i+1) for
all i results in
n-1
00000E V(C 1 ,C 2 ' ... ,C. 1,c.,c'+1 •.. ,c )i=1 1- 1 1, n
(n-1) o 0 0 0• v(c 1 ,c2 '···,ci '···,cn ) =
o 0 0 0
= v(c 1 ,c 2 '···,c., ... ,c) - v(c 1 ,c2 '···,c., ... ,c 1'c) (54)1 n 1 n- n
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v. (c. )
1 1
00000
= v(e, ,c 2 ,··· ,c i - 1 ,c i ,c i +1 ,··· ,en)
_ v (co) . (n-1)
n
gives the desired result:
n
E
i=1
v· (c. )
1 1
(55 )
The next decomposition is a well known result in expected
utility theory. It is based on the definition of utility inde-
pendence introduced by Keeney (see Keeney, 1974; Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976). In the present terminology utility independence
can be formulated as follows.
Let <Ff~> .be an expected utility structure as defined in
(3). Let f1, g1 be any two probability density functions with
identical degenerate marginal probability densities fi(ci)=
gi (ci)=1 for some ci E Ci, but otherwise unrestricted..3. cj is
Jr 1
said to be utility independent of C. if the preference among
fi and gi does not depend on the sp~cific value of ci with
unity density. Weaker formulations of utility independence can
be found in Keeney (1974); Fishburn and Keeney (1974); von
Winterfeldt and Fischer (1975); Keeney and Raiffa (1976). The
result of utility independence together with the assumption of
a von Neumann and Morgens~nutility 'function over C is the
following decomposition:
Decomposition of u
Let u be a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function
over C. Let.3.Cj be utility independent of Ci for all i. Then
Jr1
there exist functions u i : Ci~ such that either
u(c) =
n
E
i=1
'u· (c. )
1 1
(56)
or
n
1+ku(c) = IT
i=1
[1+ku. (c.)]
1 1
(57)
The proof can be found in the papers cited above.
To relate u and v the following uniqueness theorem for
additive order preserving functions is observed (see Krantz
et aI, 1971)*: If a function v:C~ is additive and preserves
*A similar proof based on constant risk aversion arguments has
been provided by Pratt and Meyer in Keeney and Raiffa (1976).
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the order of C, and if there is another function VI:C~ with the
same property then there exist real numbers a,B,a>O such that
v = av + B.
This property, now used to relate u and v with respect to the
I "
orders ~ and ~ over C, which by (7) are identical.
If (51) and (56) hold u and v are both additive and order
preserving functions from C~.
Therefore, there exist a>O,B such that
u = av + B (58 )
If (51) and (57) hold, then first (57) needs to be transformed
into an additive order preserving function before the unique-
ness theorem can be applied. Two cases have to be distin-
guished: if k>o, then l+ku in (57) is ab_ order-'p-reserving
function. If k<b then 1+ku has an inverse order.
Consider k>O first:
R.n [1 +ku]
n
= R.ri[ IT (1+ku.)]
. 1 1.1.=
(59)
n
R.n[1+ku] = E R.n(1+k~i)
i=1
(60 )
Since (1+ku) is order preserving and R.n is strictly
increasing, R.n(1+ku) is also order preserving. Therefore (60)
is an additive order preserving function. By uniqueness, there
exist a>O,B such that
R.n[1+ku] = av + B
1+ku = av+Be
1 aV+B
-
1
u = ...-e - kk
(61)
(62 )
where k>O and a>O.
If k<O then (1+ku) is an inverse order. Since 1n is
strictly - increasing 1~1+ku) is an inverse order, and
- 1n [1 +ku]
n
= - E 1n (1 +ku. )
. 1 1.1.=
(63 )
is again an additive order preserving function. By uniqueness,
there exist a>O,B such that
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- in [1 +ku] = av + 8
1+ku = -av-8e
1 -av-8 1
u = k e -j(
where k<O, a>O.
(58), (62), and (65) are the desired results.
(64)
(65)
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to modeling
environmental standard setting procedures under specific consi-
deration of the dynamic conflict situation in environmental
decisions. Three idealized decision units are considered, the
regulator, producer and impactee units: The regulator has to
fix the standard. This standard causes a financial burden to
the producer, who releases pollutants to the environment. By
means of the standard the impacteehas to be protected against
this pollution.
The starting point is a multistage model for a non~ooper~·
ative three person game. After the descr~ptLon of this model
the range of its application is indicated by the cases of North-
Sea oil, sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and noise. Since
any game-theoretic analysis includes the choice of a solution
concept, a class of concepts is discussed. The last part of the
paper contains a brief survey of the results of two multistage
cases where the relevance of the solution concepts is demons-
trated.
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A GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWOR...l( FOR DYNAMIC STANDARD
SETTING PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the 1960s environmental agencies have been
set up allover the world establishing guidelines and regulations
that should help to limit effects of modern technologies that
may be detrimental to the environment. New organizations, regu-
latory tools, standards, incentives, and procedures were rapidly
introduced which often had a substantial impact on the industrial
investment and operating costs as well as on the speed at which
new technologies were introduced. After an initial period of
zealous environmental decision making the time has come now to
reflect on this development. Questions such as the following
are raised both by environmental researchers and decision makers:
How good are our procedures for assessing impacts on the envir-
onment? How well do we take uncertainties into account when
making regulatory decisions? Are long-term environmental and
economic effects of our decision making properly taken into
account?
Researchers and experts of environmental agencies began to
realize that the difficulties in environmental decision making
often lead to decisions that are less rational than one would
wish. The problem areas most often mentioned are the vast
uncertainties that exist about the environmental effects of
pollutants, the difficulty in assessing risks of accidents of
scales never encountered before, the conflicting interests of
groups involved in and affected by regulatory decision making,
and the difficulty in assessing long-term environmental and
economic effects. These problems call for new institutional
and methodological approaches to environmental decision making
(see National Academy of Sciences, ,1975, National Research
Council, 1977).
This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to the modeling
of environmental standard setting decisions, considering speci-
fically the dynamic conflict situation in environmental decisions.
Three decision-making units are considered in the game theo-
retic model: the regulator, producer, and impactee units; such
a structure has in fact also been proposed in connection with
risk analysis (H. Otway, P. Pahner, 1976). The regulator, who
may consist of a regulatory agency where various administrative
units and experts interact, has to fix a standard. This standard
usually causes a financial burden to the producer, who may
consist of several energy producers emitting gaseous pollutants,
or any other enterprise polluting the environment. The standard
serves to protect the impactee consisting of the population
affected by the pollution.
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Under special assumptions about the parties involved one
arrives at a conflict among several people that belongs to the
class of problems treated by game theory. The assumptions are
essentially two: "Each individual has a utility-function that
he strives to maximizej" and "Each individual is able to perceiye
the gaming situation." These two are often subsumed under the
phrase "The theory assumes rational players" (R.D. Luce,
H. Raiffa, 1957, ch. 1)". The problem of how to arrive at utility
functions from given preference patterns is dealt with by
decision theory (see e.g. D. v. Winterfeldt, 1978, 1 ), and will
not be discussed in this paper. Instead the purpose of this
paper is to provide an appropriate game-theoretic framework
for standara setting, and to discuss the value of the game-
theoretic results for the problem.
The starting point is a multistage model for a game between
the three players: regulator, producer, and impactee. It is
hoped that the model is general enough to embrace some essential
features of most problems of standard setting. Furthermore it
should permit parameter analysis in a way that crucial uncer-
tainties about health effects and economic development as well
as about utility functions can be identified. This parameter
analysis seems to be indispensable especially for the regulator's
utility function, since his utiliW function should reflect both
general economic considerations and detrimental effects of
pollution on the population, the weights on both being highly
arbitrary. Though essentially descriptive, these models should
help the regulating authority structure the standard setting
task, including such problems as whether and what research
program to start, e.g. on health effects, in order to reduce
crucial uncertainties. Furthprmore they allow one to look ~t
cases where technical or physical parameters dominate such that
for all reasonable utility functions and existing uncertainties
nearly the same results are obtained.
The models concentrate on long-term aspects cr dynamic
problems and rather neglect distribution and bargaining problems
(see, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 1976, and J.C. Harsanyi, 1977) although these can be
included in principle.
The paper is organized as follows. First the model descrip-
tion is given. Then the range of applications is illustrated
by cases such as North Sea oil, sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide,
and noise. The North Sea oil problem was treated as a detailed
one-stage game model, and multistage models were developed for
carbon dioxide and noise (D. v. Winterfeldt, 1978), (E. Hopfinger,
D. v. Winterfeldt, 1978). The multistage cases are sketched
thereafter.
Since there is a variety of different solution concepts for
n-person games (n > 2), any game-theoretic an~lysis includes the
choice of a solution concept. That is why a class of appropriate
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solution concepts are discussed: the equilibrium point for
noncooperative games, Pareto-optimal points for essentially
cooperative games, the "minimal distance from bliss-point"
concept, and the Nash solution. Furthermore a hierarchi.cal
solution concept is given for cases where first the regulator
announces his strategy andfuereafter the producer. This two-
level leadership concept may be regarded as normative.
At the end a brief survey is given of the rpsults of the
two multistage cases demonstrating the relevance of the solution
concepts.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
The dynamic or multistage mode]s developed below are three-
perso~ games in extensive form. The definition of such games
is rather involved and, since the authors hope that the following
description is sufficiently self-contained for a general defin-
ition of games in extensive form, they only refer to (J.C.C.
McKinsey, 1952) and (G. Owen, 1968).
The Time-Discrete Game
It is assumed that only time periods or stages have to be
considered instead of a ti~e-continuum. Thus a game is played
at each stage, and the play~r's strategies control not only the
payoff but also the transition probabilities governing the game
to be played at the next stage. Each component game is deter-
mined by the states of the play. For example s can contain
the relevant physical state of the world, e.g., the amount of
oil in the water, of sulphur dioxide in the air, and their
distribution; or the relevant economic state. Other than with
the more usual games whe~e players make simultaneous and inde-
pendent choices, perfect information is assumed for the component
game by the following structure: At each stage the regulator
makes hi.s choice first, then the producer is informed about the
regulator's choice and makes hj.s choice, and finally the impactee
learns about the other choices and makes his choice.
The play proceeds from component game to componen~ game with
the transition probabilities jointly controlled by the players.
Since the transition probabilities are often not exactly known,
subjective transition probabilities are·admitted for the players
which may differ from each other. The process of the play can
be sketched as in Figure 1.
Let S denote the set of possible states. For each s £ S
the set of the regulator's choices or measures is denoted by MR(S).
Let Mp(S,mR) denote the set of producer's measures or choices
in the case of state s and the regulator's choice ~. If the
i+1
stage i+1, state s
...
regulator
i+1 E: M
R
(si+1 ):\'- mR Vproduceri+1 E Mp(S i+1 i+1 )mp ,mR
,j.
impactee
i+1 £ M1(S i+1 i+1 i+1)mr ,mR ,~
-:.J
ii, state s
! r<;gulator.
1. 1.I mR E r.1R (s ) ~• 'V.oC"O.~"Yproducer o ~~i i -v-<"
mp £ l-ip (s ,mR)
l
impactee
i £ Hr(s i ,mR,mp )mr
/1 stage
Figure 1. Transition from stage i to stage i+1.
iproducer chooses mp E Mp(s,mR), then Mr(S ,mR,mp ) denotes the
set of choices or measures possible for the impactee. Hence MR
is a map on S; ~ a map on {(s,mR) ISEs,mREMR(s)}; and Mr a map
on {(s,mR,rnp) ISEs,mREMR(s),rnpE~(s,mR)}. Then Pj(.ls,mR,~,mr)
(j=R,p,r) denotes the subjective probability for the next state
given state s and choices rnR,mp,m
r
. strictly speaking
P. (. Is,mR,mp,m
r
) is a probability measure on the measurable
J
space (S,d), where d is an appropriate a-algebra that depends
only on the last state and choices neglecting all previous states
and choices. For each component game a utility function is
given for each player:
Vj : {(s,mR,rnp,mr ) ISEs,mRE~~(s),rnp£~(s,mR) ,mrEMr(s,mR,rnp)}~R ,
where uj(s,mR,rnp,m
r
) denotes the payoff to player j (j=R,p,r).
Games which may stop after finitely many stages can be in-
cluded such that a permanent state is reached providin~ only one
choice for each player and zero payoff for each. This is impor-
tant in case one tries to approximate infinite stage games by
finite stage games.
A play of the game is given by an infinite sequence
11112222 ..(s ,mR,mp,m
r
; s. ,mR,mp,m
r
; ..• ) of states and dec1.s1.ons. Then
one possibility for the payoff functions is given by
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00~ iii i iU.(1T) := L p.U.(s ,mR,m.....,mI )
-J i=1 J J . P
(j = R,P,I)
where 0 < p. < 1 is a discount factor for player j. A second
J -
one is given by
1 . 1 ~ U (i iii)1.m n. L . s ,~,mp,mI
n-+co 1.=1 J
Since the latter suppresses the payoff of the first stages we
shall only use the first. The discount factor Pj is the larger
the more the future is regarded as important. In general,
U. (1T) is well defined if p. < 1. For special cases, however,
-J J
U.(1T) is well defined for p. = 1 because technical constraints
-J J
such as limited resources of fuel limit the summation
In order to arrive at games that are not too complicated
only stationary strategies have been considered. Thus a
strategy aR of the regulator i~ a function of S providing
always the same choice aR(s)e:~(s) as soon as se:S ooeurs; -a strategy
a p of the producer is a function on' {($,mR)lse:s,~e:~(s)}pro-
viding always the same choice ap(s,mR)e:~~(s,mR) as soon as
(s,mR) occurs; and analogously the impactee's strategy a I is
a function on
such that
Given a strategy tuple (aR,ap,aI ), a subjective probability
Pj(.laR,ap,aI ) over the space of possible plays is determined
for each player. Under measurability condi.tions not specified
each player can expect a payoff given by
(j = R,P,I) ,
where U.(n) denotes the payoff in the case of play TI.
-J
Except for a solution concept and except for a mathemarical
discussion of the assumptions necessary for the well-behavior
of the mathematical terms above, the model description is
complete.
So far the population affected by pollution has been represented
as a rational player with a utility function. This is no self-
evident approach. Another possibility would be to represent
the population by a response function based on its perception
of the effects of pollution. But this can be done within the
game-theoretic model given above in that the choice sets
MI(s,mR,mp ) contain one element only. If the impactee's payoff
is not of interest one can drop the impactee and only consider
the transition probabilities of regulator and producer. However,
it is not easy in general to formulate a response function ade-
quately describing the reactions of the population. One result
of a three-person game-theoretic model may therefore consist in
response functions that are special strategies of the impactee
and are considered with some solution of the game.
Juridical procedures can be formalized within this frame-
work at least by representing a court sentence as a transition
from one state into another. Research programs on health effects
and the impactee's attitude can reduce the range of MI and make
the transition law more exact, reducing, for example, the variance
of a distribution relating to the transition.
Extensions
If the game has only finitely many stages and thp. sets of
states and measures of all the players are finite, the game
always has an equilibrium point in "pure" (nonstationary) stra-
tegies (see, for example, J. RosenmUller, 1977), i.e. no random
choices are necessary. This is due to the property of full
information for all players. Nevertheless one may ask whether
other orders of succession among the players' choices are
appropriate. Firstly, this approach seems a suitable one since
the regulator is often regarded as the most powerful player who
usually is the first anrouncing his choices. Citizen groups
usually only react to the regulator's or producer's decision.
Secondly, an alternative order of succession can be included
by introducing dummy choices and enlarging the state space by
the players' last choices. Of course, this might yield a
cumbersome model.
One arrives at much more complicated games if one considers
strategies like "reduction by 20 percent of emission of a pol-
lutant over five years" if there is no major ch~nge of economic
or technical conditions. Due to a lack of time such a ~odel has
not been developed. Due to the stationary property of strategies,
however, this ~odel can increase the probability of emission
reduction by 20 percent over five years thus reflecting a
"mixed" strategy.
Bargaining of the players can be included (J.e. Harsanyi,
1977). Bargaining among the groups that are repre~ented by the
three players is not a major point of the game-theoretic model.
Instead we rather start from the assumption that the groups
have reached agreements. Thus, for example, an analyRis like
the one of (W. Richter, 1978) of the location of a public utility
has not been carried over to detrimental facilities like nuclear
plants using cooperative game theory where the players are the
affected individuals. In the case of global pollution and local
regulators, producers, and citiz~n groups, however, the local
models are the basis for modeling the conflict situation among
the groups of regulators.
RANGE OF APPLICATIONS
The following description of cases s~rvp.s as an introduction
into the variety of problems that can be treated within the
framework outlined above.
North Sea Oil
Due to oil haulage in the North Sea there is now, even
during normal operation, pollution by chronic oil discharges in
addition to accidental oil spills.
Components of state: distribution of polluting oil in the
North Sea, amount of oil raised in the previous year, amount
of fish caught in the last previous year, recreation index of
the coast, equipment and organization of the three players.
Choices:
a) Regulator: maximal amount of oil pollution, moni-
toring systems together with basic juridical measures (taxes),
research programs on effects of pollution;
b) Producer: amount of oil to be raised during the
next period, treatment, equipment, violation of standard;
c) Impactee: no action, aggression against oil
company, changes of political leaders, fishermen drop their
jobs, tourists avoid coasts.
Consequences, costs, and benefits: satisfication of stan-
dards of other nations, increase of gross national product,
better balance-of-payments, decreased water quality,
reduction of fishing and tourism.
Sulphur Dioxide
Regional pollution by burning fossil fuel.
Components of state: distribution of sulphur dioxide in
the air, number of ills effected by sulphur dioxide, amount
of sulphur dioxide produced in the previous year, distri-
bution of population, attractivity factor of landscape,
percentage of unemployed, gross national product, ••.
Choices:
a) Regulator: maximal amount of emitted SO (includ-
ing juridical basis), (taxes), monitoring, remova~ of pro-
ducers, initiate researcn program on health effects,
improvement of medical systems, help for migration of
population, ... ;
b) Energy producer: installation of filters, reduc-
tion of energy production, combustion of other fuels;
c) Impactee: migration, aggression against government
or energy producer, civil action, vote to suspend government,
reducing his own consumption of energy.
Consequences, costs, and benefits: employment, large gross
national product, lung diseases, ultimately death.
Carbon Dioxide
Global pollution manifested as increased amount of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere.
Components of state: amount of atmospheric CO2 , temperature,high temperature catastrophe.
Choices:
a) Regulator: maximal amount of a~itted CO2 (includingjuridical basis);
b) Producer: amount of production of CO2 ;
c) Impactee: aggression against energy producer or
government, vote to suspend government, reduce energy
conEumption.
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Consequences, costs, and benefits: employment, large gross
national products, catastrophe.
Noise
A lot of industrial activities impose a noise problem on
their environment. This description relates to the fast
Shinkhansen train in Japan.
Components of state: maximum quantity of noise near the
railway line, settlement in the vicinity of the railway
line, layout of soundwalls, upper bound for speed of
trains.
Choices:
a) Regulator: maximal quantity of speed or noise,
order to build sound walls;
b) Producer (of noise): sound walls, reduced speed,
dislocation of neighbors;
c) Impactee: complaints, petition to regulator,
legal action against railway company.
Consequences, costs, and benefits: increased or decreased
gross national product, dislocation of residents, health
effects on residents.
EXAMPLES
The North Sea Oil problem as yet has only been treated as
a detaiJed one..,.stage model by D. v. Winterfeld, (1978, 2). The
study contains considerations that are difficult to handle
within a genuine multistage model and is not discussed here
further. It has turned out that the sulphur dioxide problem
can only be treated adequately within a regional model including
several pollutors, input-output analysis, and migration problems.
Considering the lack of solutions and in the understanding of the
basic structures of simpler cases, this problem has been post-
poned. In the short period of time available only studies on
carbon dioxide and noise as dynamic games were carried out that
are briefly outlined in this paper. Detailed descriptions can
be found in (E. Hopfinger, 1978, 1) and (E. Hopfinger, D.
v. Winterfeldt, 1978).
A ~iul tistage Model for the Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Probl-em
The effects of increased shares of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere are not well known. The conjectures that exist at
present are rather contradictory. This model is based on the
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assumption that a continuous increase of CO 2 in the atmosphere
beyond an unknown critical value, caused by the burning of
fossil fuel, will lead to irreversible and large changes in
the climate of the earth that are to be regarded as catastrophic.
The regulator is assumed to be an international agency, and the
group of all emitters of CO2 as the producer.
The states of the game are
{(C,L) IC~O,L~O} u {k>O}
where
C is the amount of carbon dioxfde in the atmosphere;
L is the upper bound of emission of CO 2 during the period;
k is the critical value of the atmospheric CO 2-content.
Since the true critical value is unknown one has to con-
sid~r the set of all possible critical values.
Let (C1 ,L1 ) denote the first state. The choices of the
players in case of state (C,L) are the following:
The regulator chooses 0 < I < L, with I denoting the upper
bound of carbon dioxide emitted by the producer. Theproducer
chooses ° ~ a ~ 1, the amount of CO2 to be emitted. The producer
chooses the degree 6f pressure 0 < ~ < 1 he wants to exert on
the regulator. With probability pv the bound L is replaced by
~, where ° < v < 1 is a fixed number.
For state k the choices of the players are I = 0, a = 0,
p = 0.
By assumption the critical value is not known and further
information is not available. Hence all three players may have
different conjectures denoted by CI ' Cp ' and CR. For simplicity
Cp denotes the maximal amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
if all fossil fuel is burnt.
Given atate (C,L) and the choices (l,a,p) the following
states are possible at the next stage:
L(C+Ba,L) , (C+Ba,'2) , {k~C},
with Ba denoting that part of the carbon dioxide emitted remains
in the air. B is assumed to be constant. The subjective proba-
bilities PR,PP,PI for the new states are:
-11-
New state PR Pp PI
(C+Ba,L) 0 if C'::'CR<C+Ba 1-pv 0 if C'::'CI<C+Ba
1-pv if C+Ba,::,CR 1-pv if C+Ba,::,CI
(C+Ba,~) 0 if C'::'CR<C+Ba pv 0 if C.:s.CI<C+Ba
pv if C+Ba2.cR pv if C+Ba.:s.CI
CR 1 if C'::'CR<C+Ba
CI 1 if C~CI<C+Ba
State k cannot be changed.
The transition from state s to state t has the utility
I
Uj(sil,a,p'it) for plRyer j=R,P,I.
LUj(C,Lil,a,PiC+Ba,M) = c1l+c2~+c3P (M=L'2)
I( 1 k) = . 1 k-C +UR C,Li ,a,pi c 1 +c2-S-+c3P c R
UR(kiO,O,Oik) = 0
Up(C,Lil,a,piC+Ba,M) = c 4ak-CUp'(C ,Lil,a, Pi k) = c 4-B- + cp
Up(kiO,O,Oik) = 0
LUi(C,Lil,a,piC+Ba,M) = c Sa+c6P (M=L'2)
Ui(C,Lil,a,pi k ) = csk~C +c 6P+cI
Ui(kiO,O,Oik) = 0
Because of Uj(s,l,a,p) = jUj(s,l.a.p,t)dPj(tls,l,a,p) (j=R,P,I),
i.e. Uj is the subjective expected utility of the utility of the
payoff:
Uj(k,o,o,o) = Uj(k,o,o,o,k) = 0 (j = R,P,I) ,
since the conditional probability Pj(klk,o,o,o) the transition
from state k to state k occurs is one.
UR(C,L,I,a,p)
Ur(C,L,l,a,p) lc sa+c 6P , if C+Ba~Cr or Cr<C:= Cr-Cc S- B-+ c 6p+cr ' if C'::Cr<C+Ba
The parameters are assumed to have the following signs c1~0,
c 2>0, c 3<o, c 4>0, cS>o, c 6>0 whereas c R' c p ' c r are larqe
negative payoffs. c1~O reflects the regulator's internal
difficulties to set small standards, c 2>0, c 4>0, cS>o the
benefits of energy production, c 3<0 t.he damage of pressure,
and c 6<o the burden of organization. rt turns out that these
assumptions already determine the shape of the range of the
payoffs.
A Multistage Model for Noise Problems
Since the opening of the fast railway line Shinkansen in
1964, complaints about noise and vibration have never ceased.
Up to now the Japanese National Railways have been reluctant to
take steps tcwards noise reduction such as building soundwalls,
dislocation of neighbors; and slowing down trains. So far the
impactee's mearsures have gone through all the possible stages:
complaints, petition to the government, organization of citizens
for negotiations with Japanese National Railw:ays and the
government, and legal proceedings. The regulator consists of
various institutions (like the Environmental Agency, for example)
with expert committees and subcommittees, local government, and
national government. For a better understanding of the basic
structure"the institutional aspects are neglected and the regu-
lator is formalized as one player. The impactee is characterized
by a response function.
The states of the game are a subset of
{(L,i) I.!! ~ r 2. n, i = 1,2, ... 7}
where L denotes an upper bound for an admitted noise level, n
the maximum value of noise produced by the train operated only
under economic considerations, and n>O the minimum value of noise
under which the train can be run under economic considerations.
(L,1) is the first state after constr,~cti.on of the railway line.
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Hence (L,1) = (n,1). state (L,2) indicates that a getition has
been filed. (L,3) states that the population affected by noise
has org~nized itself to negotiate with the government for a low
noise standard. If negotiations fail the impactee can start a
lawsuit, which is indicated by (L,4). (L,4) can be followed by
states of typ2. (L, 5), (L, 6), or (L, 7) • (L,S) denotes that a
permanent compromise has been achieved with upper bound L for
noise: (L,6) that the lawsuit was decided in a neutral or posi-
tiv~ way for the Japanese National Railways and the government;
and (L,7) that the lawsuit was decided in favor of the impactee.
(L,S), (L,6), and (L,7) are final or absorbing states.
For each class of states the component game and the trans-
ition probability are given separately.
It Is assu~ed that the costs and benefits of the train have
aggregated such that the utility of the regulator is given as a
function o~ the values of noi~e:
as long as there is no action on part of the population. u R is
assumed to be unimodal, i.e. it is strictly increasing on [~,L+]
and strictly decreasing on [L+,n] where L+E[~,n]. uR reflects
a compromise among the economic importance of the train and the
detrimental effect on the neighboring residents. As lon~ as there
is no regulation the (noise-) producer's utility is speclfied
by the strictly increasing function
based completely on economic considerations.
In the case of the first state (L,1) = (n,1) the sets of
choices are specified by
MR (n,1) = {II!} < I < n}
~(n,1,1) = {nl!} < n < I} ;
where I denotes the utmost level of noise allowed to the producer,
and n the value of noise generated by railway operation. The
impactee's choices are not specified since the impactee is for-
malized by a response function resulting in special transition
probabilities.
Given state (n,1) only states (n,1) and (n,2) can succeed.
A critical noise level nIE[~,n] is assumed for the impactee such
that noise is regarded as a substantial impact if and only if
its value is greater than n I . The subjective transition proba-bilities are specified by
(!! ~ n < fi)
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P({n,2) n,1,l,n) 1~2 if n<n= - Iif n>n I
P((n,1) n,1,l,n) l~ -P2 if n~nI= if n>nI .
Indices j = R,P for the subjective probabilities are omitted
since this model assumes that regulator and producer consult
the same experts. P2>O represents the experts subjective proba-
bility that the impactee will prefer a petition. The utilities
are given by
UR(n,1,l,n) = uR(n) ;
Given state (n,2) the set of measures are
~(n,2) = {ll~ < 1 < n} ;
~(n,2,l) ={nl!! < n < l} •
Then (n,2) can only be replaced by (n,3) denoting the
formation of an organization. We assume "the following sub-
jective transition probabilities:
p((n,3)ln,2,l,n) = 1°
P3 ;
1
1 if n~nI
P((n,2) In,2,l,n) = 1 l'f
-P3 n>n I
where P3>0. The idea is that n~nI is conceived a~ giving in by
either the regulator by l~nI or by the producer in the case of
n~nI<l. The payoffs are specified by
UR(n,2;l,n) = uR(n)
Up(n,2il,n) = up(n)
;
If an organization is formed (which is denoted by n,3) it
is the impactee's objective to have the regulator give in.
-15-
Let
MR(ii,3) := {II!! < I < n}- -
Mp(n,3,1) := {n I.n < n <: I}
- -
then
P( (n,4) In,3,I,n) 1~4 if l<n .= - I ,if l>nI ;
l~ -P4 if l<n ;P( (n,3) In,3 ,l,n) - I= if l>nI
where P4>O and (n,4) denotes the start of a lawsuit. Let
U.(n,3,I,n) := uj(n) (j = R,P; n < n < n)
J
Three outcomes of a l~wsuit are considered. There is a
comproT.ise (L,s) suspending the lawsuit, cr a eentence in favor
of regulator and producer (L,G), or ~ ser.tence in favor of the
impactee (L,7). Let
= {lin < I < n} v:{(I,A)ln < I < A < n}
Mp (n,4,1) = ~(n,4,I,A) := {nl!} ~ n ~ I} u {(n,N)!!} ~ n
E N<ii, n!:l} •
Let
Me := {(I,A;ffip) (1,A) E MR(n,4), A~nI' mp E ~)n,4,1)}
u {(mR;n,N) I ~ E MR(fi,4), (n,N) E Mp (fi,4,mR), N~nI}
be called the set compromise pairs of choices. Then we assume
p ( (L, 5) In, 4 , mR' ffip, ) =
1 if (mR,mp ) E Me and L = min (A,N),
where A .- +00 or N := +00 unless
defined previously;
0 else;
PG if L = nR and (mR,mp ) ~ Me;
p ( (L, G) In, 4 , ffiR' ffip ) = 0 else;
=l:7
if L = n I and (ffiR,mp ) ~ Me;p ( (L, 7) In, 4 , ffiR' mp )
else;
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where ~ ~ n I ~ n R ~ n for the maximal noise level n R fixed by
the court is in favor of the producer, O~P6+P7~1. Hence
(!! < n < 1)
The payoffs are specified by
UR (n,4,mR,n) = UR (n,4,mR,n,N) = uR(n)
Up (n,4,mR,n) = Up (n,4,mR,n,N) = up(n)
State (L,S) means that either the ,regulator has agreed to take
L~nI as the maximal noise level or that the producer has bound
himself to noise levels not higher than L~nI.
Let
MR(L,S) := {II!! < 1 < L} ,
-
Mp (L·, S) := {n\!} < n < I}
- -
then
P((L,S) IL,S,l,n) = 1 •
The payoffs are specified by
U. (l,S,l,n) = u. (n) (j = R,P; !! ~ n ~ 1)
J J
. State (nR,6) indicates a sentence unfavorable to thelmpactee.
Let
MR (nR,6) = {II!} ~ 1 < n R}
~(nR,6,l) = {nln < n < I}
Then P ( (nR, 6) In R, 6 ,1, n) = 1
signifies a sentence unfavorable to regulator
and
U j (nR,6,1,n)
State (n I ,7)
producer. Let
= u. (n)
J
(j = R,P)
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Then
P( (n I ,7) InI ,7;1,n) = 1
The payoffs are given by
U. (n I ' 7 , 1 , n) = u. (n) +c . ( j = R, P)
J J J
c. 0 expresses the freedom of decisions lost for other indus-
J
trial activities involving noise since the sentence must be
taken into account for the designing of such activities. In
the case of L+>n I , it is assumed that c j is a negative multiple
-m. of u. (L+) - u. (n I ), Le.J J J
c. = -m. (u. (L+) - u. (n I ) )J J J J
Since (L,S), (nR,6); and (n I ,7) are permanent states the
payoffs for plays will only exist for proper discount factors
PR<l and pp<l. PR and Pp need not be equal. Sometimes PP<PR
seems to be an adequate assessment.
SOLUTION CONCEPTS
Given the strategy-sets L. (j = R,P,I) of the three players
J
and the vector of utilities (VR'Vp'VI ) defined on the cartesian
product LRxLpxL I of the strategy sets, each player faces the
problem of selecting a strategy in order to obtain a high
utility. Features that have to be considered in the selection
of appropriate strategies are precisely formulated as solution
concepts. However, except for two-person zero-sum games,
there is no unique solution concept for general n-person games
(see R.D. Luce, H. Raiffa,19S7), (J.C. Harsanyi, 1977).
In the following we will introduce several familiar solu-
tion concepts and discuss their applicability to the problem
of procedures for standard setting which depends on the
specific structure of the conflict situation, and the purpose
of our analysis.
Definition
+ + +
A three-tuple (oR,op,OI) £ LRxLpxL I of strategies is
called a weak equilibrium point if
+ + + + +VR(oR,op,oI) L VR(oR,oP,oI) (oR £ LR)
+ + + + +Vp(oR,op,oI) > Vp(oR,oP,oI) (op £ Lp )
+ + + +VI(oR,oP,oI) ~ VI(oR,oP,oI) (01 £ LI )
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+ + +The three-tuple (oR,op,or) is called a strong equilibrium
point if the left-hand term of an inequality is always larger
than the right-hand term.
Discussion
Equilibrium points are points of stability inasmuch as
no player can improve his payoff if all the players persist
in their equilibrium strategy. There is no statement as to
how to arrive at an equilibrium point. rn R.D. Luca, H. Raiffa,
(1957, p. 91), it is pointed out that it is advantageous in such
a situation to disclose one's strategy first and to have a
reputation for inflexibility. A further complication is that
several equilibrium points can exist.
rt can be proven that the j-th component of the equilibrium
+ + + + + + + + + .payoff vector (VR(oR,op,or),Vp(oR,op,or)' Vp(oR,op,or)) 1S at
least as large as the corresponding maximum payoff which is
defined as max inf V. (0 ,0 ,0 )
0. 0. (iE:{R,p,r}..... {j}) J R P r
J 1
The following solution concept makes sense only if some collu-
sion is possible.
Definition
Letll~ denote the range of the utility functions:
II = (Xl ,X2 ,X3 )clR1 x j = Vj (oR,op,or)
for one (oR,op,Or)GLRxLpXL r }. The payoff vector (UR,up,Ur)E:l!
is called Pareto-optimal if there is no (vR,Vp ,vr )E:llsuch that
u. <v.
J - J
(j = R,p,r)
and u.<v for one j at least.
J
Discussion
Pareto-optimal payoff vectors are the undominated payoff
vectors. Usually they exist in abundance. They are important
in the case of collusion because then one can expect the players
to use strategies yielding Pareto-optimal payoffs.
So far no comparison of utilities has been necessary. This
is different for the following concept.
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Definition
Let (u;,u;,u;) denote the point of maximal possible
payoffs called bliss point, i.e.
u; = max(u j I (uR'up'uI ) £U> (j = R,P,I)
The payoff vector (uR,up,uI ) is called bliss-optimal if
L: (u:-u.)2 = min(L:(u:-v.)2 1 (vR,vP,vI)£'iliJ J J J
j == R,P,I
Discussion
The bliss-optimal point depends on the norm. Here we
have chosen the euclidean norm, but it is quite obvious that
an IP-norm with p~ may give other results. Furthermore, if
the utilities are changed by linear positive transformation,
the new bliss-optimal point is only in special cases related
to the former by the same utility transformations.
Although R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa (195~ point out that
the following concept is independent of positive affine trans-
formations, this is no longer true for more general transfor-
mations.
Definition
Let (dR,dp,d I ) be a triple of payoffs the players obtain
if they cannot reach an unanimous agreement or the choice of
a payoff vector u£U. Then the Nash solution is the point
(u;,u;,u;) at which the term (UR-dR) (Up-dp ) (UI-d I ) is maximized
subject to the requirement (uR,uP,uI)£tL uj~dj (j = R,P,I).
Discussion
d j are called conflict payoffs. It is obvious that a
Nash solution is Pareto-optimal. By definition as a product,
the term '_RITp I (um-d j ) gives the same weight to each utility,J - , ,
hence the Nash solution is symmetrically dependent on the
utilities. Sometimes d. is assumed to be the maximum payoff
of player j. J
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So far concepts without special assumptions about the
announcement of strategies have been discussed. The following
deals with a leadership concept yielding a different solution
concept. It is assumed that the regulator has to announce his
strategy first and then the producer. Optimal responses on
part of the impactee and the producer can be regarded as
sOlutions.
Definition
A hiepapchic solution is a three-tuple (TR,Tp,T
r
) of a
strategy TREER, and two maps
+ r
r
such that
Ur(or,op,Ti(OR'Op}} = max Vr(oR,op,or}
°rEEr
Vp(OR,Tp(OR}' Tr(oR,Tp(oR}} = max Vp(OR,Op,Tr(oR'op}}
opEEp
VR(TR,Tp(TR}fTr(TR,Tp(TR}} = max VR(oR,Tp(oR},Tr(oR,Tp(oR}}
°REER
Discussion
The definition of hierarchic solution indicates that such
a solution is the solution of a dynamic programming problem
over function spaces. Hence, besides the rather restrictive
requirements sufficient for the existence of a solution
(K. Hinderer, 1970), the calculation of a solution can be
carried out only for special models. However, the hierarchic
solution is especially convincing if the corresponding payoffs
are Pareto-optimal since then collusion cannot increase the
payoff of all players. Furthermore, it is an equilibrium
point, as can easily be seen. rn the case of a one-stage
game, the hierarchic solution coincides with the solution
concept used in UN. Winterfeldt, U97B, I} under the conditions
specified there.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Whether it is worth it or not to develop a game-theoretic
framework in any sense (e.g. normative or descriptive) for the
conflict situation among the interest groups involved in a
pollution problem, can only be decided on the basis of case
studies. Actually, there is only the study on carbon dioxide
where all the solution concepts have been applied, and the noise
study where due to a lack of time only the hierarchic solution
was applied.
If in the case of carbon dioxide the impactee is more
cautious than the regulator, a region of possible payoffs is
that in the following Figure 2, assuming that the producer acts
rationally.
VR
POINT OF MAXIMAL
PAYOFFS
REGULATOR /
UTILITY
---~-----_.
.~~~~~:::-::=-=~=-=----+---.vitT 77 77 T/7GZ
PROJECTION OF THE ~"-'-~..L.L.~~~1 EQUILIBRIUM 2
REGIO~ O~_~OSSIBLE PAYOFFS ~
EQUILIBRIUM 1
IMPACTEE
UTILITY
C -C C -C
Equilibrium 1: (c 2
R
_R_+ c I )-S- Cs 8
C -C C -C
Equilibrium 2 : (c 2
I
_1_)
-S-, C s 8
Figure 2. Payoff Diagram
for Regulator and Impactee (CR > CI )
The Pareto-optimal points Equilibrium 1 and Equilibrium 2
actually stem from equilibrium points. It is obvious that
Equilibrium 2 is an approximation of the bliss-optimal point
and the Nash solution. The hierarchic solution concept,
however, yields Equilibrium 1 as payoff vector. From the
formulas given below Figure 2, one can see the parameters
that determine the solution. The analysis has yielded strate-
gies of the impactee that can be taken as an assessment of a
response function. This oversimplified model already confirms
the dominating importance of the parameters CR and CI "
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The noise study once more demonstrates that the framework
is broad enough for a variety of cases. While in some cases
extensions might be appropriate, it seems that there exist
basic features of the pollution problem, the structuring of
which would specialize the framework in greater detail, thus
rendering it much more powerful. One such feature is the
monitoring aspect or surveillance whether the producer operates
within the standard. Since there is an analysis of this problem in
D.. v. Winterfeldt, 1978, 1, and since both authors have know-
ledge of the inspection problem (R. Avenhaus, 1977), (R. Avenhaus,
E. HOpfinger, 1970), (E. HOpfinger, 1975), this problem has
been postponed especially since the approach of M. Maschler,
1966, where the inspector announces his inspection strategy,
can apparently be carried over without too many difficulties.
One other aspect not fully treated is the way of modification
of subjective probabilities if new data are available. For an
introduction, we refer to M.H. DeGrout (1970), and T.S. Ferguson
U967) .
-23-
REFERENCES
Avenhaus, R. (1977). Material Accountability, Theory, Verifi-
cation, Applications, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester,
New York.
Avenhaus, R., and HOpfinger, E. (1977). Optimal Inspection
Procedures in a Nuclear Facility for a Sequence of Inven-
tory Period: A Decision Theoretical Model for an Inspec-
tion System Based on Material Measurements. In Pro-
ceedings of the IAEA Symposium on Safeguards Techn1qUes
in Karlsruhe, Vol II, International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna.
De Grout, M.H. (1970). Optimal Statistical Decisions,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.
Ferguson, T. S . (19 67) .
Theoretic Approach~
Mathematical Statistics, A Decision
Academic Press, New York and London.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1977). Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equi-
librium in Games and Social Situations, cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, London.
Hinderer, K. (1970). Foundations of Non-stationary Dynamic
Programming with Discrete Time Parameter, Springer
Verlag, Lecture Notes in Operations Research and Mathe-
matical Systems, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
HOpfinger, E. (1975). Reliable Inspection Strategies
Vol. 17 of the Mathematical Systems in Economics Series,
Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, FRG.
HOpfinger, E. (1978). Dynamic Standard~Setting for Carbon
Dioxide, International Instibite-for Applied Systems-
Analysis, RM-78- , Laxenburg, Austria.
Hopfinger~ E. and v. Winterfeldt, D. (1978). Dynamic Model
for Setting Noise Standards, in D. v. Winterfeldt,
Procedures for the Establishment of Standards, Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria.
Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, London.
Maschler, M. (1966). A Price~adership Method for Solving
the Inspector's Non-Constant-Sum Game, Naval Research
Logistics Quarterly, 13, 11-33.
McKinsey, J.C.C. (1952). Introduction to the Theory of Games,
Rand Corporation, McGraw-Hill.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1976).
Economics of Transfrontier Pollutio~ - Paris.
•
-24-
Ostmann, A. (1978). Fair Play und Standortparadigma,
University of Karlsruhe.
thesis,
Otway, H. and Pahner, P. (1976).
pp. 122-134.
Risk Assessment, FutureS, !,2,
Owen, G. (1968). Game Theory, W.B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia.
Richter, W. (1978). A Game-Theoretic Approach to Location -
Allocation Conf licts, University of Karlsruhe, FRG.
RosenmUller, J. (1977). The Theory of Games and Markets,
University of Karlsruhe, Institute of Statistics and
Mathematical Economics~ FRG.
v. Winterfeldt, D. (1978). A Decision Theoretic Model for
Standard-Setting Regulation, International Institute for
Applied SY$tems Analysis, RM-78- , Laxenburg, Austria.
v. Winterfeldt, D. (1978). Modeling Standard-Setting Decisions:
An Illustrative Application to Chronic Oil Discharge,
International Institute for hpplied Systems Analysis,
RM-78- , Laxenburg, Austria.
III.
APPLICATIONS OF DECISION AND GAME THEORETIC ~mDELS
MODELLING STANDARD SETTING DECISIONS:
AN ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO CHRONIC OIL DISCHARGES·
Detlof von Winterfeldt
Technical Report No. 8 written for the Volkswagenwerk Foundation
Project, "Procedures for the Establishment of Standards"
*Published also as a Research Memorandum at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1978.
Abstract
This research memorandum presents an illustrative applica-
tion of a three decision maker, one stage decision model to the
problem of setting chronic oil discharge standards. It is the
third paper in a series dealing with decision models and their
applications to standard setting. The first paper (IIASA,
RM-78-5) describes the problematique ot-·oil discharge standard
setting faced by the UK and Norwegian governments with the
growing oil development in the North Sea. The second paper
(IIASA, RM-78-7) provides the formal background of a decision
theoretic model which was developed to aid regulatory agencies
in standard setting tasks. The present paper is a first attempt
to apply this model to a real world standard setting case.
The paper took the UK standard setting problem as it arose
in 1975 as its starting point. It first describes the regulation
problem in terms of sources, amounts and effects of chronic oil
discharges from North Sea production platforms. Then it presents
a three decision maker, one stage decision model for standard
setting which encompasses the decision making of a regulator
unit, a developer unit, and an impactee unit. The decision
making of the developer unit is thought as being influenced by
a standard through the possibility of detections of violations
of the standard and subsequent sanctions. The decision making
of the impactee unit is influenced by the operation and treat-
ment decision of the developer unit. Each decision unit is
modelled by a decision theoretic model inclu~in9 q~a~tifications
of uncertainties and values, determining optimal treatment res-
ponses to regulation alternatives, and utilities for all three
units as a function of standards.
The application of the model is illustrative in character.
Although some of the data used in the model were collected during
two field studies in the UK and Norway, many quantifications are
still hypothetical in the sense that they are no real assessments
by the experts and decision makers, but rather reflect the
author's perceptions of the decision maker's and experts'
opinions and evaluations. Nevertheless the model results provide
some basic insights in the standard setting problem for chronic
oil discharges.
The model showed the strong influence of the uncertainty of
equipment performance on the decision making of the developer as
a response to a standard. Even risk neutral decision makers
would make rather conservative treatment decisions. The model
also shows the sensitivity of the precise_ defini~ions of sample
v
size, sampling period and exemptions on the developer's decision
making. The model demonstrates clearly that a standard is not
equal to a standard, that is, the numerical value of a standard
tells only part of the story about its strictness in changing
the developer's decision making.
Other model parameters, such as penalty functions, utility
functions, etc., proved to be rather insensitive. Another model
result is that there are many dominated standards, i~e., stan-
dards which are not better for any deciQion unit and worse for
at least one as compared to other standards. This dominance
effect is a result of the discreteness of the developer's (treat-
ment) response to a continuous decision of the requlator.'
The general conclusion of this model application is that
such a formalization of a standard setting problem is feasible
in principle, that the model results make sense, and that
running the model gives interesting insights in the sensitivities
of certain decisiqn par~!!leters. ~!te_~p-c:Iel_~PE:tic.a_ti9l1: also
showed that especially in the modelling of the political evalua-
tions of the regulator and the environmental modelling of the
impactees much improvement is necessary to allow a trade-off
analysis between the three decision making units.
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Modelling Standard Setting Decisions:
An Illustrative Application to Chronic oil Discharges
THE PROBL&~ OF SETTING CHRONIC OIL DISCHARGE STANDARDS
Offshore oil production brings not only economic benefits
to the oil producing countries, but also increased risks and
hazards of oil pollution into the seas. One major source of
such oil pollution are production platforms with their risks of
oil blowouts and their continual chronic or operational oily
water discharges. Although accidental spills like the Santa
Barbara blowout in the Pacific (see Straughan, 1971) or the
Ekofisk blowout in the North Sea (see Fischer, 1978) are more
dramatic and have more visible impacts on fish, birds, and
beaches, chronic discharges may not be less dangerous. Such
discharges continue over years and they involve the possibility
of mortality or chronic toxicity of marine organism, long term
effects on spawning behavior and changes in the ecological
balance. Environmental agencies allover the world have there-
fore made attempts to limit these chronic oil discharges through
appropriate regulations.
Oil emission standards which are set on the oil concentra-
tion in the discharged water are the most common regulatory tool
to reduce oil pollution from production platforms in the seas.
In a previous paper (Fischer and von Winterfeldt, 1978) the
decision process was analyzed by which the UK and Norway set
such chronic oil discharge standards for North Sea production
platforms. The focus of that analysis was on the actors
involved in the decision making, their conflicting goals and
objectives, their decision alternatives and their information
processing and evaluation strategies. During this largely des-
criptive and problem oriented analysis a decision theoretic
model was developed with the aim to aid regulatory bodies in
similar standard setting tasks. The present paper is an attempt
to apply this model to the problem of chronic oil discharge
standards.
The application presented in this paper is illustrative in
character. Although some of the data used in the model were
collected during two field studies in the UK and Norway on the
problem of chronic oil discharge standards, many quantifications
are still hypothetical in the sense that they are no real assess-
ments by the decision makers and actors involved but rather
reflect the author's perceptions of the actor's values and
opinions. Using as a background the UK standard setting
problematique as it arose around 1975, the model was developed
and run to analyse chronic oil discharge standard setting in
similar situations.
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In the following section first the problem of chronic oil
discharges, their amounts and their possible effects will be
briefly reviewed following reports by the US Academy of Sciences
(1975), the US Council of Environmental Quality (1974), and the
central unit on Environmental Pollution of the UK (1976). Then
the problem of regulating such discharges is discussed as it
presented itself to the UK governmental agencies in 1975. In
the next section the decision theoretic model will be presented
following more detailed papers by von Winterfeldt (1978 a and b) •
The model application, sensitivity analyses, and a discussion of
some major results will conclude the paper.
Sources, Amounts and Effects of Chronic Oil Discharges
Oily water discharges from production platforms have three
main sources: production water, displacement water, and runoff
water. Production water is pumped out of the oil field together
with the crude oil and is discharged into the sea after a separa-
tion and possible further treatment process. Crude oil may con-
tain as little as one percent production water in the early days
of production, and as much as 30% in later stages if water injec-
tion systems are used to increase the reservoir pressure (CUEP,
1976). Before treatment production water may contain up to
3000 ppm (parts per million) of oil. In offshore oil storage
tanks at production platform sites water displaces the oil and
mixes to some degree with it through diffusion and wave action.
This water can contain up to 300 ppm of oil. Runoff water from
production decks mixes with oil residues and small oil spills
and is collected at the production platform.
Water from these three sources is usually collected and
treated through various oil-water separation devices ranging from
simple gravity separation over filtering devices to chemical or
biological treatment. Good treatment practice with present day
technology can reduce the oil content in oily water down to
20-50 ppm. In spite of these relatively low concentration levels,
chronic oil discharges from production platforms still pose a
potential danger to the marine ecology. First of all, the
separation processes are usually survived by the more toxic solu-
able hydrocarbon components. Secondly, the total amounts of
discharged oil is by no means small. Fischer and von Winterfeldt
(1978) estimated that approximately 2200 tons of oil per year
will enter the North Sea at peak production periods through
chronic oil discharges (as a comparison: accidental oil spills
are expected to lie around 5000 tons/year).
The possible effects of these chronic oil discharges on the
marine environment are mediated through the ambient distribution
of oil concentrations which is created around the platform through
the constant flow of oily water emissions. This distribution is
a result of a complicated process of emission, diffusion and
decay. A recent MIT study estimated that an area of 5.4 km2
around a platform can be polluted at levels higher than .1 ppm
(or 100 ppb - parts per billion) (Council of Environmental
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Quality, 1974}. At such concentration levels several environ-
mental impacts may occur ranging from direct mortality of marine
organisms which are exposed for a longer period to such concen-
tration, over long range cumulative effects to slight behavioral
changes in the marine ecology.
Marine biologists are not at all certain about the nature
and extent of these impacts. Early reports (NATO Report, 1970)
warned of the potential dangers of oil pollution including
possibilities of bioaccumu1ation of carcinogen substances.
Laboratory experiments showed that continuous exposure of fish
and other marine organisms at levels in the low ppm range can
lead to mortality and toxicity. Recent reports are more opti-
mistic (US National Academy of Sciences, 1975; Mertens and
Allred, 1977; Westaway, 1977; Morgan et a1., 1974). These
reports conclude that there is little evidence for bioaccumu1a-
tion and that most field studies of chronically polluting plat-
forms gave no evidence of fish kills, toxicity, or ecological
changes except in highly sensitive estuarian areas with low
currents and flows. Yet marine biologists warn of the more
subtle long term and behavioral changes, and urge regulatory
agencies to set strict standards for chronic oil discharges from
production platforms.
The Regulation Problem
When oil development went underway in the North Sea the UK
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act (1971) formed the legal basis
to regulate offshore oil pollution. This law forbade any oily
water discharges from offshore installations without exemption.
Naturally the development of the oil fields posed a dilemma to
the UK regulatory agencies, the UK Department of Environment and
the Petroleum Engineering Division (PED) of the Department of
Energy. The solution was initiated with the new Petroleum and
Pipelines Act (1975) which allowed offshore oil operators to
discharge oily water provided they used best practicable means_
for treatment. There were, however, no precise guidelines to
determine what "best practicable means" meant, and under which
precise conditions offshore operators should be exempted from
the no discharge law.
At the same time other European countries began to push the
UK to set uniform chronic oil discharge standards for North Sea
production platforms. A study team in the Central Unit on Envi-
ronmental Pollution was set up in the Department of Environment
to analyze the problem of discharge standards. Based largely on
costs and performance data this study concluded that:
"Data suggest that an average oil concentration of
30-40 ppm is achievable with present technology.
A maximum effluent oil concentration of 100 ppm
should not be exceeded more than 2% of the time.
New development of existing systems for use on
platforms may be able to reduce the effluent oil
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concentration to an average of 20 ppm, but these
systems have not yet been fully evaluated."
(CUEP, 1976, p. 22) .
Partly as a result of this study the agency responsible for
offshore platform regulation, the PED of the Department of Energy,
set a standard of an average oil concentration of 40 ppm for
platforms with discharge volumes of more than 100,000 barrels a
day (approximately 14,000 tons) of oily water, and a standard of
50 ppm for platforms with smaller discharge volumes. These
standards were effectively applied since 1977.
The effects of such standards on the regulator himself, the
offshore oil operator, and the impacted fishermen and ecologists
will be analyzed in the following section by a decision theoretic
model. The model was developed in order to examine the results
of changing the standard, possible sanctions or the monitoring
procedure. Since the offshore oil operators' response to such
regulation is a crucial element in regulatory decision making,
a decision making model for such responses was developed. The
impactees'responses were not modelled and instead impactees were
considered sufferers or beneficiaries of the regulator's and the
operator's decisions.
The model was quantified by using data from the CUEP, equip-
ment manufacturers, and the PED. Where sufficient data was
lacking, best guesses were sUbstituted and checked with experts.
Value and utility functions were not assessed interactively with
decision makers but they are based purely on the author's per-
ceptions of the decision maker's values, making use of parametric
analysis to accommodate a range of possible functional forms.
A DECISION THEORETIC MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD SETTING
To develop a decision theoretic model for solving a complex
decision problem, three main steps have to be followed:
1. The problem has to be structured. Structuring includes
a definition of alternatives and events which may
influence consequences in the form of a decision tree
or payoff matrix (see Raiffa, 1968), and an elaboration
and operationalization of the decision making objectives
by means of goal trees (see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
2. Uncertainties and value judgements have to be quantified.
This quantification includes the construction of prob-
ability distributions over uncertain events (see
Spetzler and v. Holstein, 1975), and the construction
of utility or value functions over consequences (see
Fishburn, 1965; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
3. Probabilities, values and utilities have to be aggre-
gated mathematically to an overall evaluation of action
alternatives. This includes the aggregation probabili-
ties through probabilistic inference models (see Kelly
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and Barclay, 1973), the aggregation of values and utili-
ties through multiattribute utility models (see Keeney
and Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeldt and Fischer, 1975),
and the aggregation of probabilities and utilities
through expected utility models (see v. Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954; Fishburn, 1970).
The
elements
1.
structuring of the problem provides the following formal
of the decision problem:
A set of alternatives (courses of action) A with typical
elements a, b E A;
ElementsC. is called the consequence space.
1
A set of possible events S with may influence the con-
sequence of an action a, with typical elements s, tE S;
A set of operationalized objectives c 1 ' C2 ' ... 'C i ' ... 'Cn
which will also be called attributes. Each C. is
1 1
to be a subset of R. The product setassumed
n
C = X
i=1
£, ~ are called consequences.
2.
3.
The quantification part of the analysis provides
1. A probability distribution p which assigns to each s E S
a probability p(sla); and a probability density function
f which assigns to each element c in the consequence
space a value f(£la,s). -
2. A value function v: C + R which expresses the decision
maker's relative preferences among consequences.
As an aggregation model a modified expected utility model
is assumed. An evaluation function over A is defined as:
( 1 )U(a) = J [L: P (s Ia) • f (~I a, s) ] •h [v (c)] dc
C SES
Where h is a risk transformation which expressed - loosely
speaking - the decision maker's attitude towards taking or
avoiding chances. In the present model application a special
form of (1) will be used, in which f is degenerate, h is either
linear or exponential, and v is additive. (1) can then be
written as
U (a) =
n
L: P (s Ia) • (s ign a.) exp {a. L: w. v. [c . [a, s) ] }
SES i=1 1 1 1
for a. ~ 0 and
(2)
U (a) = L:
SES
n
p(sla) L: W.v. [c. (a,s)]
i=1 1 1 1
(3 )
for a. = o.
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Here v. [c. (a,s)] is the single attribute value of attribute
~ ~
C. which obtains if a is the act selected and s occurs. The
~
w.'s are scaling parameters, and a is a risk parameter. The
~
decision maker is risk averse of a<O, risk neutral if a = 0, and
risk prone if a>O. According to models (1) ~o (3) that alterna-
tive aEA should be selected which has the highest value of U.
The assumption behind this model are spelled out in v. Winterfeldt
(1978 b).
In environmental standard setting tasks the decision model
becomes more complicated, since there is no individual decision
maker, but rather several decision makers with often conflicting
interests and opinions. In a previous study (Fischer and von
Winterfeldt, 1978) three main decision units were identified
which typically enter into standard setting decision making:
1. The regulator unit
2. The developer or producer unit
3. The impactee unit.
The regulator unit consists of people and institutions which
have to set the environmental standard, monitor its compliance
and sanction its violation. Such agencies are usually environ-
mental agencies or international control agencies. The developer
unit is defined as all those people and institutions whose deci-
sion making is restricted by the standards, typically industrial
or development organizations. In the impactee unit all those
people or groups are combined whose activities or perceptions are
impacted upon by the development or industrial activities through
pollution. The main idea of the standard setting model is to
build model (1) for each of these three units in terms of their
own actions, alternatives, relevant events, etc., and to link
them through the logic of the standard setting problem. The
resulting regulator-developer-impactee model has a structure
which is schematically represented in Figure 1.
If the regulator decides on a particular standard r, the
decision making of the developer will be influenced by the poss-
ibility of sanctions if his operations d do not meet the standard.
That is, the standard generates together with possible monitoring
and sanctions the danger of a detection of a violation with its
associated costs. The model of the developer will then be able
to determine an optimal response d(r) which may not be the res-
ponse or the action he would have selected without r.
Through pollution and their adverse effects on health and
well being the developer influences the decision making of the
impactees. Impactees may decide to leave polluted areas, or to
begin legal action against the developer or the regulator. The
model of the impactees can determine the optimal impactee action
a(d) as a response .to the developer's action d.
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REGULATORY
DECISION
MODEL
DETECTION OF
REGULATION
VIOLATION
DEVERLOPER
DECISION
MODEL
SANCTIONS
POLLUTION
GENERATING
EVENTS
IMPACTEE
DECISION
MODEL
Figure 1
POLLUTION EFFECTS
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE REGULATOR-DEVELOPER-
IMPACTEE MODEL
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The idea of the model is to determine o?timal decisions
d(r} and a[d(r}] for the developer and the impactee as a function
of r together with the associated utilities UR , UD' and UA .
Further aggregation or a Pareto optimality analysis may then be
used to focus in on a good value of r.
More formally, let Table 1 indicate the notation for the
standard setting model.
Table 1 NOTATION FOR THE REGULATION MODEL
SET ELEMENT
Regulator's alternatives R r
Developer's alternatives D d
Impactee's alternatives A a
Regulator's consequences CR £R
Developer's consequences CD £n
Impactee's consequences CA £A
Regulator's events SR sR
Developer's events SD sD
Impactee's events SA sA
The probability distributions and functions PR' PD' PA'
v R ' vD' vA' h R , hD, hA are also assumed. Without specifying
interlinkage models "detection of violations and sanctions" and
"Pollution generation and effects" the evaluation of acts for
each decision unit depends on the acts taken by other units,
since p and v are dependent on all acts. To allow a separa-
tion, the following specifications and assumptions will be made:
1. SR = ~
2. SD = {QO' Q,} where QO stands for the event "non-
detection of a violation" and Q, stands for
"detection of a violation".
3. = {llo~l<oo} where 1 is the random emission level
produced by the developer's activities.
Splitting R into three sets: the set of standard levels
SL(slESL}, the set of monitoring and inspection devices
SM(smESM), and the set of sanctions SS(SSESS), the following
utility functions UR ' UD' and UA are assessed:
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= (4 )
for some a ::f 0 .
nD
(sign a) exp{a L wDivDi[cDi (d,ss,Qk)]}
i=1
(5)
UA(a,d) = ff(lld)
L
n A
(sign B) exp{B E wAivAi[cAi (a,l)]}
i=1
( 6)
for some S ~ O. For a,B = 0, the linear form (3) applies.
The specifications and independence assumptions expressed
in (3) to (5) can verbally be stated as follows:
(3) The regulator's consequences depend only on his own
action;
(4) The developer's consequences depend only on his action,
the possible sanctions, and the detection state.
(5) The impactee's consequences depend only on his actions
and pollution levels.
This means, of course, that the UR depends on r only, UD on
d and r only, and UA on a and d only. Therefore d(r) and a(d)
can be defined as follows:
d(r) UD(d(r) ,r) = max UD(d,r}
D
(7 )
a (d) UA(a(d) ,d) = max
A
UA(a,d) . (8 )
(7) and (8) determine the optimal responses of the developer and
impactee to a standard r and a development activity d respec-
tively as well as the associated utilities as required. There-
fore the model can determine the effects of r = (sl,sm,ss) on
the three decision making units and by varying sl, sm and ss it
can explore differential effects of monitoring procedures and
sanctions. As a final analysis the model could be used to
eliminate ordina11y dominated standards and restrict further
consideration to the Parato optimal set. The Parato optimal set
can then be explored through weighting schemes of the form
(9 )
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THE REGULATOR MODEL
In this section the problem of setting chronic oil discharge
standards as seen from the regulator's point of view will be
structured, values will be quantified and some preliminary
results concerning the regulator's utility function will be
presented. In the sense of the standard setting model the regu-
latory agency in the UK which is concerned with setting chronic
oil discharge standards is the Petroleum Engineering Division of
the Department of Energy. The developer unit consists of the
offshore oil operators, i.e., the large multinational oil com-
oanies and their contractors. Given an oil discharge standard,
the offshore oil operators will have to adjust their production
and treatment processes in order to meet that standard. The
impactee unit is defined as the possible sufferers of chronic
oil pollution, notably the fishery industry and possibly con-
sumers of fish and other marine organisms. In addition, ecologists
are considered impactees who are concerned about the more subtle
behavioral and ecological changes in the marine environment.
The Structure of the Problem for the Regulator
Regulatory alternatives are the levels of oil emission
standards, defined as the average amount of oil concentration in
the effluent which is not to be exceeded. This set will be
labelled SL (for standard level) with elements sl. SL has the
following property:
SL = {sll O~l<oo}
The procedure by which I, the actual average oil concentration"
is determined is a matter of monitoring and inspection procedures
SM. 1 is assumed to be computed as an average of n measurements
taken over a fixed period of time t. Measurements are taken and
analyzed by the operator himself, but periodical checks by ins-
pectors are assumed to enforce "honest" reports.
As part of the monitoring and inspection procedure sm the
regulator has to define what constitutes a detection of a regula-
tion violation, i.e., when sanctions are applicable. For example,
he may define such detection state as strictly as: "in continuous
monitoring of the effluent the oil contration may never exceed
the standard sl". As another example, he may consider a detection
occurring only if the daily average of four samples exceeds sl
more than twice in any given month during the lifetime of the
plant. A distinction thus emerges between a single violation of
the standard (l>sl) and the detection state as defined here. In
the definition of the monitoring and inspection procedure the
regulator may decide to "overlook" a few cases of violations in
a given time period, and only if the number of single violations
becomes too large, a detection state would occur.
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In general, detection states are defined as follows: the
average 1 of n measurements taken during time period t should not
exceed the standard sl more than m times during time period
T(t«T). For example, the 1978 US oil discharge standard (EPA,
1975) of 48 ppm is not to be exceeded by the average f of four
samples (n = 4) taken daily (t = 1) more than twice (m = 2) in
anyone month (T = 30). SM thus is defined by {t,n,T,m}. The
model will explore the following specific values, which roughly
correspond to the US, UK, and Norwegian definitions of a maximum
or an average standard*:
1. UK definition of a maximum standard (UK-MAX):
Two samples are taken on every day. During anyone
month not more than two single samples (no averaging)
may exceed the standard sl (t = ~, n = 1, T = 30, m = 2)
2. EPA definition of an average standard (EPA-AV):
The daily average of four samples may not exceed the
standard sl more than twice during anyone month
(t = 1, n = 4, T = 30, m = 2)
3. Norwegian definition of an average standard (NWY-AV):
The daily average of continuous sampling may not exceed
the standard sl more than once during anyone month
(t = 1, n ~ 00, T = 30, m = 1)
4. UK definition of an average standard (UK-AV-O, UK-AV-1)
The monthly average of two daily samples may not exceed
the standard sl (more than once) during the lifetime of
the plant (t = 30, n = 60, T = 5400, m = 0,1)
These definitions do not agree perfectly with the written defini-
tions of the respective countries. For example, the EPA defini-
tion allows for 5% violations during any consecutive period of
30 days rather than two violations in one month and the UK
definition of a maximum standard allows for 4% violations in any
time period. Neither Norway nor the UK give firm values for the
number of exemptions in their definition of an average standard.
In the Norwegian case it seems clear that one exemption will be
allowed, in the UK case both zero exemption and one exemption are
analyzed.
* In brackets: translation of regulation into the parameters of
sm. A month is approximated by 30 days. The lifetime of the
plant is assumed to be 180 30 day periods or approximately
15 years.
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The regulator also has to determine sanctions, labelled SSe
Sanctions are thought of as monetary penalty function, with the
following form:
KO + K (d j ) for Q1 (detection)
ss -
o for QO (no detection)
( 10)
where KO is a fixed penalty and K(d j ) is an additional penalty
which depends on the treatment decision of the developer that
led him to a violation of the standards. This additional
penalty is interpret~d as the cost necessary to improve the
equipment and operations to meet the standard.
The regulatory objectives which the model will consider are
all political in nature. According to the regulator the stan-
dard should:
(1) agree with standards of other nations
(2) satisfy international demands for a clean North Sea
(3) agree with national energy policy
(4) agree with national environmental policy.
Quantification for the Regulator Model
The degree to which the four regulatory objectives above
are met will be expressed by functions on SL only. That means
that eRi = SL and c Ri (r) = sl, i = 1,2,3,4. The first function
v R1 is to express the degree to which sl agrees with standards
of other nations. Four national standards were considered:
Japan (10 ppm), France (20 ppm), Norway (approximately 40 ppm)
and US (50 ppm). The value function is assumed to be bell
shaped with a peak at the average of these four standards
(30 ppm). Further restrictions assumed are:
v R1 (30) = 100
v R1 (20) = v R1 (40) = 50
v R1 (sl) ~ 0 sl ~ ± 00 •
The form selected was:
(sl-30)2
v R1 (sl) = 100·e 145
( 11)
( 1 2)
( 1 3 )
( 14 )
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The second value function v R2 is to express the degree to
which sl meets international demands for a clean North Sea. An
exponential function was selected with the following properties:
v R2 (0) = 100
v R2 (50) = 50
v R2 (sl) ~ 0 for sl ~ 00 •
The final form selected was
( 1) 100 .e- .014·s1v R2 s =
( 15)
( 16 )
( 17)
( 1 8)
The third value function should reflect the UK energy policy of
rapid oil development in the North Sea. Clearly, the stricter
the standard sl, the more likely it becomes that there will be
a slow down of oil development. Therefore an exponential func-
tion was assumed with the following properties:
v R3 (0) = 0
v R3 (50) = 50
v R3 (sl) ~ 100 for sl ~ 00 •
The form of that function is
( 1 9)
(20)
(21)
(22)
The final value function should represent the UK environ-
mental policy of using "best practicable means" for pollution
abatement. This value function will build on a conclusion by
the Paris Interim Commission on oil pollution that present day
technology can achieve oil concentration reductions down to
40 ppm at reasonable cost. Since the UK agreed with this state-
ment 40 ppm is considered achieveable with "best practicable
means". The value function is assumed to be bell shaped around
the value of 40 ppm with the following properties:
v R4 (40) 100
The functional form is
-14-
(23)
(24)
(25)
(sl-40)2
v R4 (sl) = 100·e 577 (26 )
As can readily be seen, all vRis are bounded between 0 and
100. To aggregate the v. 's weights w. have to be assessed.
~ ~
These weights represent the importance which the regulator
attaches to the four objectives. More precisely they are scaling
factors which should reflect the relative degree of change
in value by stepping from a standard with a value of 0 to one
with a value of 100. Two weighting schemes will be explored in
the model: a unit weighting scheme which attaches to all objec-
tives the same weights, and a differential weighting scheme
which seems to reflect more the actual importance attached to
the objectives by the UK regulators:
Table 2 WEIGHTING SCHEMES FOR REGULATOR'S VALUE FUNCTION
UNIT DIFFERENTIAL
NEIGHTS WEIGHTS
wR1 .25 . 1 0
wR2 .25 .20
wR3 .25 .40
wR4 .25 .30
Some Preliminary Model Results for the Regulator
According to the model formulation of p. 9 the regulator's
utility function UR has the form
(27)
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which, in the above model quantification is defined as
UR(sl) =
4
~ wRiv Ri (sl)i=1
(28)
with v Ri and wRi specified as above.
UR(sl) is plotted in Figure 2 for the two weighting schemes.
For the unit weighting scheme the best value of sl is 32 ppm,
for the differential scheme 36 ppm. Thus both schemes do not
differ much with respect to the optimal value of sl. In fact,
the general shape of UR(sl) seems to be rather insensitive
towards the weighting scheme as long as the weights are not too
extreme. This is largely due to the fact that v R2 and v R3
"cancel" each other thus leaving most of the influence on UR with
the two bell shaped functions v R1 and v R4 . Therefore, for most
weighting schemes "good" values of sl will lie in the range
between 25 ppm and 45 ppm.
THE DEVELOPER MODEL
The Structure of the Problem for the Developer
The following treatment alternatives are possible responses
of the developer to a standard level sl, a monitoring and inspec-
tion procedure sm and a sanction scheme ss:
d 1 No treatment
d 2 Simple gravity tank
d 3 Corrugated plate interceptor (CPI)
d 4 CPI and gas flotation (GF)
d 5 CPI, GF, filtering (F)
d 6 CPI, GF, F and biological treatment
d 7 reinjection of oily water.
The details about these treatment alternatives are given in CUEP
(1976). For the present purposes it is sufficient to say that
d 1 to d 7 are ordered in increasing degrees of effectiveness in
reducing oily water content in the effluent, and increasing
costs. The model assumes that the developer has two conflicting
objectives:
U
R
(5
1)
10
0 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
4
U
R
(s
l)
=
L:
W
o
,V
R
,
(5
1)
,
1
.
-
1
1
1
=
U
N
IT
W
EI
G
H
TI
N
G
SC
HE
M
E
~
D
IF
FE
R
E
N
T
IA
L
W
EI
G
H
TI
N
G
SC
HE
M
E
s.
..
.
.
.
.
~
.
.
.
.
'
..
..
'S
o.
.
.
.
.
~
,
~
,
~-
-@
--
I
.
.
.
.
.
.
0"1 I
o
o
10
36
70
80
5
1
F
ig
u
re
2
O
V
ER
A
LL
V
A
LU
E
FU
N
CT
IO
N
OF
TH
E
RE
G
U
LA
TO
R
FO
R
TW
O
W
EI
G
H
TI
N
G
SC
H
EM
ES
-17-
(1) To minimize the cost of treatment, expressed in the
attribute C01 (in Pounds Sterling) with attribute
values c 01 (d j ,ss,Qk) for j = 1, ... ,7, k = 0,1.
(2) To minimize the penalties due to a violation of the
standard, expressed in the attribute CO2 (in Pounds
Sterling) with attribute values CO2 (d j ,ss,Qk)'
j = 1, ... ,7, k = 0,1.
C01 clearly depends on d j only. Therefore
(29)
However, violation costs are dependent on ss, Qk and d j .
According to the penalty scheme (10)
KO + K(d j ) if k = 1 (detection)
o if k = 0 (no detection)
(30)
K(d.) is interpreted as the cost of improving treatment on the
J
request of the regulator. The model assumes that the regulator
asks the developer to build in a treatment d j +1 if there is a
detection of a violation with equipment d .. K(d.) is defined
J J
as the additional cost
K (d j ) = c 01 (d j +1 ) - c 01 (d j ), j = 1, ... ,6 .
Therefore
(31 )
(32)
(This assumption is realistic for d 1 , d 3 , d 4 , and d S ' since the
next best treatment just adds a unit to the already existing
unit. For d 2 and d 6 the next best treatment is qualitatively
different. Yet it is probably fair to assume that d 2 and d 6
would lead to savings when installing d 3 and d 7 after a viola-
tion, which corresponds to the outlays of d 2 and d 6 ) .
Since both consequences c 01 and c O2 are expressed in mone-
tary units, it is reasonable to assume that the value function
Vo is additive and negative in cost:
! ~ •. '
-18-
(33)
Therefore
(34)
and
( 35)
for j = 1, ... ,6.
The decision problem which the developer faces can therefore be
expressed in a payoff matrix as in Table 3.
Table 3
PAYOFF MATRIX REPRESENTING THE DEVELOPER'S DECISION PROBLEM
A
L
T
E
R
N
A
T
I
V
E
S
DETECTION STATES
NO DETECTION (QO) DETECTION (Q 1 )
d1 c D1 (d 1 ) c D1 (d 2 ) + KO
d 2 c D1 (d 2 ) c D1 (d 3 ) + KO
d 3 c D1 (d 3 ) c D1 (d 4 ) + KO
d 4 c D1 (d 4 ) c D1 (ds ) + KO
d s cD 1 (d s) c D1 (d 6 ) + KO
d 6 c D1 (d6 ) c D1 (d7 ) + KO
d 7 c D1 (d 7 ) -*
* No detection can occur for d 7 .
To make the further analysis of the problem tractable, two impor-
tant assumptions have to be introduced:
(1) It does not matter to the developer, when the detection
occurs, that is a detection in the first year is not
worse than a detection in the second, third, and so on.
UO(d,r) =
-19-
(2) After detection, and after improvement of the equipment
and payment of the penalty, no further detections are
possible.
The first assumption is reasonably only if the developer does
not discount future costs. The second assumption is reasonable
if the next best treatment which the regulator asks the developer
to build in after detection is so much better than the original
treatment that further detection probabilities are essentially
zero. In the sensitivity analysis of the developer model it will
be shown that the second assumption is acceptable for the quan-
tifications selected in the model.
with these assumptions cutoff probabilities of detection
can be calculated at which the developer would switch from d, to
J
d j + 1 . The developer's utility function was defined in (5) as
1 nO
E PD(Qk) (sign a) exp{a E wo,v
o
' [cO' (d, ,ss,Qk)l}
k=O i=1 1 1 1 J
(36)
which under the present specifications becomes
(37)
+ Po(Q1Idj,Sl,sm) (sign a) exp{-a[c01 (d j +1 ) + K01}
or in linear form
(38)
The cutoff probability of detection at which the developer would
switch from d j to d j +1 is fully determined by the equation
( 39)
where, according to the assumptions above near the cutoff point
(40)
-20-
Let this cutoff probability be labelled Pb(d j ). Solving (39)
for Pb gives
(41 )
for the linear utility function, and
= 1 _ exp{-Cl[C01 (d j +1 ) + ROl} - exp{-Cl c 01 ('d j +1)}
exp{-a[cD1 (d j +1) + ROl} - exp{-Cl c 01 (d j }}
(42)
for the exponential form of the utility function.
The next step is to structure the probabilistic relation-
ships between random emissions 1, averages 1 and detection
states QO and Q1. Following the model developed in v. Winterfeldt
(1978) the assumption is made that each treatment d. has perfor-
J
mance characteristics in reducing the oil concentration in oily
water which can be described by a normal distribution over levels
1 with mean 1. and standard deviation s .. The averages l'will
J J
therefore also have a normal sampling distribution with mean 1.
J
and standard deviation s./v'nl. Let p (d.,sl,n) denote the
J 0 J
probability that the average of n samples taken from the effluent
treated with equipment d j will not exceed the standard sl. Let
N(lj,Sj) denote the normal probability distribution which charac-
terizes the performance of equipment d j . N(lj,sj/vn) therefore
characterizes the sampling distribution of 1. Po can be deter-
mined by standard methods through
sl
P (d. ,sl,n) = f N(l. ,s./vn) dl.
o J -00 J J
(43)
The calculation of detection probabilities Po(Qk1dj,Sl,sm)
will depend on the values of t (sampling period), T (inspection
interval on which detection is defined), and m (number of exemp-
tions from detection state), all of which are part of SM. Let
M = Tit characterize the number of days in which violations
(1)sl) can occur: e.g., if T = 30 and t = 1 (in the EPA-AV scheme
of page 11) there are 30 opportunities to establish l>sl. The
lifetime of the plant is assumed to be 180 30 day periods.
Accordingly there will be N = 180 inspection intervals, if
T = 30 and N = 1 inspection interval if T = 5400.
-21-
A detection is defined as m + 1 or more violations (l>sl)
during anyone inspection interval T. The probabilities of
i = 0,1, ... ,M violations during T follow a binomial distribution:
Prob[i violationslp ,M]
o
(44)
Therefore the probability
inspection interval T is
o
'"m
of no detection during anyone
m
p (d. ,sl,n) = E (M~ (1-p ) i poM-i
m J . O' 01= 1
(45 )
For example, in the
T = 30, and m = 2,
violations during a
EPA-AV scheme of page
p is the probability
m
30 day period:
11, where t = 1,
of none, one or two
Given Pm' the probability of no detection over the lifetime of
the plant can be determined as
(47)
In EPA's monitoring and inspection example N would be 180.
To give an example for a
ment d j with Ij = 100 ppm and
and sm be the EPA-AV scheme.
results obtain:
= .9938
specific standard consider equip-
s. = 8 ppm. Let sl = 110 ppm,
J
For this scheme the following
= .9992
= .8658
Often the situation is complicated, however, since the
developer does not know the true average perf?rmance Ij.' although
he may know s. for a given 1 .. In fact, in the study by FischerJ J-
and v. Winterfeldt (1978) the uncertainty about treatmentperfor-
mance was considered by the oil industry a major factor
influencing their decision making. To express this uncertainty
about 1. a judgmental probability distribution is assumed over
J
-22-
1. which is also normal with mean 1. and standard deviation s .•
J J J
s. is assumed to be known. Since 1. is distributed normally,
J A J
and since the distribution of 1 can be interpreted as a condi-
tional distribution given 1., the marginal distribution of 1 is
_ J
also normal with mean 1. and standard deviation
J
j ..;,. 2 - 2S. = s. + s. In
J J J
(48 )
A
That means that the marginal distribution of 1 is equal to the
sample distribution if there is no uncertainty about Ij. It is
equal to the marginal distribution of 1. if there is uncertainty
J
about 1., but n is very large. In all cases in between it is a
J
"dilluted" distribution in which uncertainty about the true mean
performance 1. and the uncertainty about sampling are combined.
J
The values of PD(Qk1dj,sl,sm) can now be calcu~ated from
I., s., and s. as follows:
J J J
(1) Given n, determine the marginal distribution of f which
isN(I.,s.).
J J
(2) From N(I.,~.) and sl determine p , the probability of
J J 0
no violation (f~sl) during t.
(3) From p , m and T, determine p , the probability of no
o m
detection (less than m + 1 violation) during T.
(4) From Pm and N calculate PD(QO)' the probability of no
detection during the lifetime of the plant.
Another important analysis of the problem reverses these
steps. Given a desirable low detection probability P6(d j ), one
can approximate p*(d.} the corresponding probability of no
o J
violation during any period t. From p*(d.} and N(I.,s.} a value
o J J J
l*(d.} can be set for which this desirable low detection
o J
probability PD would be achieved with d j if sl = Ib(d j }. Through
these calculations cutoff levels Ib(d j } can be determined which
correspond to the cutoff probabilities P6(d j } (41, 42).
-23-
Quantification for the Developer Model
To quantify the costs for treatment and regulation violation
which the developer faces, a reference production platform
approach is selected. The assumption is made that the standard
is to be set for a typical North Sea production platform with a
daily oily water effluent of 10,000 tons. Also it is assumed
that the platform is of a concrete type so that gravity separa-
tion and biological treatment are both technically feasible.
Since both attributes CD1 (cost of treatment) and CD2 (cost
for violating the-standard) are expressed in monetary units, the
quantification for the developer is relatively easy. Table 4
lists some rough estimates of the possible costs for the' seven
options of the developer. These costs are based on some data by
the Central Unit on Environmental Pollution (CUEP, 1976), on
communication with manufacturers, and on a report of the National
Academy of Sciences to the EPA (NAS, 1977). Yet, these cost
estimates should be considered as merely illustrative of the
model application. Total costs were calculated as the sum of
installation cost and (undiscounted) operation costs for a
fifteen year lifetime of the production platform.
Table 4
ILLUSTRATIVE COST ESTIMATES FOR DEVELOPER'S TREATMENT OPTIONS
(10 3 Pound Sterling); 1978
Installation Operation/yr.
CD1
Total
(no disc.)
d 1 (no treatment) 0 0 0
d 2 (gravity tank) 0 3 45
d 3 (corr. plate int.) 70* 5 145
d 4 (CPI + GF) 140** 10** 290
d 5 (CPI + GF + F) 200 15 425
d 6 (CPI + GF + F + bio) 500 50 1250
d 7 (reinjection) 2100*** 115*** 3825
* Source: CUEP, 1976 _
** Source: Manufacturer's data
***Source: NAS, 1977 (for new platforms, far offshore)
All other data are rough estimates.
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The sanction value KO is considered a ,parameter in the
model. The following specific values will be analyzed: 10 000,
100 000, and 1 Mio. Pound Sterling. with this information the
payoff matrix of page 18 can be filled for the sanction scheme:
Table 5
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE DEVELOPER
(entries in 10 3 Pounds, KO = 100,000 Pounds)
DETECTION STATES
NO DETECTION (QO) DETECTION (Q1)
d 1 0 45 + 100
d 2 45 145 + 100
d 3 145 290 + 100
d 4 290 425 + 100
d 5 425 1250 + 100
d 6 1250 3825 + 100
d 7 3825 -*
* No detection is possible for d 7 .
s. of
J
be estimated.
As inputs for the probability analysis estimates for the
normal distribution characterizing the developer's uncertainty
about the average equipment performance of d j have to be made.
These distributions are fully characterized by the mean I. and
_ J
standard deviation s .. In addition the standard deviation
J
equipment performance for a given mean 1. has to
J
Table 6 lists the estimates for I., S., and s. which were
J J J
made for the purpose of this model. The first column shows, in
addition, some ranges.of literature estimates of average equip-
ment performance. Table 7 lists the mean and standard deviations
of the marginal of 1 for n = 1,4,60, and 00. These means and
standard geviations characterize then the uncertainty about daily
readings 1 for the different treatment options. From these
distributions p , p , and PD can be calculated as on p. 21 simply
o m
by substituting the "diluted" distribution of 1 for the precise
sampling distribution which can be used if lj and Sj are known.
Figure 3 shows an illustration of the distributions in Table 7.
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Table 6
LITERATURE RANGES OF AVERAGE TREATMENT PERFOro·mNCE AND
PARAMETERS OF DISTRIBUTIONS CHARACTERIZING
THE DEVELOPER'S UNCERTAINTY
RANGE OF AVERAGE NORMAL DIST'N PERFORMANCE
TREATMENT PERFORMANCE (ppm) * _OVER lj STANDARD DEV.
l. - 1. 1. S. s.] ,min J ,max ] J ]
d 1 (none) 300 - 3000 500 100 100
d 2 (Gravity) 50 - 150 100 20 20
d 3 (CPI) rv50 50 5 10
d 4 (CPI + GF) 15 - 35 20 5 5
d 5 (CPI,GF,F) 3 - 10 5 2 3
d 6 (CPI,GF,F,B) - 1 . 2 .4
d 7 (reinj ect) - 0 0 0
* Source: CUEP (1976) and equipment manufacturers.
Table 7
CALCULATED MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF AVERAGES i REFLECTING
THE DEVELOPER'S UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE
TRUE PERFORMANCE OF THE TREATMENT EQUIPMENT
(Calculations based on Table 6)
TREATMENT MEANS STANDARD QEVIATIONS
d. 1. s.]
J ] n = 1 n = 4 n = 60 n -+ 00
d 1 500 141 112 101 100
d 2 100 28 22 20 20
d 3 50 11 7 . 1 5.2 5.0
d 4 20 7 . 1 5.6 5.1 5.0
d 5 5 3.6 2.5 2.0 2.0
d 6 1 .45 .28 .21 .20
d 7 0 0 0 0 0
f
(1I
d.
,
s
m
)
1
f(
1!
d
4
,
n
=
1)
f(
1I
d
3
,
n
=
1)
I I I
I
A
\
I
IV
s
4
I
0'
\
I
I
I
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
j
v
io
la
ti
o
n
w
he
n
A
I
/
s
l
=
60
s
3
I I I I I I I ,
t
'
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
~
1
(p
pm
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
F
ig
u
re
3
IL
LU
ST
RA
TI
O
N
OF
TW
O
NO
RM
AL
D
IS
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
S
CH
A
RA
CT
ER
IZ
IN
G
TR
EA
TM
EN
T
PE
RF
OR
M
AN
CE
U
N
CE
RT
A
IN
TY
-27-
Some Results of the Developer Model
The first results are the cutoff probabilities based on the
payoff matrix in Table 5 and the formulas for cutoff probabilities
Pb (41,42). Table 8 lists the cutoff probabilities for KO = 10 000,
100 000 and 1 Mio. Pound Sterling and for a = 0, 2.10- 6 , -2-10- 6 ,
i.e., for a risk neutral a risk prone, and a risk averse utility
function. *
From the cutoff probability equations (41) and (42) it is
already clear the Pb would be larger for small values of KO and
smaller for large values. This trend is clearly represented in
Table 8. Furthermore, for fixed KO the cutoff probabilities
become larger the larger the cost differential between d j +1 and
d j . For a small penalty of KO = 10 000 Pounds the probability
of detection must be in the .80 to .90s in order to force the
developer model to switch to better treatment. But for the high
penalty of 1 Mio. Pounds detection probabilities may be as low
as .05 to have the model change from d j to d j + 1 .
The effect of the utility function is not very large for the
two lower penalties. But, as one might expect, if potential
losses of 1 Mio pounds are involved the shape of the utility
function has a stronger influence on the cutoff probabilities.
For KO = 1 000 000 it clearly shows that the model with the risk
prone utility function would accept relatively high probabilities
of detection before switching (for the switch from d 6 to d 7 even
.995) while the risk averse utility function forces the model to
switch at much lower probabilities (for the switch from d 6 to d 7
.135). In general, of course, all corresponding probabilities
decrease from the risk prone over the risk neutral to the risk
averse utility function.
From the cutoff probabilities of detection Pb(d j ) in Table
8 the corresponding cutoff values lb(d j ) can be determined at
which the developer would switch from treatment d j to d j + 1 . In
terms of the standard sl these cutoff values divide the possible
levels of sl into segments where each segment corresponds to a
particular (optimal) choice of d j ; i.e., if the standard is just
* To interpret the values of a, consider the gamble in which the
decision maker would lose 1 Mio Pounds with a probability of
.5 and nothing with probability .5. The risk neutral decision
maker (a = 0) would be willing to pay _5 Mio. Pounds to insure
himself against the risk of the gamble, the risk prone deci-
sion maker (a = 2-10- 6 ) would pay only .24 Mio Pounds, the
risk averse decision maker (a = -2-10-6 ) would, on the other
hand, pay .72 Mio Pounds.
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equal to 10(d j }, then the developer would be indifferent
choosing d j or d j + 1 . If the standard sl is tightened up
(sl<lO(d j }), then the developer would select d j +1 ; if sl
laxed, he would prefer d ..
J
Table 9 lists the values of 10 for the UK definition of an
average standard (m = 1) and for different values of KO and a.
This table reflects the picture of the detection probabilities
in Table 8. Within each utility function block the cutoff levels
become larger as the penalty KO increases. This effect is
intuitively understandable and one would expect the model to
behave in this way. The larger the possible penalty, the more
cautious the developer would be, thus pushing up his cutoff
values at which he would switch from inferior to improved treat-
ment. This effect is clearest for the risk averse utility func-
tion and for the treatment options with a high uncertainty (i.e.,
none or gravity separation). Here the cutoff level shifts as
much as 100 ppm (from 717 to 8l2) when the penalty is increased
from 10 000 to 1 Mio Pounds. For the other treatment options
the effect is much less dramatic.
A similar, although smaller effect of risk aversion vs.
risk proneness can be seen. The more risk averse utility func-
tion leads to larger cutoff values. Again this is an affect
which one would expect from the decision model: the more risk
averse, the more cautious the cutoff levels should be set. This
effect is only slight, although the choices of utility functions
cover quite a substantial range in terms of the behavioral con-
sequences.
Table 10 lists the cutoff values for the risk neutral
utility func~ion and KO = 100 000 for all five monitoring and
inspection procedures. There are several noteworthy character-
istics of the cutoff levels in Table 10. First, it shows that
the definition of the monitoring and inspection procedure as
part of the regulation has an effect on the decision making of
the developer which is similar if not stronger than the effect
of changing penalties or utility functions. For example lO(d 3}
varies between 62 ppm (for the UK-AV-l definition) to 78 ppm (for
the three values of KO within the UK-AV-1 definition (Table 9).
This effect of the monitoring and inspection procedure is exceed-
ingly important.: it means that the impacts of a standard are
highly dependent on the sample size, sampling period, exemption
numbers, etc. For example, if EPA had an average standard of 66
combined with their own EPA-AV scheme, such standard would corres-
pond to a UK standard of 62 combined with the UK-AV-1 scheme.
"Correspond" here means that the standard would lead to the same
decision making and costs to the developer.
Table 9
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CUTOFF LEVELS lb(d j ) AT WHICH THE DEVELOPER WOULD
SWITCH FROM TREATMENT d j TO TREATMENT d j + 1
(For UK-AV-1 definition)
-6 0 -6a = 2·10 a = a = -2·10
KO(10
3 ) 10 100 1000 10 100 1000 10 100 1000
d 1 (none) 712 749 778 714 754 790 717 757 812
d 2 (G) 140 147 152 140 147 156 140 148 159
d 3 (CPI) 60 62 63 60 62 64 60 62 65
d 4 (CPI+GF) 30 32 33 30 32 34 30 32 35
d 5 (CPI,GF,F) 8.5 8.8 9.2 8.6 9. 1 9.8 ·8.8 9.3 10.5
d 6 (CPI,GF,F,B) 1.3 1.3 1 .4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1 .4 1.4 1.5
d 7 (reinject) - - - - - - - - -
-
Table 10 CUTOFF LEVELS lb(d j ) AT lmICH THE DEVELOPER WOULD
SWITCH FROM TREATMENT d j TO TREATMENT d j + 1
(For KO = 100 000; risk neutral utility function)
DETEC.TION DEFINITION*
UK-MAX EPA-AV NWY-AV UK-AV-O UK-AV-1
d 1 (none) 872 767 785 791 754
d 2 (gravity) 172 151 155 153 147
d 3 (CPI) 78 66 64 63 62
d 4 (CPI,GF) 38 34 34 33 32
d 5 (CPI, GF, F) 13.7 10.4 1 0 . 1 9.5 9. 1
d 6 (CPI,GF,F,B) 2 . 1 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4
d 7 (reinject) - - - - -
*Precise detection definitions are:
UK-MAX t = 1/2; n = 1 ; T = 30, m = 2
EPA-AV t = 1 n = 4 . T = 30, In = 2,
NWY-AV t = 1 n -+ 00· T = 30, m = 1,
UK-AV-O t = 30 n = 60; T = 5400, m = 0
UK-AV-1 t = 30 n = 60; T = 5400, m = 1
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The second observation is that the UK-MAX scheme leads the
developer to the most cautious cutoff levels, i.e., to a switch
to imEroved treatment, even if the standard is far above the
mean 1. of the performance uncertainty distribution. On the
J
other extreme, the UK-AV-1 scheme the most lax one since it would
allow the developer to stay longer with infereior treatment when
the standard level is tightened up.
The final observation from these calculations is that a
joint average and maximum standard (as the one which the UK
presently uses) can lead the developer into a conflict: should
he decide according to the maximum standard or according to the
average standard? For example, if the standard was set at
sl = 35, the developer model would select treatment d 5 (CPI, Gas
Flotation, and Filtering) if it was the maximum standard (UK-MAX),
but he would still stick with d 4 (CPI and Gas Flotation) if it
was an average standard. Or, alternatively, if the maximum stan-
dard is different from the average standard, e.g., slmax = 100
and sl = 40, then the developer model would select d 4 accordingav
to the average standard, (UK-AV-1), but stick with d 3 for the
maximum standard.
To give some illustration of the results in Table 10, and
to complete the developer model analysis, Figure 4 shows the
optimal developer decisions and the associated expected utilities
in the case of risk neutral utilities, for KO = 100 000 Pounds,
and for the EPA-AV definition. For lax standards say above 900
ppm the developer model chooses no treatment as its optimal deci-
sion, and the cost of that decision are small, since the prob-
ability of violating such a lax standard is very low (in the
above case PD(Q1 1900, d 1 , sm) = .0000043 where sm corresponds to
the EPA-AV definition). If the standard is tightened up, the
probability of detection will increase and therefore the expected
utility UD will decrease. If the cutoff point lb(d 1 ) is reached,
this utility UD is just equal to the utility of the cost of the
next best treatment decision d 2 . As can be seen, if the standard
is further tightened the utility UD remains constant, since the
probability of detection remains small. Only when reaching
stricter levels (e.g., around 160 ppm) this probability increases
rapidly and adds to the cost of d 2 the expected penalty cost,
therefore further decreasing the utility UD until the next cutoffpoint is reached.
The corresponding figure for other definitions of the stan-
dard monitoring and inspection procedure will be similar, although
the cutoff values will be slightly shifted, and the slope of UD -function in the area of the cutoff value will change.
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An interesting way of putting Figure 4 in perspective is
by means of a "perfect information analysis". To construct
Figure 5 the cutoff levels and expected utilities for the devel-
oper's optimal decision making were calculated assuming that
there was no equipment performance uncertainty (i.e., Sj ~ 0
and S. ~ 0). Overlaying Figures 4 and 5 give some interesting
J
insights. First, now the shift in cutoff levels, before induced
through manipulations of KO etc., becomes much more drastic.
Second, the cost differential around the cutoff levels shows the
cost of having to make a decision with imperfect information.
Another change in Figure 4 occurs if another utility func-
tion is used. Although Table 9 has already shown that the cut-
off levels shift only slightly for different values of a, the
utility functions will have effects on the spacing of UD.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate this effect for the risk averse
and the risk prone decision maker (a = ± 2 0 10- 6), K = 100 000 in
the EPA-AV scheme. They show clearly that for the risk prone
decision maker the relative expected utilities are fairly equally
spaced, while for the risk averse decision maker the relative
utility of the high cost options are extremely low as compared
with the low cost options. This distortion effect even shows
although the utilities in Figure 5 are spaced logarithmatically
to accomodate the graph.
THE IMPACTEE MODEL
The Problem Structure for the Impactees
This application of the model does not give the impactees
any action possibilities. Impactees are considered sufferers
of the potential effects of oil pollution. The objective of
the impactees are:
1) Minimize mortality of commercial marine organisms
(fishery industry);
2) Minimize tainting and chronic toxicity of marine
organisms (public);
3) Minimize ecological disturbances (ecologists).
Unfortunately, with the present stage of knowledge about fate
and effects of chronic oil pollution, no reasonable estimates
can be made about the effects of say oily water emissions of
10 000 tons a day at 100 ppm oil concentration levels. There-
fore, it proved futile to attempt to operationalize the three
above objectives in terms of value relevant consequence measures
(e.g., percent fish loss). In any case, the degree to which the
objectives will be met is a function of the random emission
levels, and any such function will be highly correlated with
actual effects. Rather than operationalizing the above objectives
I W ~ I
51
(l
og
pp
m
)
I
b(
d j
)
~ , •
50
0
G
RA
V
IT
Y
40
0
I
CU
TO
FF
LE
V
EL
S
1
0(d
j)
,
O
PT
IM
A
L
D
E
C
IS
IO
N
S
d
j(
sl
),
AN
D
EX
PE
CT
ED
U
T
IL
IT
Y
U D
AS
A
FU
N
CT
IO
N
O
F
TH
E
ST
AN
DA
RD
51
,
IN
CA
SE
OF
PE
R
FE
C
T
IN
FO
RM
A
TI
O
N
(E
PA
-A
V,
K
O
=
10
0
00
0,
a
=
0)
-
-
-
:
U D
w
it
h
u
n
c
e
r
ta
in
ty
)
10
0
50
40 I
+ GFC
PI
I
C
PI
iF
ig
ur
e
5
++ FGF10 I C
PI
4 I
BF+ + +GFcp
r
1
.
6
I
d
7
d
6
d
5
d
4
d
3
d
2
d
1
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
J1
\
V
1\
V
t\
~
1\
~'
--
--
--
5
20
U
O
[d
j(
51
)
,
5
1
)]
(-
lo
g
10
3
P
ou
nd
s)
-
4
5
-
1
0
-
42
5 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
,
-
29
0
~
-
1
4
5
~ I , IN
ON
E
, , ,
,
J
I I I
I
,
.
.
-
1
I I I
I
_
_
.
.
.
1
I I
1
-
-
-
-
,
=
-
t
l.
.J
I I I
-
12
50
1_
,.
l_
_
J
I I I , ,
-
32
85
L-
-,
R E r N J E C T I o N
-35-
sl
770151663411
d 7
~-- '------, r---
1 .6
1 1 6 4 1P I 40 100 400 OpO
I I I
-1 d 7 d 6 d 5 d 4 d 3
~
Jr
'/ d 2 d 1
'I
-4 -
I
10 _
J
40 _
00 -
Figure 6 CUTOFF LEVELS 1b(d j ), OPTIMAL
'00
-
DECISIONS d. (sl), AND EXPECTED
J
UTILITIES UD AS A FUNCTION OF
THE STANDARD sl
(K = 100, EPA-AV, -600
-
a = -2·10 )
00 -
-1
-10
-20
UD [d j {sl),Sl] (log)
d
7
1
.
5
d G
10
d
S
d
4
d
3
d
2
d
1
~'
--
--
--
-'
Vr
--
--
65
14
7
74
4
.
1
0
-6
)
I w '"I
51
(l
og
)
L
D
E
C
IS
IO
N
S
U D
A
S
A
1
1
.
6
4
10
40
10
0
40
0
10
00
I
I
I
I
I
-
.
9
_
I(
-
.
8
_
.
(
-
.
7
_
(
-
.
6
-
-
.
5
-
f
-
.
4
_
-
.
3
_
-
.
2
-
-
.
1
-
f
0
F
ig
u
re
7
C
U
TO
FF
LE
V
EL
S
1
0(d
j)
,
O
PT
IM
A
d
.
(5
1)
AN
D
EX
PE
CT
ED
U
T
IL
IT
Y
-
.
1
-
J
FU
N
C
TI
O
N
O
F
TH
E
ST
A
N
D
A
RD
51
(E
PA
-A
V,
K
=
10
0
0
0
0
,
a
=
2
0
U D
[d
j(
51
),
51
]
-37-
and quantifying uncertainties, as it was done for the developer
model, the impactee model will use the random emission levels
directly as a proxy for the impactee's consequences. (Using
emission levels as a proxy for consequences would, however, be
undesirable, if one would want to know more about possible effects
of chronic oil pollution and the degrees of uncertainties involved.
Also, if one needs to make tradeoffs between costs, pollution
and political objectives (i.e., tradoffs between the three deci-
sion making units), a further elaboration of the effects of
chronic oil pollution would be desirable. However, for the Pareto
optimality analysis and the sensitivity analyses to which this
paper restricts itself emissions are an appropriate measure.)
Quantification for the Impactee Model
The value function vA for the impactees is directly defined
on the emission level 1. This value function is supposed to be
linear and negative in 1:
vA (1) = -1 (49)
The probability distributions over emissions 1 which con-
stitute the events with which the irnpactees are concerned were
already quantified for the developer model. For the impactees
the relevant distribution would be the distribution over 1 for
n = 1, i.e., the actual dilluted performance distribution of the
given treatment d j . It is assumed that the developer and the
impactees agree that the distributions given in Table 7 reflect
these uncertainties.
As an alternative, one could quantify the value function VA
by an exponential function in order to reflect that increases in
emission levels at low initial levels are considered ore or less
serious than increases at already high levels. Since an exponen-
tial form results if the impactee is assumed to risk seeking, no
special attempt will be made to redefine VA.
According to (6) the impactees' utility function is defined
as
for 8 f. 0 and as
+00
UA(d
J
.) = !N(I.,s.)o(-l)dl
-00 J J
(50)
(51)
for 8 = 0, s. is determined using n = 1. Besides the risk neutral
J
impact (8 = 0) a risk prone impactee (8 = .028) and a risk averse
impactee (8 = -.028) are considered.
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Some Model Results for the Impactees
The main analysis for the impactees consists in the computa-
tion of the expected utilities UA(d j ). Table 10 lists the
expected utilities for the three utility functions. The expected
utilities for the exponential utility functions could be deter-
mined by observing that the moment generating function of the
normal distribution is
(53)
where m and s are the mean and the standard deviation of the
normal distribution. Thus setting t = .028 and -.028 the expected
utilities could be calculated from the means and the standard
deviations of the normal distributions for the dj's. For the
linear utility function the expected utilities coincide with the
means Y.• Table 11 summarizes the results.
J
The effect that already showed for the developer model, namely
that expected utilities for the risk prone decision maker are
much more equally spaced than those for the risk seeking one
shows here again.
DOMINANCE ANALYSIS
The emphasis of the modelling attempt so far was put mainly
on the developer model through which it was possible to determine
the developer's response d. (sl) as a function of a standard sl,
J
for various monitoring and inspection procedures sm, penalty
schemes and utility functions. In comparison to the detailed
treatment of the developer model, both the regulator model and
the impactee model are relatively superficial. This reflects
partly the better data base of the developer model, partly the
softness of modelling the "political" decision making of the
regulator, and partly the high uncertainty of the impactee model
which prohibited a detailed analysis of fate and effects of oil
pollution. The following sections will nevertheless try to con-
vey a coherent picture of the accomplished results of all three
decisions models. First the sequence r, d(r), UR(r), UD[d(r) ,r],
and UA[d(r)] will be examined for various cases as outlined in
the general scheme of the regulator-developer-impactee model of
p. 7. Comparing utilities UR' UD, and UA then leads naturally
into a Pareto optimality analysis which determines ordinally
dominated standards, i.e., standards which are not better (in
terms of utility) for any decision maker, and worse for at least
one. It will be shown that such standards actually exist due to
the discreteness of the developer's response.
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Table 12 gives an example, in which the EPA-AV monitoring
and inspection scheme was used, for the risk neutral developer
and impactee utility function, for the unit weighting scheme of
the regulator, and a penalty value of KO = 100 000. For the
purpose of constructing this table the utilities of all three
decision making groups were standardized to cover similar ranges.
The most interesting result is that there are many dominated
standards, i.e., standards which are not better than others for
anyone, but worse for at least one. For example, the standard
of 50 ppm results in utilities of 48 to the regulator, 28 for
the developer, and 80 for the impactee. However, the standard
of 35 ppm results in the same decision of the developer, and
thus the same utilities for the developer and the impactee as
the standard of 50 ppm, while the regulator's utility increases
to 65. In this case the standard of 50 ppm would be considered
dominated by the standard of 35 (and, in fact, by any standard
between 35 and 50). The model would suggest to eliminate this
standard from further consideration.
Table 12 UTILITIES OF REGULATOR, DEVELOPER, AND IMPACTEES AS A
FUNCTION OF THE STANDARD sl
(a,B = 0, KO = 100 000, EPA-AV scheme, unit weights wRi )
sl d. (sl) UR(sl) UD[dj(sl)] UA(d j )J
0 d 7 26 -856 100
1 d 7 26.5 -856 100
2 d 6 27 -213 99
5 d 6 29 -213 99
10 d 6 30 -213 99
15 d 5 38 -6 95
20 d 5 48 -6 95
35 d 4 65 28 80
40 d 4 62 28 80
50 d 4 48 28 80
100 d 3 28 64 50
150 d 3 26 64 50
500 d 2 25 89 0
1000 d 1 25 100 -400
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The same effect is shown in Table 13 for the analysis of
the UK-MAX monitoring and inspection procedure, where the only
other change is the selection of the differential weighting
scheme for the regulator's utility function. Again the dominance
effect shows. Consider, for example, the maximum standard of
150 ppm vs. the standard of 100 ppm. In both cases the same
utilities accrue to the developer and the impactee. However,
the regulator would prefer 150 ppm. Therefore 150 ppm dominates
100 ppm.
The reason for these dominance effects lies in the formula-
tion of the decision problem. In the model the regulator's
utility function changes continuously with the standard sl.
However, the developer's responses to standards are discrete,
with segments of standard levels in which the developer would
select the same treatment response. within most of the range
between two adjacent cutoff points lb the utility of the devel-
oper does not change* and begins to decrease only if the standard
approaches the next cutoff point. Only when the standard is very
close to this cutoff point (e.g., 1-5 ppm) a rapid decrease in
utility occurs. If the standard is further away the probability
of detection is extremely small so that there is virtually no
change in utility. The impactees' utility depends only on the
developer's action~ They stay constant in the full range of
standards between two adjacent cutoff points lb. Therefore
within most of the range between two such cutoff points the
regulator's utility dominate.
Thus a fine analysis of the dominance phenomenon has to
focus on the small range around the cutoff points in which there
is a noticeable change in the developer's utility function.
Since between any two adjacent cutoff points the impactees'
utility remains constant, the analysis can be done by plotting
the regulator's vs. the developer's utilities. Figure 8 shows
such a plot for the EPA-AV scheme, KO = 100 000, risk neutral
utility functions, and the unit weighting scheme for the regula-
tor's utility function. The figure shows the changes in utility
between a standard of 33 and the standard of 767.
There are several remarkable features in this figure. First
of all the figure demonstrates again how fast the developer's
utility function changes between the cutoff points. Consider
the cutoff point of 33 ppm. Between 33 and 36 ppm the developer's
utility function changes from -6 to +28 (this corresponds to a
monetary change from 425 000 to 290 000 Pounds). For such a
small change in the standard, the regulator's utility function
changes, of course, only very little. Then, after 36 ppm the
regulator's utility function changes, but up to 66 ppm the
developer's utility function remains virtually constant. A
similar picture arises then after the next cutoff point of 66 ppm.
* Strictly speaking this is not true since there are, of course,
changes in the developer's utility function even at values
only slightly lower than the cutoff value. However, for all
practical purposes, the probability of detection is so small
that these changes can be neglected.
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Table 13 UTILITIES FOR REGULATOR, DEVELOPER, AND IMPACTEES AS
A FUNCTION OF THE STANDARD sl
(UK-MAX scheme, a,S = 0, KO = 100 000, diff. weights wRi )
sl d j (sl) UR(sl) UD[dj(sl)] UA (d j )
0 d 7 22 -856 100
1 d 7 22 -856 100
2 d 7 23 -856 100
5 d 6 25 -213 99
10 d 6 29 -213 99
15 d 5 36 -6 95
20 d 5 45 -6 95
35 d 5 65 -6 95
40 d 4 64 28 80
50 d 4 56 28 80
100 d 3 36 64 50
150 d 3 38 64 50
500 d 2 40 89 0
1000 d 1 40 100 -400
Therefore, although there is a standard for each point on
the line in Figure 8, some of them can be eliminated through
dominance. For such analysis, however, also the changes in the
impactees' utilities have to be considered. Figure 9 shows the
developer vs. impactees' utilities for the standards in Figure 8.
There is no change in the impactees' utility function between
standards of 11 and 32 ppm. At 33 ppm the utility function drops
to 80 and stays constant up to the next cutoff level of 66. Of
course the developer's utility function shows an increase in
that range. At 66 ppm the impactees' utility function drops
again due to the changed decision by the developer. Again,
until the next cutoff level of 151, no change occurs in the
impactees' utilities while the developer improves his utilities.
Which standard would survive a dominance test? In strict
mathematical terms there is no dominated standard, since the
developer's utility function changes, however slightly, also for
standard values below a cutoff point. From an inspection of
Figures 8 and 9 however, it is clear that standards in the range
between 40 and 66 ppm, between 70 and 151 ppm, and 160 and 767
ppm produce essentially no change in the developer's utility
function. The question then is, how close to the cutoff point
must the standard be in order to consider a utility change
-43-
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significant. Between that point and the next higher cutoff level
one could then consider the developer's utility constant, and
since the impactee's utility is constant in that range anyway,
the regulator's utility would dominate.
For the purpose of such an approximate dominance analysis
only integer valued standards are considered and a deviation of
the utility function corresponding to less than 100 Pounds is
considered not essential. (In the utility function scaling of
Figures 8 and 9 one utility unit corresponds to 4027 Pounds,
100 Pounds therefore corresponds to 0.025 units.)
Standards between 37 and 66, between 71 and 151, and between
169 and 767 produce developer's utilities which differ by less
than .025 units. These standards are therefore considered
dominated by the regulator's utility, which drops with the stan-
dard level. The standards which are considered non-dominated
are those between the lowest of these dominated standards (e.g.,
37) and the next lowest cutoff point (e.g., 33). In this small
. range the developer's utility function decreases rapidly, while
the regulator's utility function improves slightly. Figure 10
shows the standards which would survive this dominance test.
All standards between 152 and 168 survive, since the utility
change of the regulator is significant according to the above
rules.
The results of the dominance analysis depend critically on
the cutoff point values Ib and the variance of the equipment
performance distribution. If one considers the case of perfect
information (Sj ~ 0) detection probabilities are degenerate and
therefore no gradual changes of the developer's utility function
occur. Instead, the developer's utility function changes in
steps as indicated in Figure 5. The points at which the utility
changes are the cutoff points for perfect information which
coincide with the mean values 1. which now have a probability of
J
1 to occur with treatment d .. The developer would select d. for
J J
l.~l<l. l' e.g., he would choose d 4 (CPI and GF) for 50~sl<100.J J-
Within that range his utility function and the function of the
impactees remain constant, and the regulator's utility function
dominates. Figure 11 shows the resulting non-dominated standards
for this perfect information case.
50, 100, and 500 ppm are cutoff points and at the same time
the points with the highest regulator's utility in the respective
intervals [50, 100) ~ [100, 500) ~ and [500, 00). 32 is the point
with the highest regulator utility in the interval [20, 50), and
19 is the integer valued standard with the highest regulator
utility in the interval [5, 20). (Although 19 is dominated in
the regulator-developer utility plane, it is not dominated in the
developer-impactee plane).
The perfect information analysis shows clearly the dependence
of non-dominated standards on the degree of uncertainty (as
expressed in s.). An interesting byproduct of the perfect
J
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Figure 10 NON-DOMINATED STANDARDS BETWEEN 33 AND 767 IN THE
REGULATOR-DEVELOPER UTILITY PLANE
(EPA-AV, KO = 100 000, risk neutral utilities,
unit weights wRi)
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information analysis is that 32 emerges as a non-dominated stan-
dard here, while 34-36 were non-dominated in the previous analy-
sis. The reasons are, however quite different: in the perfect
information analysis 32 dominates because it coincides with the
peak of the regulator's utility function, while in the previous
analysis 34-36 dominate because they are just above the next
lowest cutoff point 16(d4 } = 33.
In inspecting Figures 8 to 11 it becomes clear that in the
"normal" range of possible standards, e.g., between 10 and 70
ppm, certain groupings of standards are more desirable than
others. These are groupings of standards around cutoff points
or around the maximum of the regulator's utility function.
Depending on uncertainty, the cutoff points will change. It
appears, however, that for several uncertainty characteristics
and several changes in model parameters standard values between
30 and 40 ppm emerge as "good" (in a non-technical sense) solu-
tions; they are "good" in the regulator's sense since they lie
in a range around the maximum of the regulator's utility function.
They are acceptable for the developer, as long as they are not
too strict as to force him to select d S ; and finally, they are
acceptable to the impactees since their utilities reach 80 for
such standards (as compared to 0 for 500 ppm and 100 for 0 ppm).
DISCUSSION
From running a decision theoretic model with many soft,
several uncertain, and some even speculative quantitative inputs,
no final decision recommendations can be expected. In fact,
recommendation was not the primary purpose of running the model
but rather a feasibility test of the model itself (does it behave
right?) and a sensitivity and dominance analysis of the parts of
the chronic oil regulation problem which are of most interest
to the regulator, the developer, and the impactees.
In the following first some general remarks about the
applicability and possible problems of applying the decision
theoretic model to standard setting will be made, followed by a
discussion of the interesting model sensitivities, dominance
effects, and implications for real life standard setting.
In principle the model seems applicable in the sense that
it is understandable to the experts and representatives of the
decision units involved, that it reflects the basic structure of
the decision problem, and that it behaves "right" (as one would'
want a decision model to behave), both in its overall character-
istics (dominance effects, changes of utility function), as well as
in its local behavior (changes of cutoff points, sensitivity to
uncertainty, etc.).
The model is weakest in the regulator and the impactee part.
One may want to consider better procedures to establish and
quantify the political objectives of the regulator, for example,
through scenario approaches. The impactee part can certaintly be
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improved in other applications. The fact that impactees did not
have response capability in the model and that they were assumed
to follow such a simple objective function is not only an over-
simplification but probably an undesirable way to go about model-
ling impactees. In most standard setting problems one would
need a more formal way to deal with the fates and effects of
pollutants, and decision theory certainly offers tools to do
just that. In this illustrative application, no such attempt
was made partly because marine biologists have great difficulties
in answering even the most basic questions about chronic oil
pollution.
Improvements could certainly be done here by using the
ambient distribution as an index CA to measure the impactees'
objectives. Diffusion models for continuous point source emis-
sions into an infinite disk would be appropriate and were, in
fact explored. However, the uncertainty about the model para-
meters (decay rate, diffusion coefficients) for North Sea condi-
tions ultimately would have made the application of a more
sophisticated model less useful than using emissions directly.
The developer model emerges as the heart of the present
modelling attempt, and in fact, most of what can be learned from
this model application is a result of the developer model run.
It is clear that the developer model had an advantage by being
easier to quantify (uncertainties about equipment, cost, etc.),
through the inherent statistical definitions of standards, and
equipment performance, and the relatively good data base. Yet,
here too some improvements should be made in real applications.
The no-discounting of future operation and sanction cost
is certainly unrealistic. If discounting is done, however, the
model becomes quite a bit more complicated, since now the exact
time of detection matters. The model assumption of zero prob-
ability of detection after a treatment improvement is unrealistic,
but with the present quantification proved reasonable. In real
applications finer choices of the developer may be included which
then would leave the possibility of detection after improvement.
All these ideas for improvement really lead up to a more finely
tuned decision making model, made explicitely sequential, taking
into account the continuous inflow of information, etc.
For the developer model alone such improvement appears
possible, since the structure of the sequential problem is rather
well defined and analysed in the literature (see, for example,
DeGroot, 1970; Rapaport, 1967). However dynamizing the model
in its present three decision maker version would lead to serious
problems, since it is now lacking feedback loops from the devel-
oper and impactee back to the regulator etc. In the present one
stage formulation this is still acceptable, since the model is
considered more a cognotive roadmap for the interest parties
along which they can test short term reactions and responses,
rather than a simulation of a real sequential and interactive
decision process. For a step in the direction of sequential
multi-stage games see H8pfinger and Avenhaus, 1978.
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So much for a discussion of the general model character-
istics, problems, and possibilities which this illustrative
application encountered. This discussion will conclude with
some more specific remarks about the sensitivity and dominance
results which the model uncovered. This discussion will largely
be restricted to the detection and the developer model.
The model clearly showed the influence of the uncertainty
about equipment performance on the developer's decision, i.e.,
the definition of cutoff levels lb. Since this uncertainty is
also influenced by the monitoring and inspection procedure, the
model demonstrated that the definitions of such procedures and
the definitions of detection probabilities can playa crucial
part in standard setting.
For most penalty schemes, utility functions, and other para-
meters, the cutoff levels Ib were approximately 2-3 standard
deviations higher than the corresponding mean of the equipment
performance distribution Y.. This insensitivity has a very
. J
simple explanation in the model: detection probabilities over
the lifetime of the plant (as defined e.g., by EPA-AV or UK-MAX)
which are in the range of .01 to .99 are all generated by single
day violation probabilities (1 > sl) of .02 to .0001. But prob-
abilities in that range all correspond to areas under the normal
distribution outside of 2-3 standard deviations from the mean.
Since cutoff levels Ib were directly determined from cutoff prob-
abilities Pb between .01 and .99 this insensitivity becomes
understandable.
In the modelling of detection probabilities another result
of the model run emerged: a standard is not equal to a standard.
Since sample size, sampling period, inspection interval, and
exemption number all influence the uncertainty about 1 and detec-
tions, a tighter numerical standard can be in fact more lax than
a numerically higher one. Demonstrations of this effect were
given in the discussion of the developer model.
The most interesting result in the dominance analysis came
from the discreteness of the developer's response to the con-
tinuous decision of the regulator. Together with the "suffering"
role of the impactees, this paradigm allowed the regulator to
dominate decisions with his utility function.
Not all of these model features may .apply to other standard
setting cases. Some may not even remain tenable in a more
detailed run of the model for chronic oil discharges. A few
main conclusions can however already be drawn:
1) It is very important how the regulator defines sampling,
monitoring procedures and detection states;
2) There will be in many cases dominated standards, and the
regulator should find the sensitive non-dominated areas;
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3) Uncertainty about equipment performance is a crucial
parameter to determine the developer's response to a
standard; and
4) Penalties do not control the developer's response to a
strong degree.
-52-
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Abstract
Under the assumption that a continuous increase in atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide beyond a critical value, caused by the
combustion of fossil fuel, will lead to irreversible and large
changes of the climate of the earth, the problem of limiting
C02 emission becomes an urgent concern. The subject of how to
determine and adapt an emission standard for carbon dioxide is
treated as a three-person infinite stage game, the players of
which are the decision units of regulators, producers, and
population. After the description of the model solutions are
derived for several solution concepts and discussed. In special
cases the solutions differ substantially from each other.
Dynamic Standard Setting for Carbon Dioxide
INTRODUCTION
The emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere resulting
from fossil fuel use has been increasing at an exponential rate
for more than one century. If this expansion continues, the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere may be. doubled
in about the next 60 years according to R.M. Rotty, 1977. The
effects on the global climate may well appear suddenly and could
get out of control before remedial actions become effective.
Since easily accessible fossil fuels contain such big amounts
of carbon there is a strong tendency to use them as a source of
energy that could last for nearly two more centuries. This is
much more so since the competing nuclear energy meets increasing
resistance by citizen groups. But it is the vastness of this
carbon reserve that causes deep concern within the climatological
community. The amount of carbon in recoverable fossil reserves
is ten times the amount now contained as carbon dioxide in the
entire global atmosphere.
As these reserves are being used, the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere will surely increase; and because carbon
dioxide absorbs a portion of the infrared radiation emitted by
the earth, it is generally believed that a higher atmospheric
temperature will result ("greenhouse effect"). Although it is
uncertain how much warming is produced by a given increase, the
increased atmospheric carbon dioxide could have a considerable
impact on man's environment.
Significant physical effects that may be expected with high
fossil use are the melting of polar sea ice and/or decreasing
precipitation in mid-latitude regions. Major socio-political
impacts could plausibly attend a substantial increase of carbon
dioxide, for example:
- large and persistent fluctuations in global food supply,
due to repeated crop failures in various regions of the
world which are caused by chronic and severe weather
variability;
- increasingly regulated demographic migration between
regions and across national borders, due to a climate-
related collapse of selected webs in regional economies;
shifts in the power balance among nations due to physical
effects stimulating the economic and cultural decline in
some regions and stimulating increased growth and pros-
perity elsewhere.
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At the present time the physical processes causing varia-
tions of temperature are poorly understood (see J. Williams,
1978 and T. Augustsson et al., 1977), and changes due to atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide increases are impossible to detect since
there is no accurate knowledge of the natural variability of the
global average temperature. As outlined by O.W. Markley et al.,
197~ and R.M. Rotty, 1977, the other physical and sociopolitical
effects are also highly uncertain. .
Although a large part of the climatological community shares
the opinion that mankind needs and can afford a time window
between five and ten years for vigorous research and planning in
order to narrow the uncertainties sufficiently so as to justify
a major change in energy policies, the model analyzed in this
paper excludes an increase of relevant knowledge about the physi-
cal effects. Thus the model deals with the pessimistic view of
the climatic aspects of carbon dioxide. It is global in charac-
ter because the global effects seem to dominate the local or
regional ones.
Given these substantial uncertainties about the development
of climate, the problem of what energy policies governments should
choose, becomes important. This problem is approached as a con-
flict situation among the groups of governments, producers
emitting carbon dioxide, and population. In order to work out
the global aspects this conflict situation has been formalized
as a multistage three person game, the players of which are
called regulator, producer, and impactee. Thus we neglect con-
flicting interests among governments, producers, and different
groups of populations, such as of developed and developing
countries. The regulator stands for an international agency,
the producer for an organization of all producers, and the
impactee for the community of people possibly affected by the
carbon dioxide problem.
The paper is based on the assumption that a continuous in-
crease of atmospheric carbon dioxide beyond a critical value
will lead to irreversible and large changes of the climate which
are regarded as a catastrophe. All three players have their sub-
jective probability of the level of the critical value. Since,
by assumption, there is no increase of knowledge about the cli-
matological process, the regulator can only be concerned about
the reactions of the producer and especially of the impactee.
After the specification of the model the results for several
solution concepts are derived. These are quite different in
general but can all be interpreted in terms of fair play or power.
Given that the model allows prescriptive answers although it is
primarily descriptive.
Since data are often unknown or scarcely available or arbi-
trary--as in the case of the regulator where the utility function
may be conceived of as reflecting a trade-off between the inter-
ests of producer and impactee--solutions are derived as functions
of the parameters. Hence parameter analysis can reveal the
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crucial oarameters. For the purpose of illustratio~ a small
numerical example is added.
THE rlODEL
The conflict situation is described by a three-person dy-
namic or multistage game in extensive form (see G. Owen, 1968, or
J.C.C. McKinsey, 1952) which resembles stochastic games. At
each stage a component game of perfect information is played
which is completely specified by a state. The players' choices
control not only the payoffs but also the transition probabili-
ties governing the game to be played at the next stage. Each
player has his own subjective estimate of the transition proba-
bility due to his subjective probability of the "true critical
value".
The set of states of the game is
S={(C,L) C ~ C ~ O,L ~ O} v {k ~ O}p
C being the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere;
Cp the maximal amount of carbon dioxide if all fossil fuelis burnt;
L the upper bound of carbon dioxide emission during a
period;
k the critical value for a catastrophe.
Let (C 1 ,L 1) denote the first state. Then c1 can be assigned
the present amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide, and L1 the
present maximal emission of CO 2 or some mult"iple of it.
The perfect information of the component games is specified
as follows:
For state (C,L) the regulator's set of choices is
where ~ denotes the upper bound of the emission of carbon dioxide
by the producer.
Then the producer chooses the amount of carbon dioxide to
be emitted. His set of choices or measures equals
C -C
Mp(C,L,~) = {a I 0 ~ a ~ ~, a ~ -If-}
o < 8 < 1 is defined below. The impactee's set of measures
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equals
Knowing the choices ~ and a he chooses the degree p of the
pressure he wants to exert on the regulator. p can denote the
probability of a vote to suspend the government or of an aggres-
sion against institutions.
The sets of measures in the case of k, i.e. a catastrophe
has occureed at amount k of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere,
equal
MR(k) = {a}
~ (k,O) = {a}
HI (k,O,o) = {o}
whi.ch means that there is no pressure.
Given state (C,L) and the choices (~,a,p) the following
states are possible at the next stage:
L(C + Sa, L), (C + Sa, 2)' {k ~ C}
The first component of the first and second states indicates
tbat the constant share Sa of emitted carbon dioxide is added to
the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This is con-
sistent with results of box models for the CO 2 cycle of the earth(see R. Avenhaus, et al., 1978) if a is emitted at a constant
rate during the time period. The estimates for S range between
0.01 and 0.5. Amount (1 - S)a is assumed to disappear into the
biosphere, the upper mixed layer of the sea, and the deep sea.
The second components express that the old upper bound either
remains or is reduced by half. It is assumed that there is a
probability pv that L is replaced by ~, where 0 < v < 1 is a
parameter provided that the catastrophe will not occur. k ~ C
denotes the amoung of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at which
the catastrophe occurs.
All three players are assumed to have subjective probabili-
ties relating to the critical amount k of carbon dioxide. They
characterize the transition probabilities. For simplification
of the model we assume that the subjective probabilities con-
centrate on points denoted by CR' Cp ' and CI for regulator, pro-
ducer, and impactee. We assume CR < Cp ' Cr < Cp thus allowing
the producer to neglect a possible catastrophe.
The subjective probabilities PR' Pp' PI for the transition
from (C,L) to the possible new states are
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New state t
(C+8a, L) o if C~R<C+8a
or CR<C<C+8a
1-pv if C+8a~R
or CR<C=C+8a
o if C~R<C+8a
or CR<C<C+8a
pv if C+8a~R
or CR<C=C+8a
1 if C~R<C+8a
o else
1 if C~I=CR<C+8a
o else I
Pp(tIC,L,~,a,p)
1-pv
pv
o
o
PI(tlc,L,~,a,p)
o if C~I<C+8a
or CI<C~C+8a
1-pv if c+8a~I
or CI<C+8a
o if C~I<C+8a
or CI<C<C+8a
pv if c+8a~I
or CI<C=C+8a
1 if C~R=CI<C+8a
o else
1 if C~I<C+8a
o else
UR(C,L,I,a,p; k)
If the inequality C~j<C+8a holds, player j thin~s that with
probability 1 catastrophe C. will occur since with the scheduled
J
emission a the critical threshold is passed. The probability
for C.<C<C+8a is only defined so that the scope of the definition
J
covers all possible states and choices. Nevertheless, the proba-
bility is defined such as to express the idea of player j that
although C. has turned out as a view too pessimistic, C.<C and
J J
any further increase C<C+8a will result in a catastrophe. From
the results below it is obvious that the specific definition of
CR<C has no consequence.
State k cannot be changed: P. (klk,o,o,o) = 1 (j=R,P,I).
J
Since no utility functions are known for the three players, we
start with linear ones which are simplest to assess. Let the
transition from state s and measures (l,a,p) to state t have the
utility Uj(s; l,a,p,t) for players j=R,P,I.
UR(C,L,I,a,p; C+8a,M) = c 11+c2a+c 3P
k-C
= c 11+c 2--8- + c 3P+cR ;
= 0;
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Up(C,L; l,a,p; C+Sa,M) = c 4a
Up(C,L,; l,a,p; k) k-C += c 4- S- c P
Up(k; 0,0,0; k) = 0
Ur(C,L: l,a,p: C+Sa,M) = c Sa+c 6P
U
r(C,L; l,a,p; k)
Ur (k; 0,0,0; k)
k-C
= c S--S- + c 6P+c r
= 0
to
The parameters are assumed to have the signs c1~O, c 2>o,
c 3<O, c 4>O, cS>O, c 6<O. Cj(j=R,p,r) is the additional payoff
player j due to catastrophe and therefore regarded as largely
negative. c1~ reflects the regulator's internal difficulties
in setting small standards, c
2
>O, c 4>O, CS>O the benefits of
energy production; c 3 <O the damage to the regulator due to
pressure exerted on him; and c 6<O the burden of organization.
The term k~C expresses that energy production is only valuable
up to the critical amount. Thus the idea is excluded that in
the case of a slowly developing catastrophe energy production
combustion of fossil fuel may give additional benefits during
the initial stages of the catastrophe.
A play rr of the game is given by an infinite sequence
1 1 1 1 222 2
rr = (s ,1 ,a ,p ; s ,1 ,a ,p ; ... )
by
of states, measures of the regulator, producer,' and impactee,
respectively. According to the list of transition probabilities,
there are only sequences where
1 . i 1 L1 L 1
C ~l~p and L E{L , :2' If' ... }
i Ci +1_Ci , i+1 '+1 '+1
and a = S 1f s = (C 1 , L1 )
Furthermore if si = k then sm = k for m > i. As a first
approach we define the utility of a playas the undiscounted in-
finite sum of the transition utilities:
ex>
L: iii i+1U, (rr) = UJ' (s ,1 ,a,s )-J
i=1
Since the summed-up internal utilities ~c11i can become infinite
, h b 'f ' ( 1 1 1 1 1 ) dwe om1t t em y speC1 y1ng c 1 = O. Let s, ,a,p ,... enote
1 h i (C i Li ) d i+1 ka p ay were s = , an s =.
-7-
Then
i
~R(S1 ... ) = ~(c2aj+c3pj)
j=1
i+1
= c 3 ~ pj + C2k~i1 + c RJ~1
Inthecaseofs j = (Cj,L j ) forj=1,2, .••
1~R (s , ••• )
1Admitting -00 as a payoff then ~R(s , ... ) is well defined because
i
of C ~p.
The same argument gives
:Qp( )
k_C 1
+ Cp= c 4- S-
Cj-C 1Up ( ) = c 4 lim S
and i+1
~I( ) k_C
1
+ ~ pj += c S- S- c 6 c 1 ,
j=1
Ci _C 1
00
:QI( ) lim + ~ i= c s c 6 PS
j=1
respectively.
The game is now
tion of strategies.
strategies where the
last measures of the
completely described except for the defini-
For simplification we admit only stationary
choices depend only on the last state and
other players.
Definiton: A strategy OR of the regulator is a map:
oR : S -+ JR
such that
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a
R
(k) = 0
A strategy ap of the producer is a map
0' p : { (s, 1) Is E: S , 1 E:r.1.R (s) } -+ IR
such that
c -c
ap(C,L,l) E: ~(C,L,l) = {aIO~~l,-lr-}
ap(k,O) = 0
A strategy a
r
of the impactee is a map
a r : { (s, 1 , a) Is E: S , 1 E:Mp (s) , a E:Mp ( s , I)} -+ [ 0 , 1 ]
such that
ar(C,L,l,a) E: [0,1]
ar(k,O,O) = 0
The sets of strategies are denoted by ~. (j = R,p,r) .
J
Due to the list of transition probabilities defined above
infinitely many plays can occur. The appropriate a-algebra over
the set IT of all possible plays is defined as the minimal 0'-
algebra containing all cylinders with finite bases (see M. Loeve,
1955, 8.3). Due to the theorem of Tulcea there exist probability
measures Pj(o laR,ap,a
r
) on this a-algebra where Pj(o laR,ap,a
r
)
stems from the iteration of given subjective probabilities.
The payoff function to player j is defined as his high sub-
jective expected utility
The formalism allows to derive a sharp upper bound for
vj(aR,ap,a
r
). Due to the definition of the transition proba-
bility PR the set of plays with a component state sm=(Cm,Lm),
such that cm>cR has probability PR(o laR ,ap ,(1 ) = o.
1 1 1 1Hence only plays TI = (s ,1 ,a ,p ; ... ) have to be considered
where a component state sm either equals (Cm,Lm) such that
cm<cR or CR' Hence
i+1
= c 3 L
j=1
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or
!!R (TI)
i+1
= c 3 2:
j=1
if Cj<CR (j=1, ... )
C _C 1
RIn both cases !!R(TI) ~ c 2 S is obvious. Hence
The analogous argument yields VI(oR,op,oI)
C _c 1
P!!p(TI) ~ c 4 S immediately implicates
C _c 1
Vp(oR,op,oI) ~ c 4 P s
C _c 1
I~ C s S whereas
The bounds are sharp in the sense that strategy triples
exist yielding the bounds as payoffs.
C -C
Let 0R(C,L) = L, 0p(C,L,l) = min(l,~), 0I(C,L,l,a) = 0.
C _c 1
Then VR(oR,oP,oi) = c 4 Ps
We give examples for VR and Vp below. If the establishment of
the payoffs as expected payoffs over IT were more elaborated (see
e.g. J. Kindler, 1971) it would be obvious--that we arrive at the
same payoffs Vj : ~R x ~p x ~I + IR if we replace the component
utility VI by VI,r
csa if M = L
VI (e,L; l,a,p; C+Sa,M) =
,r
c 6 if M Lc a+- = 2"s v
VI (C,L; 1,a,p; k) = VI(C,L; l,a,p; k)
,r
VI (k; 0,0,0; k) = VI(k; O,O,O,k)
,r
This remark permits to shorten proofs in the next section.
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THE GAME-THEORETrC SOLUTrON
Except for two-person zero-sum games or equivalent games,
there is no unanimous solution concept. rnstead there are a
variety. Therefore we shall first give brief definitions bf the
solution concepts (for a broader discussion see R. Avenhaus and
E. Hopfinger, 1978), and later on describe strategy three-tuples
satisfying them.
.. + + +Definition: A three-tuple (oR,op,Or)cERxEpxE
r
of strate-
gies is called a (weak) equilibrium point if
(ORCER)
(opcEp)
(orcEr)
Definition: The payoff vector (Vj(OR,Op,or))j = R,p,r is
called Pareto-optimal if there is no other payoff vector
(Vj (LR,Lp,L r )) where LjCE j (j = R,p,r), such that
and at least one inequality strictly holding.
3Definition: Let (WR,Wp,Wr)CR denote the point of maximal
possible payoffs which is called bliss point, i.e.
W. = max(V. (oR,op,or) lo.cE. (i = R,p,r)). The payoff vectorJ J 1 1
(vR,vp'v
r
) is called bliss-optimal if
Definition: Let (dR,dp,d
r
) be a triple of payoffs the
players obtain in case they cannot reach an unanimous agreement on
the choice of a payoff vector. Then the Nash solution is the point
(WR,Wp,W
r
) which maximizes the term (uR - d R) (up - d p ) (u r - d r )
subject to the requirements u j = Vj(oR,op,or) (j = R,p,r) for some
strategy three-tuple and u. > d. (j = R,p,r).J - J
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Definition: A hierarchic solution is a triple
(TR,lp,lr) consistent of a strategy TREL R, and two maps
,
1 r: l:RXLp -+ L r
such that Vr(OR,Op'lr(OR'Op)\ = max Vr (C1 R,Op,Or)) °rELr
VP0R'Tp (OR) ,T I (OR' 'P (OR)))
VR('R' 'P ('R) "I ('R"P ('R~)
The game has a huge variety of equilibrium points. rn the
following we give three equilibrium points, the first two of
which have Pareto-optimal payoffs, whereas the third is only given
as an indicator of the variety of equilibrium points.
Theorem: The tuples of strategies given below are equilib-
rium points:
1 ) 1 (C,L) : min (L,maX(O, CR-C ~OR = --)B
1 (C,L, 1) : 10p. =
1 (C,L,l,a): = 0or
The inherent utilities are
1
111 C -CRVR(oR,op,or) = c 2 B
1 1 1 1V (oR,op,or) = c4
CR-C
p B
{5 CR-C 1 if CR ~ Cr1 1 1 BVr(oR,op,or) 1
c
s
Cr-C + c if CR > CrB r
2) °~ (C, L): = min (L, max (0,
20p(C,L,l): = 1
C-C)
_1 )
S
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CI-C
r if 1 = min (L'-B-) and C ~ CI2°r(C,L,l,a): = C -C1 if 1 -f min(L,_I_) or C > CIB
The inherent utilities are
C _C1
I if CI ~ CR{~ B222VR(OR'OP'OI) = C _C1I
+ CR if CI > CR~ - B
222 CI -C1Vp(OR'OP'OI) = (;4
B
3) Keep quiet point
3
°R(C,L) = 0
3 00p(C,L,l) =
\0 if 1=0 and C=C
1
3
°I(C,L,l,a) =
11 C>c 1if 1>0 or
with t'l't' V (3 3 3) 0 (j =R, P, I)u 1 1 les j 0R'OP'OI =
Proof: In order to avoid descriptions that are cumbersome
but not illustrative we give sketches only.
1) Let i R £ {1 ,2, ... } be defined by c1+B'(iR-1)L1~CR<c1+BiRL1.
One can show by iteration on i that
i +1 1 B' L1 (' 0 1 . 1 ) i L1 (' 1 '1 )C =C + 1 1=" ... , l R- , a = 1=, ... , l R- ,
i i R
- R_ CR-Ca - _
B
Ci +1 (" '+1 )=CR 1=lR,lR , ... ,
due to the regulator's strategy. Hence
iR-1 i R1 2 3 ~ 1 CR-CVR(OR'OR,OR)=c2~ L +c2~~fl--
i=1
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analogously
C _C 1
Vp (OR,Op,OI)=C 4 RB
In the case of CR ~ CI , (CR,L1 ) will be the state of the
play for i = i R + 1,iR + 2, ... also due to the subjective prob-
ability of the impactee. However, if CR > CI ' catastrophe CIC -C1
will be the final state resulting in a payoff C s IS + c I .
The regulator's condition for an equilibrium is obviously
satisfied since the strategy triple gives him the maximal pos-
sible utility. Just as is obvious, there is no better payoff
for the producer with another strategy, and this is also true for
the impactee in the case of CR ~ CI •
Only CR > CI requires more sophistication. Let Op denot~ a
different strategy of the impactee. Then a play rr with lim C1 <
=~ CI is only possible if the reduction of Li to its half takes
place an infinite number of times. But then ~I,r(rr) =00 <
C -C1
C s IS + c I . If the reduction of L' takes place only a finiteC -C'I
number of times then ~I,r(rr) ~ C s B + c I . Hence any other
strategy cannot yield a better payoff.
2) In the case of CI < CR the r7gu~ator can ~nly get a better
payoff if plays rr with states CC 1 ,L1 } where C1 > CI occur with a2 i i
subjective probability greater than zero. But then 0I(C ,L ,l,a)=
= 1 infinitely often yielding the payoff -00 to the regulator.
Thus he cannot get a better payoff with a different strategy.
Obviously the producer cannot get a better payoff, whereas the
impactee gets his maximal payoff.
In the case of CI = CR regulator and impactee receive their
maximal payoffs, whereas the producer has no better response.
In the case of CI > CR the regulator may want to escape catastro-
phe by applying a strategy like the one of the first equilibrium
point. But then he is punished an infinite number of times by
pressure from the impactee and gets a smaller payoff. Again it
is obvious that producer and impactee cannot do better.
3) The impactee's ability to exert pressure infinitely often
again makes the strategy triple (O~,O~,Oi) an equilibrium point.
The question arises: Which of these equilibrium points yield
Pareto-optimal payoffs? The answer can immediately be deduced
from the following:
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Theorem: The set of payoffs
is a subset of the following domain D~m3
1) Let CR < CI < Cpo Then D consists of all (x,y,z)E:m
3
such
that a pair (PR,PI ) of real numbers exists such that 0 ~ P R,
o ~ PI' 0 ~ PR + PI and the following inequalities hold:
1 1
+ P Cr_C + (1-P -P )cP-C }
1---8- R I 8
1 1
CI-C + (1-P -P ) (c CI~
+ cPR I 5-~-
5 I 8 8
;
+ C )
I
2) Let CR = CI < Cp . Then D consists of all (x, y, z) E m
3 which
4
are part of a solution (x,y,z,p)E:~ of the following system of
inequalities:
3) Let CI < CR < Cp . Then D consistss
of all (x, y, z) E: JR3 which
are part of a solution (x,y,z,PIPR)E:m of the following system
of inequalities:
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O~PI' O~PR' O~1-PI-PR
C _C 1 C _C 1
x~.c2 PI~I=8- + c 2PR RB +
CR-C1+ PR-a- + (1-P I-P R) ;
Sketched proof: Let (OR,Op'OI) denote a strategy triple. In
the case of CR < CI <_ Cp letPR de?ote-the probability (Pp(TRloR,op'OI)
that a play with states (Ci,Li), C~ ~ CR will be realiz7d, i.e.
. 1 1 1 1 ~TR ~s the set of all pl~ys.~ ,1 ,a ,p , .•• } such that C ~ CR for
all component states (C~,L~}(i = 1,2, ... ). Le~ PI =.Pp~TIloR,Op'OI}
denote the probability for the set of plays (s~,li,a~,p~)(i = 1,2, ... )
such that Ci < CI for all i, where si = (Ci,L
i ) (i = 1,2, ••• ) but
Cj > CR for at least one j. Obviously
By definition of the regulator's transition probability,
PR(TRloR,Op,OI} = PR' but with probability 1 - PR the catastrophe
will occur. Hence
The impactee's probabilities for plays with only state com-
ponents below CR' and between CR and CI are PR and PI respectively.Therefore
The proofs for the two remaining cases follow the same line of
argumentation. One has only to consider that p is the producer's
subjective probability tha~ a play will occur where Ci ~ CR = CI
~for all component states C. In the last case PI denotes the
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producer's probability for a play with component states not
greater that CI,PR' the probability for a play with a component
state greater than CI ' and all component states not greater than
CR·
Corollary: The first and the second equilibrium point of
the last but one theorem have Pareto-optimal payoff vectors.
In the case of CR > c
1
and CI > C
1 the keep-quiet point~has no
Pareto-optimal payoff vector.
Proof: Having chosen either PI = 1 or PR = 1 and p = 1, im-
mediately verifies that the payoff vectors of the first and sec-
ond equilibrium points belong to the boundary plane given on the
right-hand side of the inequalities of the last but one theorem.
Hence the payoff vectors are Pareto-optimal.
Under the given conditions the keep-quiet point is dominated
by the first or the second equilibrium point. The results are
illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 showing the projection of subset
D of the last theorem.
As can be seen from the figures even the combined solution
concepts of equilibrium point and Pareto-optimality do not yield
an unanimous solution. But what about the remaining solution
concepts? In order to discuss them we give the boundary plane
of the last theorem after elimination of the parameters for the
case of CR < CI < Cp by the following equation:
y z
- +-
':=4 c"I
Since by assumption c I and c R are huge negative numbers the
equation is dominated by the first term -Y-. Hence the payoff
C -C1 C -CI C -C1 c 4
vector (C 2 RS ,c4 RS ,cs RS ) is ~ither bliss-optimal or very
close to the bliss-optimal payoff vector. Hence we can regard it
as approximately bliss-optimal.
in the case of CI ( CR <CI < Cp, andC -CiI
,cs S ).
for CR =
C -C1I
same holds
C -C'I(c 2 8< C forP
The
Without proof we state that the two approximate bliss-opti-
mal points are Nash solutions for d. = 0 (j = R,P,I) as soon
J
as the absolute values of c I and c R are large enough. This means
that the bliss-point concept as well as the Nash solution favor
a behavior based on the most pessimistic estimate min (CR'C I ) ofthe critical value.
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Point of naximal Payoffs
C -c 1 C -c1(C 2 RS 'Cs Ie )
Equilibrium 2
Equilibrium 1
~QUILIBRIUM 2
POINT OF MAXIMAL
PAYOFFS
REGION OF
POSSIBLE
PAYOFFS
VR
EQUILIBRIUM 1
REGULATOR
UTILITY
IMPACTEE-+--------':*--r+--~
UTILITY
Figure 1. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR < CI ).
EQUILIBRIUM 1 "
R POINT OF MAXIMAL
PAYOFFS
IMPACT~E:E~:R:EG:I:O:N~O:F~P~O~SS~I~BL~E~P~A~Y~O~F~FS~~~~~~~~~ EQUILIBRIUM2
UTILITY VI
f. C -C 1 C -C 1 REGULATOR
Equilibrium 1 ,C2 RS ,cs IS + c I ).. UTILITY
C -C 1 C -C 1
Equilibrium 2 (C 2 IS ,C S IS)
Point of Maximal Payoffs
C -C 1 C -C 1(C 2 RS ,cs I B )
Figure 2. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR > CI ).
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The hierarchic solution concept is much more complicated
than the preceding ones since it involves maps from strategy
spaces into strategy spaces. We circumvent the mathematical
optimization problem specifying only the resulting strategies.
111Theorem: Let (aR,ap,a
r
) be the first equilibrium point of
the last but one theorem, i.e.,
a~(C,L,l) = 1 ;
1a (C,L,l,a) = 0
r
111Let (TR,Tp,T
r
) denote a hierarchic solution. Then (TR,TA,T
r
)
defined by
;
.,
= T1 (aR,ap ) (a .E:E .-{a~} (j=R,P)J J J
is also a hierarchic solution.
=
to the regulator.
dioxide is in the atmosphere.
= max Vp(a~,ap,ar)' which is
ap,a
r 111is trivially satisfied since vR(aR,ap,a
r
) gives the maximal pos-
C -C1
sible utility c 2 RB
111 111 111Proof: vr(aR,ap,a r ) = max vr(aR,ap,a r ) since (aR,ap,a r ) isar
an equilibrium point. The next step is the verification of
1 1 1 _ (1 1,' ,Vp(aR,ap,a r ) - m~; Vp aR,ap,Tr(aR,ap'l. The regulator s strategy
a~ prevents a larger amount than CR of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, whereas the producer's utility is the larger the more
C -C1
Therefore Vp(a~,a~,ai) = c 4 RB
even stronger. The last condition
-19-
It should be remarked that the theorem is independent of
whether CR < CI or not. It simply states that the r.egulator is
strong enough to push through his standpoint.
The following example serves to illustrate the order of mag-
1 16 16 1 16
nitude. Let C = 6 . 10 g, CI = 18 . 10 g, L = 0.2 • 10 g,
8 = 0.3, c 2 = 0.002$/g, c 4 = 10-
4
c 2 , c 5 = 0.7 c 2 . c
1 is in the
order of magnitude of the present amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere, and L1 in the order of magnitude of the present
release of carbon dioxide. $3.6· 10 12 is an estimate of the
gross world product of 1970. Then production is possible for 200 14
years and the payoff vector equals ($8 • 1014 , $8 • 1010 , $5.6 . 10 ).
CONCLUSION
The game has been analyzed for different solution concepts.
It turns out that the Nash solution and the bliss-optimal concept
yield solutions that are basically different from the hierarchic
sOlution. In the case of CI < CR where the impactee's view is
more pessimistic than that of the regulator, the Nash solution
and the bliss-optimum concept, by their tendency to fair bargains,
favor the second equilibrium point based on the estimate Cr.
Contrary to this the hierarchic solution yields the first equi-
librium point which is based on the estimate CR as critical value.
The results heavily depend on the fact that the summed up
component payoffs are not discounted. Thus the impactee can
principally push the regulator's payoff down to minus infinity.
Actually he cannot exert pressure infinitely often since then he
would also receive the payoff minus infinity. Hence this cap-
ability to punish or to exert pressure only yields a vastness of
equilibrium points. rt seems that the results may change sub-
stantially if discounting is included. Then the regulator may be
able to resist pressure, and on the other side the impactee may
be able to afford pressure. Another way would be to assume the
game to be stopped as soon as the upper bound L is below a given
limit, e.g., if L is less than ten percent of the carbon dioxide
produced by the biosphere during one year. Again the question
arises whether the impactee can enforce a total release that is
C -C1
less than 1 8
So far the impactee has been represented as a rational
player with a utility function. Another possibility would be to
represent him by a response function based on his perception of
the regulator's and the producer's decisions, i.e., to prescribe
one strategy of the impactee. Then we would actually have a
regulator-producer game, and as soltuion concept we might take
the hierarchic solution. But which response should we use?
Our analysis of the three-person game offers us two responses:
-20-
101 (C,L, l,a) = 0
CT-C
Cif I = min (L'-T-) and C<C2 - I°I(C,L,I,a) = C -Cif I 1= min(L,_I_) or C>C I.. B
If we assume the first, then the impactee is actually a dummy
player. Then equilibrium point one is part of the hierarchic so-
lution. In the case of oi however, the hierarchic solution yields
the second equilibrium point as can be verified very easily.
Thus, the three-person game can provide for ideas how to formalize
a response function.
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Abstract
This paper describes the application of a multistage game
theoretical model to setting noise standards which is illustrated
by the case of trains. The problem was structured to match the
decision problem which the Environment Agency faced when setting
standards for Shinkansen trains. The model considers three play-
ers: the regulator (environment agency), the producer (railway
corporation), and the impactees (residents along the railway line
who suffer from noise). The game has seven stages characterized
by the actions of the impactees ranging from petitions to legal
litigation. The final stages are the outcomes of a possible law-
suit. The case is either won by the producer or the impactees,
or a compromise is reached. Transition probabilities between
stages are considered parameters of the game. They depend mainly
on the noise level the impactees consider acceptable, the stan-
dard set by the regulator, and the actual level of noise emitted.
Only the regulator and the producer are active players in the
sense that they have a set of choices characterized as standard
levels (regulator) and noise protection measures (producer).
The impactees are modeled as a response function. Several so-
lutions according to a hierarchical solution concept of the game
are derived. In particular, conditions are given under which the
regulator or the producer would prefer a compromise solution to
awaiting the outcome of the court case. These ·conditions can be
expressed directly as functions of noise levels and transition
probabilities, given some simple assumptions about the shape of
the utility functions of the regulator and the producer.
A DYNAMIC MODEL FOR SETTING
RAILWAY NOISE STANDARDS
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the superrapid "bullet train", the Shinkansen, be-
gan operations in Japan in 1964, complaints about train noise
have never ceased. Peak noise levels can reach over 100 dB lead-
ing to substantial disturbances of residential living. Since
the responses of the government and the railway corporation to
these complaints have been slow, citizens began to go through
various forms of protest, including petitions, organizations,
and legal litigation. In 1972 the government asked the railway
corporation to take urgent steps against Shinkansen noise. But
it was not until 1975 that noise standards (70-75 dB) were issued
to force the railway corporation to respond to the citizens'
need for quietness. Residents, however, were not contend with
these standards and the railway corporation's subsequent attempts
at improving sound protection measures. A legal battle between
residents and the railway corporation is still going on in which
residents ask to reduce Shinkansen noise to a "nondisturbin~"
level.
In a recent paper (see [1]) the decision process of the
Environment Agency and the railway corporation was des-
cribed and analyzed. In this analysis the need was recognized
for more formal methodologies to study decision making involving
the conflict between environmental and developmental interests.
The present paper is an attempt at developing such a methodology
based on dynamic game theoretic models. The purpose of such
models is to explore alternative strategies of the conflicting
actors in environmental standard setting decisions, and to
derive "optimal" strategies depending on the parameters of the
game and alternative solution concepts.
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Essentially three groups are involved in typical environment-
development conflicts: the' regulator, the producer (developer),
and the impactee (sufferer of pollution). In the case of train
noise these groups are an environmental agency (regulator), a
railway corporation (producer), and the residents along the line
(impactees). Neglecting institutional arrangements, the regula-
tor and the producer are considered single rational players for
the purposes of the model. The decisions of the residents are
considered (possibly probabilistic) reactions to the decision
of the regulator and the producer. Thus the impactee is not
modeled as a rational player but rather as a response function.
The conflict situation between regulator, producer, and res~dents
is formalized as a multistage two-person game, where a stage is
characterized by the action of the residents or a sentence by
a court.
2 . THE ~lODEL
Two-person dynamic or multistage games in extensive form
(see [2] or [3]) are regarded that are similar to stochastic
games. At each stage a component game of perfect information is
played that is completely specified by a state. The players'
choices do not control only the payoffs but also the transition
probabilities governing the component game to be played at
the next stage. It is assumed that the regulator and the pro-
ducer have the same estimates of the transition probabilities.
The states of the game are a subset of
{(i,L)li = 1, ... ,7; n < L < n}
where i indicates the last action or measure of the residents or
the court. L denotes an upper bound for the admitted noise level,
n the maximum value of noise produced by the train without special
sound protection measures, n > 0 the minimum value of noise under
which the train can be run under economic considerations, and
(1,L) is the first state after construction of the railway line.
Hence (1,L) = (1,n). State (2,L) indicates that a petition has
taken place. (3,L) states that the population affected by noise
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has built up an organization for negotiations with government
in order to arrive at a low noise standard. If the negotiations
fail the residents can start a lawsuit. This is indicated by
(4,L). (4,L) can be followed by states of type (S,L), (G,L), or
(7,L). (S,L) stands for a permanent compromise between all par-
ties with upper bound L for noise. (G,L) indicates that the law-
suit was decided in a neutral or positive way for the railway
corporation and the government, and (7,L) that the lawsuit was
decided in £avor of the residents. (S,L), (G,L), and (7,L) are
final or absorbing states. See also Figure 1. For each class of
states the component game and the transition probability are spec-
ified separately.
ORGANIZATION OF RESIDENTS
AND DIRECT NEGOTIATION
WITH GOVERNMENT
FILING OF A LAW SUIT
PETITION BY THE RESIDENTS
INITIAL STATE AFTER CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE RAILWAY LINE1-p2
COMPROMISE OUTCOlm IN FAVOR
OF RP.IL~lAY CORPO-
RATION AND GOVERN-
lmNT
OUTCOME IN FAVOR
OF RESIDENTS
Figure 1. States of the game and transition probabili-
ties (Pi).
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The model assumes that the costs and benefits of restricting
or increasing noise levels from the train can be expressed as
utility functions on noise levels. The utility function of the
railway corporation is given as
as long as there is no effective action by the residents. In
general, this function will be strictly increasing. In fact,
there exists evidence that within reasonable values of nand n
(e.g. 60 and 100 dB, respectively) this function may be linear
(see [1]). Thus in some cases it may be possible to express
up as
up (n) = n + e
neglecting a scaling factor.
The utility function of the regulator is also assumed to
be defined directly on noise levels:
u R : [n,n] -+- IR
uR is to reflect a compromise between the economic importance of
the train and the noise pollution effects on residents along the
line. In the model u R is assumed to be unimodal with a peak at
+
n < L < n. The following argument supports the assumption
that uR is unimodal. Assuming that u R balances environmental
and developmental interests, a crude approximation of uR could
be given by
u R = WUp + u I
where W > 0 is an importance weight factor which indicates the
relative weight of economic considerations, and u I is the im-
pactee's utility function. From survey data [4,5] one can infer
that the strength of complaints to noise (an indicator of u I )
is approximately quadratically related to noise level. Thus
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neglecting scaling factors
u I =-(n - n) 2 + f
Substituting u I and up in uR gives
u R = Wen + e} - (n - n}2 + f
which is unimodal with a maximum at L+ W= 2 + n.
In case of the first state (1 , L) = (1, n) the component
game is specified as follows. First the regulator chooses his
measure ~EMR (] , n), where MR C1 , n} denotes the set of measures
available to him. Knowing mR the producer chooses mp EMp (1,n,mR}
where Mp (1,n,mR} is the set of measures available to him. MR
and Mp are specified by
Mp (1,n,I}: = {n < n < I}
where I denotes the highest level of noise the regulator allows,
and n the value of noise generated by operating the railway.
The residents' chokes are not specified because they are formal-
ized by a response function resulting in special transition proba-
bilities.
A substantial property of the model is the assumption of a
threshold nIE[~,n], so that a noise level below n I is not con-
sidered a relevant disturbance of the residents.
Given state (1,n) only states (1,n) and (2,n) can succeed.
Regulator and producer believe the transition probabilities to
be
and
p ( (1 , n) 11 ,n, I , n} = 11
1-p2
if n <
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P ( (2, n) 11 ,n, 1 , n) = 1 - P ( (1 , n) 11 , n, 1, n)
where P2 > 0 represents the expert subjective probability that
the residents will choose a petition if n > n
r
. The utilities
are given by
u j (1 ,n,l,n) = u j (n) (j = R,P; n < n < 1)
The state (2,n) can either remain or be replaced by (3,n) denot-
ing the formation of an organization. We assume the following
transition probabilities:
= 11 if n < n rP ( (2, n) 12, n, 1 , n)
1- P3 if n > n r
and
P ( (3 , n) 12, n, 1 , n) = 1 - P ( (2, n) I2, n, 1, n)
where P3 > o. The idea is that n ~ n
r
is generated either by the
regulator (1 ~ nr) or by the producer (n ~ n
r
< 1) giving in to the
residents' demands. The payoffs are specified by
u. (2,n,1,n): = u. (n) (j = R,P; n < n < 1)
J J
rn case of a formation of an organization (3,n) residents
will begin negotiations aimed at forcing the regulator to give
in and set an acceptable standard. Let the m~asure set of the
regulator and the producer be given by
Mp (3,n,1): = {nl~ < n < l}
-7
Then
P ( (3 , n) I3 , n, 1 , n) = 1 if 1 ~ n r
1-P 4 if 1 > n r
P ( (4 , n) I3 , n, 1 , n) = 1 - P ( (3 , n) I3 , n, 1 , n)
where P4 > 0 and (4,n) denotes the start of a lawsuit. Let
u.(3,n,1,n) = u.(n)(j = R,P; n < n < 1)
J J
Three outcomes of a lawsuit are considered. There is a
compromise (5,L) suspending the lawsuit, or a sentence in favor
of regulator and producer (6,L), or a sentence in favor of the
residents (7,L). Let
Mp (4,n,1) = Mp (4,n,1,A) = {nl~ < n < I} u {(n,N) I~ < n <
< N < n, n < I}
(l,A) indicates that the regulator fixes a bound 1 for the noise
at the current stage and at the same time makes a permanent com-
mitment for a fixed bound A in later stages. A could be inter-
preted as a quality standard to be effective permanently after
a fixed period of time has passed. For simplicity we assume that
A becomes effective immediately. Analogously n in (n,N) denotes
the actual noise level at the current stage, while N denotes a
commitment made by the producer to regard this limit from now
on. Let
be called the set of compromise pairs of choices. Me contains
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just the pairs (mR,mp ) of measures guaranteeing to the residents
that from now on no noise level greater than n r will occur. Then
1
we assume
if (MR,mp)£Mc and L = min (A,N)
where A: = + 00 or N: = + 00 in
case it is not defined
o else
{
if L
= Po6p ( (6, L) I4 , n,mR ' mp )
else
-
where ~ ~ n r ~ n R ~ n holds for the maximal noise level n R fixed
by a court sentence in favor of the producer, and P6 + P7 need
not equal 1. Hence
The payoffs are specified by
u j (4, n , mR' n) = u j (4 , n, mR' n , N) = u j (n) (j = R, Pi n < n < l)
State (S,L) means that either the regulator has agreed to take
L ~ n r as the maximal level of noise, or that the producer has
bound himself to noise levels not larger than L ~ n r . Let the
sets of measures be given by
Mp(S,L,l): = {nl~ < n < l}
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Then
P((S,L) IS,L,l,n) = 1
The payoffs are specified by
u. (S,L,l,n) = u. (n) (j = R,P; n < n < 1)
J J
State (6,nR) indicates a sentence unfavorable to the residents.
Let
Then
P ( (6, nR) I6 , nR' 1 , n) = 1 and u j (6, n R, 1 , n) = u. (n) (j = R,P)J
State (7,n I ) denotes a sentence unfavorable to regulator
and producer. Let
MR (7 , nIl = {11 !: < 1 < nIl- -
Mp (7 , n I , 1) = {nln < n < 1}- -
Then
PU],n I ) 17 ,nI ,1,n) = 1
In the case of a lost lawsuit the producer's and the regulator's
utilities change. This is because such a sentence would have
much wider reaching consequences than a voluntary agreement to a
standard. First of all, implementation time, rules of operation,
etc. prescribed in a sentence would mean substantial restriction
of freedom to the railway corporation. Secondly, the sentence
would most likely be applied throughout the railway network.
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Thus the model assumes that
where c < 0 is a fixed penalty as a result of the sentence.
P
Also, the regulator stands to lose both in prestige and in lost
flexibility if the court should decide in favor of the impactees.
Again this loss is expressed in his utility function.
In the case of L+ > n I it appears not unreasonable to assume that
c .(j = P,R) is a negative multiple m. of u.(L+) - u.(n I ), Le.J J J J
c. =
J
(j = P,R)
A play TI of the game is given by an infinite sequence
1 1 1 2 2 2(s ,mR' mpi s ,mR,mp ; .•• ) of states and measures. We define
the utility of a play TI by the discounted infinite sum of the
stage utilities
U.(TI):
-J
00
=2:
i=1
(j = R,P)
where 0 < P < 1 is a discount factor.
The game is now completely described except for the definition
of strategies and the solution concept. For simplifications we
admit only stationary strategies where the choices depend only on
the last state and the last measures of the other players.
Definition: A strategy OR of the regulator is a map
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such that
°R (s) E:MR (s ) (S E: S )
where S denotes the set of states.
A strategy 0p of the producer is a map
such that
0p(s,l)E:Mp(s,l)
The sets of strategies are denoted by ER and Ep .
1 1 1 2 2For each strategy pair (oR'op) a play n = (s ,1 ,n; s,l,
n
2 ; ... ) is realized. Since the strategies are stationary, two components
iii r r r i r(s ,1 ,n ) and (s ,1 ,n ) are equal as soon as s = s. By the
definition of the transition probabilities at most seven states
can occur with probability greater than zero and only one will
be repeated infinitely often. From this it follows that the
set n(oR'op) of possibly realized plays n is finite or denumer-
able. The probability p(nlo ,0 ) for TIE:IT(o ,0 ) is given as an
R p . +1 . . R. P
infinite product of the terms p(Sl Is 1 ,11,n1 ) defined above.
The payoff of player jE:{R,P} is supposed to be his expected utility
of the plays:
The strategies are to be determined according to the following
solution concept.
Definition: A hierarchical solution is a pair (TR,T p ) of a
strategy TREE R and a map Tp : ER + Ep such that
-12-
VR(TR,Tp(T R» = max VR(OR,Tp(OR»
°REER
3. THE GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTION
In order to keep the analytical part as small as possible
we shall only discuss heuristic equations which, however, can
be justified as soon as one establishes the analytical framework
in full detail. At least part of it can be found in [7].
Because of the definiton of the component game payoffs and the
transition probabilities, the measures (l,A) and (l,nI ), or
(n,N) and (n,n I ), respectively, have the same effect in the case
of A < n I , respectively. This also holds in the case of 1 and
(l,n) or nand (n,n). Hence, without loss of generality, we can
reduce the measure sets MR (4,n,mR) to
r4R (4): = {(l,A)lnI < A < n,~ < 1 < A} ,
Mp ( 4 , 1 , A): = {( n , N) In I ~ N ~ n, n ~ N, n ~ I}
Since then only the states (1 ,n), (2,n), (3,n), (4,n), (5,nI ),
(6,nR), (7,n I ) can occur, the states are completely fixed by their
first component. We therefore drop the second component in all the
terms.
For the rest of the paper let fb(b = 1, .•• ,7) denote sub-
games of the original game such that b ist the first state.
Hence f 1 is the original game. fb(b = 5,6,7) has only the state
b. fb(b = 1,2,3,4) covers states b, b + 1, ••• ,7. Though in
principle one has to distinguish the strategies for different
f b we denote by abuse of notation the reduction of 0jEE j to f b
by 0 .• Let V. b denote the payoff function for player j in gameJ J,
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rb • without the simple proof we state that
(b = 5,6) ,
for j = R,P. Now let (OR'Op) (i): = (OR(i},Op(i'OR(i}}(i = 1, ..• ,7).
Then
where O~ (4,1,A) denotes the first component of 0p(4,1,A}. By
backward iteration
Three situations are conceivable:
(b = 1,2,3; j = R, P) ,
(1) The regulator can enforce his maximum utility;
(2) If regulator and producer have won the lawsuit,
the regulator has to offer 1 > L+ in order to keep the
producer from compromising;
(3) If regulator and producer have won the lawsuit, not even
the offer 1 = nR can keep the producer from compromising.
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Though the calculation of the hierarchical solution for three situ-
ations is not difficult for any given set of values of the param-
eters, the derivation of the hierarchical solution as a function
of the parameb& would require a lot of space. Therefore we con-
sider only the first and the third situations. The two classes
6f parameters given, however, do not in general exhaust the set
of all the parameter values possible.
At first we establish a pair of strategies yielding the
maximum utility to the regulator.
Definition: Let L+ > n I • The vector of real numbers+L ,nI ,nR,p,P6,P7) satisfies the comp~omise condition of
player j (C,j) if
holds.
As can be seen by the formulae above, (C,j) indicates that
a compromise is more advantageous to player j.
Theorem: Let ~£~R and ~£~p be defined by
¢(i): = L+(i = 1,2,3), ¢(5): = ¢(7): = n I ,
¢ (6) : min += (L , nR)
=fnr •nr ) if L+ > n I and (C ,R) holds~ (4) :
(L+,L+) if L+ < n I or (C, R) is violated-
~(i,l): = l(i = 1,2,3,4,6,7)
~ (4,1,11.): = (1,11.)
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Then (~,~) yields the maximal utility to the regulator:
In order to avoid a lengthy and not instructive proof we
only give the idea of the proof. First let L+ ~ n I • Because
of the definition of UR(i,mR,mp ) the inequality UR(i,mR,mp ) ~
UR(L+) holds for all possible states i and measures mR and mp •
Hence VR(OR'Op) S 1~P UR(L+) for each (oR,Op)£L R x Lp • ButVR(~,4) = 1~P UR(L+) because of ~(1) = L+ and P(1)1, (~,~) (1) = 1.
Now let L+ ~ n I " Obviously VR,j(oR'Op) S VR,j(~'~) (j = 5,6,7).
Then (OR'OP) with (oR'op) (i) = (~,'¥) (i) (i = 5,6,7) maximizes
VR,4(OR'op) if (oR'op) (4) = (~,'¥) (4) under consideration of the
compromise condition (C,R). Hence VR,4(OR'Op) ~ VR,4(~'~).
The final step of the backward iteration yields VR(oR'op) ~
VR(~'~) for each pair (oR,Op)£LR x Lp •
If ~ is an optimal response to ~ , i.e. Vp(~,4) = sup VpLp
(~,op)' it is not important to derive a hierarchical solution
since the regulator can enforce his maximum payoff.
Definition: The payoff vector (VR(oR'op)' Vp(oR'op)) is
Pareto-optimal if there is no other strategy pair (o~,op£LRXLp)
such that Vj(OR'Op) ~ Vj(o~,Op) (j = R,P) and that at least
one inequality is strict.
Theorem: Let (~,~)£LRxLp be defined as in the preceding
theorem. Then ~ is an optimal response to ~, i.e. Vp(~,'¥) >
~ Vp(~'op) (Op£L p )' and VR(~'~) > VR(OR'Op) (OR£L R, Op£L p ) if
one of the following conditions holds
( i) L+ < n I ;
(ii) L+ > n I and (C,R);
(iii) L+ > n I and not only (C,R) but also (C,P) is
violated.
In these cases (VR(~'~) ,Vp(~,~)is a Pareto-optimal payoff
vector.
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+Sketched proof: Case (i): Because of ~(1) = L ~ n r1 +P (1 11 , (~, op) (1)) = 1. Hence VP (~, op) = T=P up (op (1 , L ))
where Op(1,L+) ~ L+ is maximized by~. In order to obtain
+a greater payoff Vp(oR'op) for one stage at least L has to
be replaced by n > L+. But then the regulator's payoff is
+smaller because of uR(n) < UR(L ).
Case (ii): p(514, (~,op) (4)) = 1 because of ~(4) = (nI,nI ).
By backward iteration evaluating Vp,i(~'Op) (i = 5,4,3,2,1)
one immediately sees that ~ maximizes Vp(~'.). The proof of
the Pareto-optimality relies on the fact that only strategies
oR with 0R(i) = ~(i) (i = 1, ••• ,5) give maximal payoff to the
regulator. The verification of this fact requires a lengthy
and uninstructive discussion which we therefore omit.
Case (iii): Given ~ the assessment ~(i,l): = 1 (i = 5,6,7)
belongs to an optimal response for all values of the param-
+ + +
eters. Because of ~(4) = tL ,L ) and L > nr a strategy 0p
maximizing Vp 4(~'.) takes either the value Op(4,L+,L+) =
= (nI,nI ) or the value (L+,L+). Since (C,P) is violated the
second assessment yields a larger utility. Hence ~ maximizes
Vp,4(~'.). Then obviously ~ maximizes Vp,i(~'.) (i = 3,2,1).
The Pareto-optimality of (VR(~'~)' Vp(~,~)) can again be veri-
fied by changing some values of (~,~) (i) proving that they
reduce the regulator's payoff.
If (C,P) holds and (e,p} is violated the strategy' is generally
not an optimal response of~. The situation can arise where the
regulator by reduction of his own payoff can force the maximizing
producer to a no~compromise strategy. In order to keep the
analytical part small we only treat a special case where this
situation cannot arise.
Definition: The vector (~,nI,nR,n,p,P6,P7) satisfies the
strict compromise condition (SC) if
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holds.
(SC). can be interpreted by the way that the utmost offer and
threat of the regulator cannot match the value of a compro-
mise for the producer.
Theorem: Let (SC) hold. A hierarchical solution (TR,T p ) is
given by TR = ¢ and Tp(oR) = YELp for each 0RELR where
y(i,l): = 11 (i = 1,2,3,5,6,7)
Y( 4 ,1, !I.): = (min (I, n I ) , n I )
Sketched proof: Because of (SC) the second component of
0p(4,oR(4)) equals n I for any optimal response 0p of any 0RELR.
By backward iteration one immediately sees that y is an optimal
response of each 0RELR' i.e. Vp(oR'op) ~ Vp(oR'Y). VR,5(.'Y)
is maximized by ¢ and, more generally, VR . (.,Y) (i = 4,3,2,1),l.
as one can see by backward iteration.
Remark: In case of L+ > n I and (SC) but violated (C,R) the
regulator generally does not obtain the possible maximum pay-
off
Part of the results can be given in a more illustrative way. In
the case of n I < L ~ n R let
(j = R,P)
m. is assumed to be a constant positive factor. It specifies
J
the weight of the severe consequences of a noise reducing sen-
tence because afterwards the sentence has to be regarded for
all other noise-producing activities. A short calculation yields
that (C,j) is equivalent to
(j = R,P)
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The second theorem implies that in the case of n
r
< L+ ~_nR
and ~P7P ~ 1 - p(1 - P6) the regulator prefers the compromise:
¢(4) = (nI,n
r
). In case of n
r
< L+ ~ nR and mj P 7P ~ 1 - p (1 -P6)
(j = R,P), howeve~ the lawsuit will result in a sentence: (¢,~) (4) =
+ + + +
== (L , L; L, L ).
valent to
An elementray calculation
d of the lawsuit is d = 1
P6+P7·
shows that the expected duration
Given d, condition (C,j) is equi-
1
- > P7 >d -
1
1-p+p d
p(m.+1)
J
(j = R,P)
The following example illustrates the relevance of the results.
Let d = 4 years, p = O.~ and mR = mp = 10. Then (C,j) (j = R,P)
is approximately given by P7 > 0.03. Hence a la~suit should
only be executed if the probability for a sentence in favor of
the residents in one year is not g:rea.ter than three percent. rf
P7 = 0.03 then the probability of such a sentence being pronounced
at all is dP7 = 0.12.
4. CONCLUSrONS
A main element of the model is the consideration of the
impactees' reactions in standard setting. Under certain assumptions
the model could identify the important areas in the decision pro-
cess of the regulator and the producer. In particular the decision
about offering and accepting or rejecting a compromise turned out
to be of crucial importance. This decision could be determined
as a function of the model parameters in which the subjective
probabilities of the outcome of the court proceedings can play a
major role.
Model limitations include the "short-sightedness" of the im-
pactees' response which only covers present standards and noise
levels. Consequently the strategies of the regulator and the pro-
ducer do not include commitments for later time periods, e.g. in
the form of quality standards. The model results indicate, how-
-19-
ever, that such extensions are feasible, although at a substantial-
ly greater effort. For example, strategies could be in the form
of long-term noise reduction plans instead of short-term standards,
and impactees' responses would take into account the nature of
these plans.
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A b s t r act
In this paper, an attempt is made to review some of the prin-
ciples that underlie physiological responses following exposure
to environmental agents. The review takes the form of the com-
parison of the health effects from two often competing fuel cy-
cles, nuclear and coal. In addition, efforts will be reviewed
to assess the current literature of the health effects of energy
systems. This review will not be comprehensive, but will rather
indicate briefly those areas where there is general agreement
and those where the data are madequate.
Although each individual pollutant, whether it be chemical, bio-
logical, radioactive, gaseous or solid, has its own peculiarities
which requires individual consideration, there are underlying
principles which are useful in evaluating and understanding all
of them. It was intended, that, by focussing on these two energy
systems, theses principles, their uses and abuses could be illus-
trated.
The Biological Basis for Standard
Setting for Environmental Pollutants: A Critique
L.A. Sagan and A.A. Afifi
1. Introduction
The process of standard setting for environmental pollutants
requires that there be some trade-offs between the often conflict-
ing needs of economics, social welfare, preservation of the en-
vironment and health. Of these, possibly the most difficult to
assess is the last. To begin with, no universally acceptable
definition of health exists, nor do we know exactly how to mea-
sure health, or deviations from health. Furthermore, as tech-
niques for measurement of chemical pollutants both in the en-
vironment and in biological tissues become more refined, more
chemical species are detected in human tissues. Whether the
mere presence of potentially toxic substances is considered
hazardous is sometimes controversial, particularly when exposure
to larger quantities is known to be toxic, or when effects are
known to occur only after many years. For example, analyses of
drinking water in the United States have recently revealed the
presence of dozens of chemical species, many of which are known
to be toxic to animals or humans at higher concentration. The
responsible administrator knows that the costs of detecting the
source of these pollutants, regulating and restricting their
discharge is enormous to say nothing of the industrial costs
which may be attendant upon such restrictions. When he turns
to the toxicologist or public health specialist for advice, he
is likely to be confronted with contradictory, confusing and
often incomplete data. What is he to do?
In this paper, we attempt a review of some of the principles
that underlie physiological responses following exposure to en-
vironmental agents. The review takes the form of a comparison
of the health effects from two often competing fuel cycles,
nuclear and coal. Although each individual pollutant, whether
it be chemical, biological, radioactive, gaseous or solid, has
its own peculiarities which requires individual consideration,
there are certain underlying principles which are useful in
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evaluating and understanding all of them. It was our hope, that,
by focusing on these two energy systems, we could highlight:
and illustrate these principles, their uses and abuses.
Historically, technologies have been allowed to develop
solely on the basis of market forces. Since market forces do
not include costs for the health effects imposed on the public
by such systems (the "externalities"), they could be conveniently
ignored. Health effects to industrial employees have never been
compensated at their full market value, but would be, in the ma-
jority of industrial activities, a small cost of production.
Furthermore, even if interest in health costs had been keener,
information simply was not available with which to make accurate
assessment of these costs. Such evaluation requires a fairly
sophisticated society with an enormous information system of
vital statistics, medical skills and investigative ability. Un-
fortunately, necessary information and knowledge with which to
make these judgements is still incomplete, but has been markedly
increased only during recent decades. Furthermore, the develop-
ment and availability of the computer enormously enhanced the
ability to manage such vast quantities of data. These capabili-
ties have only recently become available.
Secondly, although we have managed to get along without
consideration of health or other environmental costs in the past,
we cannot any longer ignore the consequences of such a policy.
Trial and error alone simply will no longer do. One wonders if,
had the health costs of automobile transportation been antici-
pated, would we have developed such a technology in the way that
we have. No longer are we willing to introduce new chemical or
pharmacologic agents without some consideration of possible toxic
effects and prior testing. The requirements that environmental
impact statements be written for Federal projects in the U.S.
institutionalized the requirements for some prior thought of
potential environmental consequences and alternatives of new
systems. Although it has not been proven that such forethought
will have benefits, that is at least the reasonable hope.
Lastly, consideration of the health and environmental effects
on energy systems is urged upon us by recognition of the enormous
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increase in world energy production likely in the near future.
Assuming a world population of 12 billion and a per capita con~
sumption of 5 kW, energy requirements could increase almost
10-fold in the next 100 years. Clearly, energy options must be
developed in such a way as to optimize health and environmental
costs as well as the economic costs of such development.
In this paper, we will review efforts to assess the current
literature of the health effects of energy systems. This re-
view will not be comprehensive, but will rather indicate briefly
those areas where there is general agreement and those where the
data are inadequate, with references to the literature for those
who wish to pursue the issues. The literature is not extensive.
Charpentier [1,2], in reviewing 159 energy models, found only 13
which incorporated some estimate of environmental damages and
only two which contained a health effect evaluation.
Comprehensive study of health effects of an energy system
involves several elements. The first is an estimate of the
emissions or releases from various portions of the fuel cycle
as shown in Fig. 1. This is followed by some estimate of the
resulting dose to the population, and is in turn followed by an
estimate of the health effects which result from such exposures.
The first of these steps is methodologically the simplest. With-
in the second stage, dispersion, enormous problems are encountered.
When emissions are to air, as from a stack, the variety of meteoro-
logical conditions that may occur between release and exposure,
particularly when the exposed population is at some great dis-
tance, make modeling very difficult. Furthermore, during trans-
portation interactions among chemical species may occur that are
not well understood. Photochemical smog is an example of these.
Emissions may also occur into waterways, resulting in contamina-
tion of drinking water, or of the food fish taken from that water.
When that water is used for irrigation of agricultural land,
pollutants may find their way into the human food chains. These
food chains may be highly complex and unusual concentrations may
occur unexpectedly. The very high concentraion of fallout radio-
cesium on arctic lichens and the further concentration of cesium
within the tissues of reindeer for whom the lichens are a dietary
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mainstay led to relatively high body burden among Laplanders
for whom, in turn, the reindeer is an important nutritional
source.
Estimating damage functions is possibly the most difficult
of the functions shown in Fig. 1. Because an understanding
of the relationship and uncertainties in environmental health
depends so strongly on damage functions, the next section deals
in some length with the subject of establishing dose response
relationships in human populations.
The last factor shown in Fig. 1 is trauma or accidents
in which injuries occur due to falls, burns, explosions etc.
Note that in both the case of trauma and chemical emissions,
persons occupationally involved are likely to have the greatest
exposure to risk.
RELEASE
FUEL FACTORS EMISSIONS TO DISPERSION DOSE TO
• .. PEOPLECYCLE: ENVIRONMENT AIR, WATER, FOOD
EXTRACTION
REFINING DAMAGE
TRANSPORT FUNCTIONS
CONVERSION
WASTE DISPOSAL
DISTRIBUTION
END USE
HEALTH
TRAUMA ~ EFFECTS
PHYSICAL, BAROMETRIC, THERMAL
Fig. 1: Elements of Health Effects Estimation
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2. Establishing Causal Relationships
Evidence of causality in disease induction derives from a
number of sources including animal experimentation and human ex-
periences, both of which are essential. Human observations in-
clude accidental exposures, therapeutic exposures, industrial
or occupational experiences, and epidemiological studies. The
reader should be aware of certain principles which constrain
epidemiologic investigation.
2.1 Long latent period
The phrase "latent period" refers to the interval between
exposure and appearance of disease. The fact that this interval
may be decades enormously complicates the life of the epidemiolo-
gist. Examples of such latency are the cancers appearing in
uranium miners 20 years following initial exposure, or lung can-
cers now appearing in asbestos workers whose industrial exposures
occurred during World War II. Still another example which might
not have been uncovered but for the unusual character of the re-
sponse is the recent discovery of rare vaginal cancers among
young women whose exposures to diethylstilbestrol occurred during
intrauterine life some 20 years earlier, a drug with which their
mothers had been treated during pregnancy.
Rarely are records or memories adequate to document such
remote exposures. Furthermore, because of the great mobility
of people, it cannot be assumed that persons residing in a
certain community under study had lived there throughout the
period of interest. Nor, with rapidly changing industrial prac-
tices, can it be assumed that current conditions of exposure had
existed during earlier decades. One may then be currently ob-
serving effects which are totally unrelated to present environ-
mental conditions but rather to -conditions of a distant past
for which no records exist. Shocking as it may seem, interest
in the environment is very recent and observations of environ-
mental indices frequently do not exist beyond a very few years.
2.2 Non-specificity response
Those diseases which occur in response to environmental ex-
posures, unlike many infectious diseases, are in no way character-
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istic, i.e. they ,are clinically indistinguishable from those which
occur spontaneously. The leukemia which occurs in atom bomb sur-
vivors, for example, is in no known way different from leukemia
which occurs in non-radiation exposed persons. To detect such
effects, then, requires comparison of the frequency of disease in
exposed populations with the frequency of disease in non-exposed
populations. The difficulty here is that, for unknown reasons,
-the frequency of disease varies remarkably from one community to
another, even when the populations appear to be quite similar in
all known respects and where proper adjustments for age, sex, and
race have been made. The problem posed for the epidemiologist
then is to find comparable populations which differ only in re-
spect to their exposure. In fact, he cannot often be certain that
differences in disease are the result of exposure to a suspect
agent or to some unsuspected factor.
It is of considerable benefit in this respect if the disease
entity is rare or unusual. For exa~ple, the angiosarcoma of
the liver now known to occur among persons working with vinyl
chloride first came under suspicion when only three cases were
found in a small industrial plant. The physician was aware
that the probability of a cluster of three cases in such a
small population on the basis of chance alone was extremely
small. One of the consequences of this situation, of greater
interest to lawyers than to epidemiologists, is that one can
never be certain in the individual case whether the outcome
is the result of a known exposure or might have occurred any-
way. All that the epidemiologist can offer is some estimate
of the probability that such an exposure was responsible. Le-
gal requirements of proof have been considerably broadened in
such cases.
2.3 Knowledge of dose
In order to ~ake some estimate of the effect of exposure to
an environmental agent, it is not only necessary to know whether
such exposure has taken place, but also necessary is some estimate
of the amount of exposure. In the matter of environmental pol-
lutants, it is rare that one is comparing an exposed population
with a non-exposed population, but rather it is a matter of com-
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paring a more heavily exposed population with a less exposed popu-
lation, and so the need to estimate dose. A number of obstacles
stand in the way of dose-estimation. Some of them are as follows.
Our measures of ambient concentration may not reflect ex-
posure to the individual. A useful example is community air
pollution measurements which are typically measured at one or
two monitoring stations. Such crude measurements may be totally
inaccurate measures of dose for those who are indoors, or for
those in distant suburban surroundings or for the traffic po-
liceman standing on a heavily polluted intersection.
Furthermore, we cannot be certain whether it is the peak
concentration reached that is important, the average daily dose,
average yearly dose or the geometric mean dose. (This leads to
the question of dose-rate which will be addressed below in a
consideration of radiation effects.) Even this ignores the
problem of the faulty measurement of the agent at interest.
There is some evidence that the technology for ambient sulfate
measurements was badly in error until recently, throwing older
measurements into some disrepute. Recalling the above paragraphs
on latent periods, it is the measurement of dose 20 years age
rather than current measurements that are needed to explain to-
day's morbidity when considering chronic disease induction.
2.4 Synergistic effects
Scientists generally prefer to examine effects of single
agents on health parameters. To do so is difficult enough with-
out attempting to unravel the enormously more complicated prob-
lems of experimental design when two interacting agents are under
study, yet there is fairly good evidence that such synergistic
or additive effects do occur (a synergistic effect is one in
which the total effect is greater than would be expected on the
basis of a summation of two independent effects). In the absence
of good evidence of health effects of either S02 or particulates,
considerable suspicion has fallen upon some interactions between
these two elements of air pollution. Better examples of synergy
are the established links between cigarette smoking and both
uranium mining and asbestosis. The data appears to show a greater
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than additive effect in the induction of lung cancer among ciga-
rette smokers who are engaged in either of those occupations.
These examples of synergy provide warning signals for un-
expected effects that might not be suspected on the basis of
studies of individual agent alone, but there is still another
phenomenon that further compounds the complexity of the problem
and that is the possibility of interference or protective effect
of one agent against another. The use of a large number of
therapeutic agents are based on this principle. Although no
example of interference among agents commonly thought of as
pollutants is known, there has been little search for such effects
which in all likelihood do exist.
3. Genetic Effects
The foregoing discussion has been fairly extensive reflect-
ing both the authors' interest as well as the breadth of our
current state of knowledge. The following discussioil of genetic
effects will be short for the same reason, but the subject cannot
be ignored altogether.
Many agents are known to be mutagenic in animal or other
test systems, yet none of these has been shown conclusively to
have produced genetic effects in humans. The latter is not taken
to mean that humans are peculiarly resistant to mutagenic agents,
but rather that the demonstration of mutagenesis is peculiarly
difficult. Unlike somatic effects, i.e. those wich occur in
the animals who are themselves exposed, the manner in which
genetic effects might manifest themselves are unknown. Further-
more, since the majority of mutations are of a recessive cha-
racter and must occur in both mates to appear in one half of
the offspring, the probabilities of demonstrating such effects
are vanishingly small. There are occasional reports of cyto-
genetic changes in circulating lymphocytes of persons exposed
to suspect mutagens, but whether or not these are viable and
transmissible to offspring is not known. Something more will
be said about radiation nutagenesis below.
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4. In the Matter of Proof
Under these conditions of uncertainty, what guidelines are
available to support a contention of a causal relationship be-
tween exposure to an environmental agent and some specific hu-
man health effects? There are three: First, that observations
be replicated under a large number of conditions, thereby mini-
mizing the likelihood that anyone observation be the result of
unsuspected variables. For example, the appearance of leukemia
in human populations exposed to radiation in both Hiroshima and
Nagasaki as well as in therapeutically radiated populations
provides indisputable evidence of such an effect. Secondly, a
graded dose-response relationship adds impcrtant weight to such
an observation and such is the case for radiation induced leu-
kemia. Whether or not such a relationship is linear or not is
another question that needs not to be discussed here, but is not
crucial to the usefulness of some form of gradation. Thirdly,
supporting animal data adds strong weight to the claim of cau-
sality. Here, some judgement is necessary in extrapolating
from the animal data to humans. For example, some mouse strains
exposed to radiation develop ovarian cancers. Humans exposed
to radiation have not been known to develop ovarian cancers;
nevertheless, evidence that radiation is carcinogenic in ani-
mals strongly supports the evidence that radiation is carcino-
genic in humans, even though not in precisely the same way.
5. Damage Functions
Building on the previous general introduction, we will now
turn to consider two specific damage functions: those from
radiation exposure, and subsequently, from the emissions from
the combustion of coal.
In spite of some uncertainties, evaluation of the health
effects of the nuclear power industry is a fairly straightfor-
ward operation. Simplicity arises from the fact that there
is only a single toxic effluent which requires consideration,
i.e. radiation, and secondly because the toxicity of radiation
exposure is, although by no means complete, probably better
-10-
understood than that of any other environmental agent. In turn,
reasons for this understanding are multiple, not the least of
which is the very large amounts of money that became available
for supporting radiation effects research at the end of World
War II. Also, radiation is, for the experimentalist, a very
easy tool with which to work. Dose can be easily and precisely
administered and measured, facilitating animal work. Human
studies involving survivors of the atomic bombings and radiation
accidents, occupational exposures, and also the thousands of
persons treated with radiotherapy permitted thorough analysis of
human radiation toxicity. Furthermore, there has been an enor-
mous effort by several organizations, both national and inter-
national, to carefully analyse and assess the significance of
this data. Their efforts, in which they reach a surprising de-
gree of consensus, simplifies the task greatly. That is not to
say that there are no problems. The most frustrating of these
problems is the question of the dose-response relationship. For
those not familiar with the concept, the latter can be re-
phrased in the following questions: How much radiation does it
take to produce an effect? Does raising or lowering the dose at
all levels have a proportional effect, i.e. a linear relation-
ship, or are there deviations from this? What happens if the
dose is protracted over a longer time or is fractionated?
For radiation, much of this information is available at
high doses. By "high" is meant from a few hundred to a few
thousand times "background" or natural radiation levels. At
those doses, the data is consistent with a number of dose-res-
ponse models, including a proportional model in which the line
passes through the origin. The implication of this interpre-
tation would be that any radiation exposure, no matter how
slight, would have some small but significant effect. In fact,
that is the interpretation that is most widely accepted, not be-
cause it better explains or "fits" the data, but because it is
considered by most (but not all) to be the most prudent assump-
tion, prudent in the sense that it does not ignore the possibility
that low doses may produce some effect.
-11-
A second assumption underlying the usual assessment of risk
from radiation exposure is that dose rate has no effect. This
is almost certainly an incorrect assumption. The judgement
that it is in error arises from widespread animal studies which
strongly support the likelihood that dose rate does have an
effect [3-5]. Furthermore, evidence that human response to en-
vironmental, chemical or nutritional agents is generally influ-
enced by dose rate reinforces the suspicion of this assumption.
Consider the nature of a sudden exposure to intense sunlight or
alcohol or aspirin. In any of these examples, intemperate ex-
posure can be harmful or lethal whereas the same dose spaced
over a longer period of time can be harmless or beneficial.
Why then, is such an assumption made? Again, it is a
matter of prudence: Since there are no observations on cancer
frequency among human popUlations exposed to high doses at low
dose rates (no such populations exist), the high dose rate data,
i.e. radiotherapy, atomic bomb survivors is used even though the
populations to whom these risk estimates will be applied will
be exposed at very low dose rates, thus leading to what is likely
to be a gross exaggeration of risk.
Keeping in mind the above assumptions, just what are the
risk estimates? Several organizations have assessed the avail-
able data and arrived at such estimates: They are, the United
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tion, UNSCEAR, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and the
International Committee on Radiation Protection, ICRP. The
estimates of the National Academy of Sciences (BEIR Report) are
as follows [5]:
(i) It is estimated that exposure of the parents to 170 mrems
per year (or 5 rems over the 30 years of the usual re-
production period) would cause in the first generation
between about 150 and 3,600 serious genetic disabilities
per year in the U.S. population, based on 3.6 million
births per year.
-12-
(ii) It is estimated that the same exposure of the U.S. popu-
lation as above could cause from roughly 3,000 to roughly
15,000 deaths from cancer annually, with 6,000 being the
most likely number. (Could is used in the preceding
sentence because many scientists feel that as a result
of the efficiency of the body's repair mechanisms at the
very low dose rates involved, the true effects might
approach zero production of cancer.)
. The above numerical values are in essential agreement with
those reported by the ICRP (3] and the UNSCEAR Committee [4].
The latter report stresses that the risk estimates are valid
only for the doses at which they have been estimated (high le-
vels), whereas the BEIR report suggests that the values are use-
ful as upper-limit estimates in assessment of effects at low
levels. A recent NCRP report [6] discusses this matter criti-
cally and concludes that the BEIR values have such a high prob-
ability of overestimating the actual risk that they are of only
marginal value, if any, for purposes of realistic risk-benefit
evaluation. At this time, we judge the consensus to be that
the BEIR values are most likely overestimated by a considerable
margin, but if used with that understanding, then there are im-
portant comparisons that can be made.
One shortcoming of these estimates is that they leave un-
answered the question of the latent period between exposure
. and development of cancer, or to put that same issue differently,
the amount of life shortening that will result. There is some
evidence that latency may differ for cancer of different organ
systems and may also differ for different conditions of ex-
posure. For example, the latency prior to the development of
leukemia was shorter for those persons treated radiotherapeuti-
cally to the spine for arthritis than for atomic bomb survivors.
-13-
6. Assessment of Risk from Nuclear Power
Health risks to both the general public and occupational
personnel from the nuclear fuel cycle are considerably better
estimated than those from fossil fuel combustion. This is be-
cause (a) there is a single causative agent released from the
nuclear plant--ionizing radiation--whereas there are literally
hundreds of individual species released from fossil fuel com-
bustion; (b) since the first nuclear weapons tests in the 1940s,
about a billion dollars have been spent on research on the ef-
fects of ionizing radiation; (c) radiation exposures are easily
and precisely measured; and (d) there is a great body of know-
ledge from natural background exposure and from accidental,
industrial, and military exposures of populations.
Table 1 shows the UNSCEAR estimates of man rem exposures to
the public, both locally and worldwide per MW(e) per year.
Typically, a roughly equivalent total exposures will occur to
occupational personnel, but are not similarly distributed in
the same portions of the fuel cycle. A large source of occupa-
tional exposure occurs to the underground uranium miner whose
lungs are exposed to the radioactive gas, radon, and to the
alpha particles of the radon "daughter products" which may ab-
sorb to ambient chest particles and deposit in the bronchi of
the miners lung. Lung cancer has been demonstrated in this
group, particularly in those who are also cigarette smokers.
Utilizing a "value of life" approach and the radiation
risk estimate descrtbed above, a dollar cost per man rem can
be calculated. For example, assigning a 300,000 dollar value
to life and using the risk value of 100 cases per million man
rem, simple arithmetic produces a 30 dollar per man rem value.
In addition to risks from radiation exposures discussed
above, some specific issues and concerns have been raised which
will be touched on briefly here.
6.1 Accidents
The basic document in regard to reactor accidents is the
"Rasmussen Report" [8]. It attempts to predict the probabilities
and consequences of a total spectrum of conceivable reactor acci-
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dents. Critical reviews of this report have been made by the
American physical Society [9] and the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists [10]. The essence of these analyses is that the Rasmussen
estimates would have to be low by 3-5 orders of magnitude in or-
der for the risks from catastrophic accidents to be comparable
to those from normal operations of the coal, oil or nuclear fuel
cycles. It is a matter of conjecture whether the public would
accept the probability, although very small, of a single nuclear
event causing an immediate loss of hundreds of lives as prefer-
able to or in place of the loss of a large number of lives from
fossil combustion occurring in driblets and therefore unnoticed.
6.2 Plutonium
Of all the radionuclides involved in the nuclear fuel cycle,
plutonium has aroused the greatest public concern in regard to
potential hazard. A great deal of experimental work has been
done over the years on the biological effects of plutonium [11,
12]; but of course as with other toxic substances it is not pos-
sible to predict precisely the effects of low levels in the range
of exposure that would produce undetectable effects.
Following is a discussion of those factors that tend to
cause plutonium-239 to be hazardous, and then of those that tend
to reduce its hazard. Plutonium, as any alpha-emitting radio-
nuclide, is very biologically effective in producing cancer when
it is located within the body in direct contact with living
tissues. When it is inhaled it comes into direct contact with
living tissue, and when it enters the blood it is deposited in
such tissues as bone, liver, and lymph node; once deposited it
remains for a long time during which it irradiates the tissue.
Because of its long physical half-life (24,300 years) it must
be regarded essentially as a permanent contaminant just as are
many other stable idustrial chemicals that pollute the biosphere.
Because alpha radiation will not even penetrate the dead
layer of skin, plutonium is not a hazard when it exists outside
of the body. Contrary to popular conception, plutonium when
swallowed remains essentially outside the body because it is
extremely poorly absorbed, does not enter the bloodstream in
-16-
significant proportions, and being mixed with intestinal con-
tents does not irradiate the surface of the intestines as it
passes through the gastrointestinal tract. Plutonium does not
become concentrated in the food chain. These characteristics
result in large part from the low solubility of plutonium in
water and biological fluids and its tendency to remain fixed
in soil.
It appears that inhalation of plutonium is the most hazard-
ous route of exposure. Because plutonium deposited in the lung
may be presented as small particles, .a question has been raised
as to whether a given amount of such radioactivity deposited in
the lung would be more hazardous if present as small particles
rather then being uniformly deposited. This is presently a
matter of controversy. One group of workers [13] claims on the
basis of theoretical considerations that small particles would
be more hazardous (hot particle theory) and therefore that exist-
ing standards, which are based on uniform distribution, should
be made more stringent. Other workers and several official
groups claim that experimental data support existing concept~
and that there is no reason for any drastic change of standards
[14-17] •
The p~oblem of malevolent use of plutonium cannot be logi-
cally assessed; this matter has been discussed by Cohen [18].
It appears that except for an unreasoning widespread public fear,
terroristic purposes could be much more readily achieved by
using other more easily available chemical or biological agents.
In general it can be stated that plutonium when inhaled is
a toxic carcinogen and great care should be taken to prevent its
access to the biosphere. Essentially none would be released from
normal operation of the nuclear fuel cycle. Estimates of risks
from it as a component of nuclear fuel cycles and the experience
of the past 30 years indicate that they are lower than from other
parts of the cycle and from other fuel systems.
-17-
7. Fossil Fuels
The data presented on the health effects associated with
fossil fuels suffer from certain limitations and uncertainties.
First, genetic effects are not included because our present
state Of knowledge does not allow even an approximate estimate
for such effects. Second, the data do not adequately dis-
criminate between premature deaths that may occur early in life,
such as from accidents, and those that may shorten life only
slightly, as seen, for example, in increased mortality among
persons hospitalized for chronic disease, who already have high
mortality rates. Perhaps of greatest importance is the uncer-
tainty about the validity of the upper estimates for the effects
on the general public from burning coal and oil. Not only is
there the problem of the magnitude of the effect, but lack of
knowledge about the causative agents makes it difficult to
ir.stitute effective control procedures.
The primary data come from epidemiological studies. Major
episodes (Meuse, Donora, London, New York City, etc.) clearly
showed that air pollution, sufficiently severe, could cause
illness and premature death. During the 1950s and 1960s the
major issue was whether air pollution in concentrations usually
existing over industrial cities would cause adverse health ef-
fects. The emphasis shifted next to quantifying pollution rela-
tive to effects produced and more recently to the effects of low
levels of pollution and the effects of interactions.
From a methodological standpoint epidemiological, animal,
and experimental human studies are needed. Epidemiological
studies are important in uncovering possible associations that
can then be tested under controlled conditions; they are also
needed for evaluation of human risks suggested by laboratory
experiments. Animal studies are used to determine efficiently
the sites of effects, mechanisms, and dose--response relation-
ships, and they are more easily adapted for chronic studies
than are human investigations. Because of species differences,
controlled studies on humans are needed to establish responses
and to determine the influence of disease or of various physiolo-
gical states on the effects of pollution.
-18-
Since all of the human data from which damage functions
have been drawn rest on the use of regression analysis, we offer
in the Annex some brief comments on that technique so that the
reader may be aware of the use and limitations of the method.
8. Air Pollution Damage Functions
In calculating the health effects of energy, it is sometimes
possible to rely on actual experience. For example, reliable
records of accidents incurred in coal mining exist [21]. These
can be used to calculate the expected fatality or injury rate per
unit of coal extracted. Other effects, such as radiation hazards,
have been statistically estimated from a wealth of data as dis-
cussed above. The effects of chemical air pollution, however,
have been more elusive. The derivation of quantitative damage
functions has been attempted only in the past decade and re-
searchers relied almost exclusively on regression analysis.
Furthermore, since reliable morbidity data are difficult to ob-
tain, most studies have restricted themselves to mortality rates.
The major studies in this area are summarized here.
Lave and Seskin [22] considered 117 standard metropolitan
statistical areas (SMSAs) of the u.S. As dependent variables,
they used total, infant, and certain disease-specific mortality
rates. The independent variables included the percent non-white
population, the population density, the percent of population
over 64 years old, and the percent poor population, i.e.
families with annual income under $ 3000. The air pollution da-
ta consisted of 26 biweekly concentration measurements of sus-
pended particulates and total sulfates. From these, they used
as independent variables the minimum, maximum and mean of each
group of 26 values. The data were collected for the years 1960
and 1961 and multiple linear regression were performed for each
year. The following is an example of their 1960 regression re-
sults:
-19-
Total mortality rate (per 10,000 people) = 19.607
+ (0.041) mean suspended particulates (ng/m3 )
+ (0.71) minimum sulfate (ng/m3)
+ (0.001) number of persons per square mile
+ (0.0041) percent non-white
+ (0.0687) percent over 65 years.
In this equation, only the variables whose regression coeffi-
cients were statistically significant at the 0.05 level were in-
cluded. To understand the relative practical significance of
each variable, the authors calculated the elasticity. That is,
based on the regression coefficients, they calculated the percent
increase in the mean value of mortality rate if the mean of each
of the independent variables was increased by 10%. These cal·
culations are presented in Table 2. Thus, understandably,
mortality rates are most sensitive to the older segment of
the population. Lave and Seskin conclude from these elastici-
ties that mortality would decrease by 4.5% if the level of pol-
lution was decreased by 50%.
Table 2: Elasticities of Air Pollution and Socio-
economic Variables*
Variable
Mean P
Min S
P/M2
% N-W
% 65
*From [22].
Increase in Mortality
Due to 10% Increase
0.53%
0.37%
0.07%
0.57%
6.32%
In another paper, Lave and Seskin [23] considered the
effects of some meteorological and home heating variables. The
pollution variables remained statistically significant and the
-20-
magnitude of the regression coefficients did not change appre-
ciably. The authors also conclude that transformations of the
variables did not improve the goodness of fit [24].
Winkelstein et al. [25] studied mortality rates from all
causes among white males 50-69 years of age in Erie County, New
York. His statistical unit was the census tract (125 in all).
He tabulated these death rates for subgroups of this population,
based on the socio-economic levels and mean air pollution measure-
ments. The strong associations suggested by these data prompted
Hamilton and Morris [26] to compute the following regression
equation:
Mortality rate of men 50-69 years per 1000
= 33.97
+ (0.15) mean total suspended particulates (ng/m3 )
- (0.0034) mean family income ($).
Hickey et al. [27] considered 15 measurements of atmos-
pheric chemicals and mortality rates due to cancer and heart
disease. This restricted their sample size to 38 SMSAs. The
data were averages for the period 1957-1964. with no adjustments
for age and socio-economic status, they obtained regression
equations of these disease-specific mortality rates on the loga-
rithms of the pollutant concentrations. The concentrations
of S02 and N02 appeared consistently as significant predictors
in these equations.
Carnow and Meier [28] used benzo[a]pyrene as an index
of air pollution. Their dependent variables were age-specific
death rates due to pulmonary cancer. They compared urban with
rural, migrant with nonmigrant and smoking with nonsmoking popu-
lations. The independent variables were average cigarette smo-
king levels and benzo[a]pyrene concentrations in the 48 con-
tiguous states of the U.S. For 19 highly developed countries they
calculated regression equations with tobacco sales and consump-
tion of solid fuels as independent variables. They summarized
their study with the statement: "A reduction of 60% in urban
-21-
air pollution might be expected to reduce the deaths from pul-
monary cancer by 20% in all smoking categories."
Schwing and McDonald [29] noted that these and other regres-
sion studies suffered from two limitations:
(1) They included a limited number of pollution measure-
ments; and
(2) They used ordinary least squares to estimate the re-
gression coefficients.
In attempting to overcome these limitations, they included "a
rather broad (but still incomplete) list of explanatory vari-
ables". These consisted of seven chemical pollution measure-
ments, two radiation values, tobacco sales, four weather vari-
ables and nine variables describing population and socio-economic
distributions. The dependent variables were mortality rates
among white males for the 15 leading causes of death, age-stra-
tified total deaths and age-stratified deaths due to lung can-
cer and heart disease. The sample consisted of 46 SMSAs. In
all, they computed 40 regression equations, one for each of the
disease and age categories. The authors also calculated elasti-
cities for the pollution, radiation and smoking variables. Al-
though the results were not always consistent, concentration of
sulfur compounds and cigarette smoking were generally strongly
associated with mortality. Associations with nitrogen compounds,
the hydrogen index used, and ionizing radiation were less conclu-
sive.
Later in this paper, we prese~t a summary of calculations
of health effects of energy based on these and other damage
functions. To illustrate the difference between these func-
tions, we, present calculations made by Hamilton and Morris [26]
based on the above mentioned equations derived by Winkelstein
(W) [25], Schwing and McDonald (S-MC) [29] and Laven and Seskin
(L-S) [22]. They considered a 1000 MW(e) coal-fired power plant
with a 1000 foot stack, using 3% sulfur coal, 12% ash and 99%
particulate removal. In an 80 km radius area with "typical"
population distribution (164,000 people), they calculated the
-22-
expected ambient concentrations of S02 and sulfur particulates.
Applying the above equation, Table 3 of expected "excess deaths"
was generated.
Table 3: Comparison of "Excess Mortality"
Based on Various Damage Functions*
Damage Function
Men 50-69 (W)
Men 50-69 (S-MC)
Total male (S-MC)
Total population (L-S)
*From [26].
Excess Mortality
29.0
0.1
90.0
19.0
It is interesting to note that these estimates are within
two orders of magnitude of each other. This is typical of the
calculations made by different researcher in this area and reflect
the state of our knowledge at the present time.
In 1970, air quality standards for selected pollutants were
mandated by the united States Clear Air Amendments. Emphasis
was placed on sulfur dioxide because of the evidence that ambient
levels were associated with health effects of air pollution di-
sasters. Subsequent studies indicated that sulfur dioxide by
itself could not be the primary causative agent and it was pos-
tulated that a combination of sulfur dioxide and particulates was
responsible [30-32]. More recent evidence suggests that oxi-
dation products of sulfur dioxide (i.e. sulfuric acid and parti-
culate sulfates)--possibly acting synergistically with sulfur
dioxide and other pollutants such as nitrates, particles, and
ozone--are primarily the causative agents [33-35]. It must be
emphasized that although suspended sulfates are now being used
as an indicator of health effects and there appear to be corre-
lations between them and such effects, there is no firm evidence
as to which substance or substances in polluted air are the
-23-
causative agents. Without such knowledge, air pollution con-
trol strategy based on reduction of sulfur alone does not have
a valid scientific basis.
The major categories of health effects associated with air
pollution are (a) chronic respiratory disease; (b) symptoms of
aggravated heart-lung disease; (c) asthma attacks; (d) children's
respiratory disease; and (e) premature death. It would be most
useful to understand the quantitative relationships between ex-
posures to specific agents and these health effects in order
to know how much investment is justified for control measures,
to know which chemical effluents to control, and to make com-
parisons with biological costs of nuclear power.
In a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences-
National Academy of Engineering-National Research Council [36],
illustrative calculations were made of the health effects
associated with sulfur oxide emissions for representative power
plants in the Northeast. The results are presented in Table 4.
They were derived from models that related ambient levels to
emissions including factors for conversion of S02 to sulfates;
health effects from ambient levels were calculated by using
dose-response curves from epidemiological data from studies
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It must be empha-
sized that the numerical estimates of Table L~ are controversial,
relying on limited information and numerous arbitrary assump-
tions, and cannot be regarded as proven results. A critique
in the same document from which Table 4 was derived [36, Chap-
ter 4] suggests that the estimates could be low by a factor of
two or high by a factor of ten. What can be concluded from
Table 4 with reasonable assurance is that the effects listed
are produced at detectable levels by factors associated with
air pollution, with power plants most likely making a signifi-
cant contribution. It should also be noted that a cost-benefit
assessment of the data in Table 4 indicates that the economic
impact of the nonlethal effects is much greater than of the
premature deaths.
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Table 4: Health Effects Associated with Sulfur Oxide
Emissions*
Case of chronic respiratory
disease
Person-days of aggravated heart-
lung disease symptoms
Asthma attacks
Cases of children's respiratory
disease
Premature deaths
Remote
Location
25,600
265,000
53,000
6,200
14
_Urban
Location
75,000
755,000
156,000
18,400
42
*Source: [36, Chapter 13]. Illustrative calculations
based on distributive models, postulated conversions
of S02 to S04, and EPA epidemiological data for re-
presentative power plants in the Northeast emitting
96.5 • 10 6 pounds of sulfur per year--equivalent to a
620 MW(e) plant.
9. Health Effects from Electricity Generation
Several reports have been published that contain estimates
of the health effects associated with electricity production [7,
21,37-42]. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the available estimates
for each phase of the fuel cycle for each of the four fuels:
coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear. By and large, the esti-
mates relate to contemporary technology and existing circum-
stances. In each case the data have been adjusted to represent
the number of premature deaths or occupational impairments pro-
duced per year by processes associated with a 1000 MW(e) power
plant, which is roughly that required for a population of
1,000,000 people. The values given represent the lowest and
highest from the cited references. The references should be
consulted for an understanding of the methodology and detailed
assumptions; limitations have been discussed in the previous
section.
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Consider first from Table 5 the effects on workers. For
coal-fired plants the values range from 0.5 premature deaths
per year and for the other fuel sources they range somewhat low-
er, from 0.06 to 1.3. Most of these effects are due to accidents
in coal mines, to conditions that cause black lung disease, or
to activities in oil refineries, uranium mining, and nuclear
fuel reprocessing.
Consider now from Table 5 the effects on the general popu-
lation. It has been estimated that the transport of coal re-
quired for a year's operation of a 1000 MW(el plant i.s responsible
for 0.6 to 1.3 premature deaths by accidents at railroad crossings;
no estimates are available for truck or barge transport. The
comparative values for the other fuel systems are insignificant.
The data so far discussed have a reasonable statistical base
of past operation and are to that extent reliable. The number of
premature deaths among the public from power plant operation
(conversion or generation of electricity) results primarily from
dissemination of air pollutants and, as discussed earlier, these
effects are a matter of great uncertainty. The upper-limit
estimates for coal and oil are about 100 premature deaths per
year compared with 1 or less for natural gas and nuclear.
Table 6 presents data on the number of nonfatal occupational
injuries per year associated with the operation of a 1000 MW(e)
power plant. These have been defined as injuries serious enough
to cause loss of working time for several days or more. These
effects are roughly the same for coal and oil, ranging from
about 12 to 100 cases per year, and somewhat lower for natural
gas and nuclear. Most of these effects are associated with
mining, well digging, coal transport, oil refining, and nuclear
reprocessing.
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10. Areas in Need of Further Research
Several issues and controversies regarding health effects
of energy need to be settled. On the biological side, the me-
chanisms involved in the effects of radiation are poorly under-
stood and those of chemical pollution even more so. This is re-
flected in the controversy of threshold versus linear extrapo-
lation theories alluded to earlier. Further light may be shed
on the problem if scenarios are constructed where each theory
is adopted in turn. On the one hand (threshold), some dele-
terious effects on health may be neglected while on the other
(linear) the use of energy may be needlessly restricted. Balanc-
ing these two types of "errors" at our present incomplete state
of knowledge is a pragmatic issue which needs to be resolved.
Another pragmatic issue is to find a common index for
various health effects which may be quantitatively and qualita-
tively different. On the one hand, chemical versus radiation
effects and on the other normal operations versus accidental
effects. This involves comparison of short-term somatic effects
with long-term genetic effects. It also involves effects on
which varying magnitudes of data are available and some on which
no data are available (and hopefully never will be).
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Annex
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis is a statistical technique used to
study the relationship between a criterion (or dependent) vari-
able and a set of explanatory (or independent) variables. For
example, the dependent variable may be mortality rate and the
independent variables may be various measurements relating to
air pollution, health conditions and socio-economic status of
a given population.
Denoting the dependent variable by Y and the independent
variables by x 1 , ••• ,Xp ' we can postulate the functional re-
lationship:
The major statistical problem is how to best estimate the
parameters of this function. To this end, a number of measure-
ments from different regions (cross-sectional) or at different
time points (longitudinal) must be obtained. Then the para-
meters can be estimated from the data using, e.g. the least
squares or maximum likelihood methods.
Some assumptions are usually made:
(i) independence, i.e. a data point does not affect,
and is not affected by any other data point;
(ii) homoscedasticity, i.e. the variance of the distri-
bution of Y at a given combination of values of
x 1 , ••• ,Xp is the same as that at any other combination.
Another assumption is often made in order to be able to test
hypotheses about the parameters of the regression function f;
namely:
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(iii) normality, i.e. the distribution of Y at any com-
bination of values of X1 ,o •• ,Xp is normal (or
Gaussian).
To proceed with the analysis, the form of the function f
must be specified. The one used in most applications is the
linear function, i.e.
where a,8 1 , ••• ,8p are unknown 'parameters to be estimated from
the data. The main advantage of this function is its simpli-
city; Y changes by an amount 81 if the value of X1 is increased
one unit (provided x2 , ••• ,Xp are not changed). The estimates
of the parameters are easily obtained by the method of least
squares. Indeed, several efficient packaged computer programs
exist for this purpose [19]. Furthermore, the least squares
estimates are optimal under assumptions (i) and (ii) [20].
The disadvantage of the linear model is that it may not
provide an adequate description of the underlying functional re-
lationship. If a nonlinear regression function is assumed, how-
ever, complex iterative procedures must be used to estimate the
parameters. When the number of independent variables is large,
the calculations become difficult, even with the aid of a large
computer. This leads many researchers to using linear functions
as approximations. The degree of approximation can be improved
by limiting the range of variables, limiting the diversity (or
span) of the population, or making transformations of the vari-
ables.
Although the regression curve may be non-linear over a wide
range of the variables, it is frequently possible to consider
only limited ranges over which the curve can be approximated
reasonably well by a straight line. Similarly, if the popula-
tion (or time span) under study is restricted, a linear regres-
sion may prove an adequate model. Finally, transformation of
some or all the variables can produce (at least approximately)
linearity. For example, s~ppose that the regression of Y on one
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independent variable X is
a+13xY = e
Then,
log Y = a + 8x ,
which is a linear regression equation of log Y on X. Quadratic
or higher order powers of the independent variables can also
provide an approximation of the non-linear regression curve
while keeping the model linear in the parameters.
At this point some words of caution about interpreting the
results of regression analysis may be useful. In using data
not collected from a planned experiment, it is rarely possible
to control for, or include measurements on all of the factors
involved. Therefore, based on the regression results alone, it
is not possible to infer causal relationship. The variables
measured often act as surrogates of the underlying, unmeasured,
causal factors. Furthermore, intercorrelations, i.e. collineari-
ties among the independent variables often make it difficult to
quantify the effect of an individual independent variable on the
dependent variable. Thus, although regression analysis is a
powerful predictive tool, it must be used only with caution as
a normative explanatory technique.
